Haspel v. O'Brien

• Decision Date: 06 May 1907
• Docket Number: 70,68,60,57,62,61,58,59
• Citation: 67 A. 123,218 Pa. 146
• Parties: Haspel v. O'Brien, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

67 A. 123

218 Pa. 146

Haspel v. O'Brien, Appellant

Nos. 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 68, 70

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

May 6, 1907

Argued March 27, 1907

Appeals, Nos. 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 68 and 70, by defendants, from judgment of Superior Court, Oct. T., 1906 Nos. 104, 226 and 229, affirming judgment of C.P. No. 1 Phila. Co., Dec. T., 1905, No. 1,214, and judgment of C.P. Del. Co. March T., 1905, No. 108, making absolute rule to pay over money in case of Lewis A. Haspel, Receiver of the United Building and Loan Association of Philadelphia, v. Daniel O'Brien, Mortgagor, Wilson H. Brown, Sheriff, and the City of Philadelphia, and the cases of Lewis A. Haskel, Receiver, v. May Ellen Robinson, Mortgagor, and the City of Philadelphia, and of Lydia Gibbons et al. v. I. Engle Cochran, Jr., et al. Reversed.

Appeal from the Superior Court.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the case.

Error assigned was the judgment of the Superior Court.

The judgments of the Superior Court and of the common pleas are reversed, and distribution directed to be made in accordance with this opinion.

John G. Johnson, with him Mayne R. Longstreth, James Alcorn, John L. Kinsey, A. A. Cochran and Geo. M. Booth, for appellants.

Wayne P. Rambo and Jos. H. Hinkson, with them Albert L. Lewis and Ormond Rambo, for appellee.

Before MITCHELL, C.J., FELL, MESTREZAT, POTTER and STEWART, JJ.

OPINION

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MITCHELL:

These cases present the same question, and were argued together. The contest is for priority of payment out of the proceeds of sheriff's sales between mortgages made before June 4, 1901, and municipal claims for taxes, water rents, paving, etc., assessed and filed as liens of record after that date, where the sales were made on the mortgages, but the proceeds were not sufficient to pay both. It turns on the construction of the Act of June 4, 1901, P.L. 364.

By the Act of February 3, 1824, P.L. 18, which was in force until 1901, the taxes, etc., were entitled to be first paid. But the act of 1901 expressly repealed the act of 1824, while re-enacting in substantially identical terms its provisions as to priority of payment of liens out of the proceeds of sheriff's sales.

The act of 1901, sec. 2, after declaring that taxes shall

The act of 1901, sec. 2, after declaring that taxes shall be a "first lien" on the property, provides that "such liens shall have priority to, and be fully paid and satisfied out of the proceeds of any judicial sale of said property before any other obligation, judgment, claim, lien or estate with which the said property may become charged, or for which it may become liable."

Section 3 makes a similar provision in regard to municipal claims, except that they are only declared a lien, the word "first" being omitted.

The words, "with which the said property may become charged, or for which it may become liable," are relied upon to show that taxes, etc., are only given priority to mortgages, obligations, etc., created after the date of the act, and that their priority to obligations previous in date being only by virtue of the act of 1824 is lost by the repeal of that act.

It must of course be conceded that statutes are presumed to be prospective only and the phrase "may become" prima facie refers to the future. It is, however, a question of the legislative intent, and it is by no means certain that the future period meant to be referred to in this phrase is the date of the act rather than the dates of the sales thereafter to be made under it. So understood it would mean that taxes are to be paid before other obligations with which the property is charged or chargeable at the time of the sale or distribution. This view derives considerable force from the closeness with which the act of 1901 follows the language of the act of 1824 up to this point, and then makes a significant change. The corresponding section of the act of 1824 reads, "and the said lien shall have priority to and shall be fully paid and satisfied before any recognizance, mortgage, judgment, debt, obligation or responsibility which the said real estate may become charged with or liable to, from and after the passing of this act." The omission of the words "from and after the passing of this act" from the act of 1901 leads strongly to the inference that the date of the...