Haslage's Appeal

• Citation: 37 Pa. 440
• Parties: Haslage's Appeal.
• Decision Date: 07 January 1861
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

37 Pa. 440

Haslage's Appeal.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

January 7, 1861.

THIS was an appeal, by William Haslage, from the decree of the Orphans' Court of Allegheny county, setting aside the confirmation of a sale of the real estate of H. H. Ryan, deceased.

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David Reed, for appellant, cited and relied on Morrison v. Witey, 7 W. & S. 437; Salter's Appeal, 4 Casey 170; Hawk v. Stouch, 5 S. & R. 161; Fox v. Mench, 4 W. & S. 447; Miles v. Diren, 6 Watts 148; Yeager's Appeal, 10 Casey 173; Russell's Appeal, 10 Casey 258; Vastine v. Fury, 2 S. & R. 434; Shields v. Miltenberger, 2 Harris 79; Young's Appeal, 2 Penna. R. 380; Carson's Sale, 6 Watts 144; Evans v. Miller, Tr. & H. Pr. 805; Whiteau v. Pratt, Id. 805-6; Campbell v. Ruddach, Id. 806; Story's Eq. §§ 244-250; Wharton's Digest, title "Execution," p. 782, No. 529; Dimmock's Estate, 5 Penna. Law J. 262; Same Case, Hood on Executors 281.

He also cited the Act of 1832, relative to appeals to the Supreme Court, and the Act of June 16th 1836; Witter v. Hoag, 7 Paige 18; Hess's Appeal, 1 Watts 257; 7 Harris 440; Eckfeld's Appeal, 1 Harris 172; 3 Binn. 273.

A. S. Bell, for appellee, contrà.

The opinion of the court was delivered, January 7th 1861, by LOWRIE, C. J.

There is no particular virtue in the form which this proceeding took in the court below, that entitles it to be reheard here. The bill, or petition of review, was nothing more than a motion for a rehearing on the report of the sale; in which all the reasons in its support are fully stated. If we review the matter, it is only because the setting aside or confirmation of a sale of land under the order and supervision of the Orphans' Court, is a proper subject for review.

On the hearing, the court set aside the sale because there was some inadequacy of price, and the complaining heir had been misled by one of the administrators in relation to the conclusiveness of the result of the biddings. We confess a doubt about the sufficiency of these grounds, as shown by the evidence, and think we should ourselves have allowed the sale to stand. But we cannot treat this case as we might have done, if holding the Orphans' Court. The question here is: — Is the action of the Orphans' Court so manifestly wrong, that we ought to say they have exercised their discretion unlawfully? We are not prepared to say so.

Possibly we ought to go further, and state the question to be, whether this court ought to listen to an appeal that...