Hass v. Wisconsin
| Decision Date | 16 January 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-C-0198.,02-C-0198. |
| Citation | 241 F.Supp.2d 922 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin |
| Parties | Gerard N. HAAS, Jr., Plaintiff, v. State of WISCONSIN, Wisconsin Supreme Court—Office of Judicial Education, David H. Haas, Racine County, Racine County Sheriffs Department, William L. Mc Reynolds, John Does— Unknown Racine County Deputy Sheriffs, City of Racine, Racine Police Department, Richard Polzien, David Spenner, John Does—Unknown City of Racine Police Officers, City of Racine Municipal Court, and Robert S. Michelson, Defendants. |
Robert Bernhoft, Christopher Ertl, Milwaukee, WI, for Plaintiff.
David C. Rice, Madison, WI, Raymond J. Pollen, Milwaukee, WI, W. Scott Lewis, Racine, WI, for Defendants.
DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Gerard N. Haas brings this claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that defendants violated his federal constitutional rights including rights guaranteed by the First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. He also brings various state law claims including abuse of process, false arrest, false imprisonment, trespass and conversion. All of plaintiffs claims stem from his allegation that he was wrongfully incarcerated for failing to comply with several municipal court judgments imposing civil forfeitures. Plaintiff names as defendants the City and County of Racine, the State of Wisconsin, and various departments and employees of these governmental entities. He seeks damages and injunctive and declaratory relief.
Based on Eleventh Amendment immunity, I previously dismissed plaintiffs claims against the State and state agencies, as well as his federal law claims for damages and all of his state law claims against state officials in their official capacity. I also dismissed plaintiffs claims against defendant Ronni G. Jones because of her recent death. In addition, plaintiff voluntarily withdrew his claims under the First, Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Amendments.
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the remaining defendants now move to dismiss plaintiffs remaining claims.
On several occasions, plaintiff was cited for violating ordinances of the City of Racine. Instead of paying deposits or appearing in court, plaintiff ignored the citations. As a result, the municipal court entered default judgments against him. When he failed to comply with the judgments or attempt to explain why he could not do so, the court ordered his incarceration.
Plaintiff complains of a number of incidents, all of which involve arrests or attempted arrests of him pursuant to the municipal court's orders. On May 12, 1998, he was detained on eight outstanding municipal warrants until his brother paid $603.90 to cover the unpaid forfeitures. On August 13, 1999, police officers went to his mother's house seeking to arrest him for non-payment of other default judgments. On February 10, 2000, plaintiff was arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant and taken to the Racine County Jail based on non-payment of approximately $3,100 in outstanding judgments. On March 24, 2000, plaintiff was served with papers stating that he had violated various municipal ordinances and failed to pay the resulting judgments and would be imprisoned for approximately five years unless he paid approximately $76,000 in forfeitures. On January 30, 2002, plaintiff was detained until his brother paid $2,536 in outstanding judgments.
Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the foregoing incidents, he suffers a "constant threat of imminent and unlawful arrest" and that he has suffered "great humiliation, embarrassment, mental suffering, loss of liberty and property, deprivation of constitutional and statutory rights, as well as loss of reputation." (R. 1 ¶ 31.)
Plaintiff asserts that I have jurisdiction over his federal claims based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims based on 28 U.S.C. § 1367. However, I conclude that I am deprived of jurisdiction based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923). Although the parties have not raised this issue, I raise it sua sponte because federal courts are required to jealously guard their own jurisdiction. See Lewis v. Anderson, 308 F.3d 768, 771-72 (7th Cir.2002). In doing so, I assume that all of plaintiffs allegations are true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to him. See Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 2119 v. Cohen, 171 F.3d 460, 465 (7th Cir.1999) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1)).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives a lower federal court of jurisdiction to review a state court decision. Lewis, 308 F.3d at 772. The doctrine extends to claims seeking direct review of a statecourt decision and claims "inextricably intertwined with the state-court [decision] such that the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issue before it." Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); accord GASH Assocs. v. Vill. of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 727 (7th Cir.1993) (). The doctrine bars review even if I am convinced that the state court's decision was unconstitutional or otherwise contrary to law. Rizzo v. Sheahan, 266 F.3d 705, 713 (7th Cir.2001); Remer v. Burlington Area, Sch. Dist, 205 F.3d 990, 996 (7th Cir.2000).
In determining whether the doctrine applies, "[t]he pivotal question ... is `whether the injury alleged by the federal plaintiff resulted from the state court judgment itself or is distinct from that judgment.'" Lewis, 308 F.3d at 772 (quoting Rizzo, 266 F.3d at 713). In Homola v. McNamara, 59 F.3d 647, 649 (7th Cir.1995), a state court entered a default judgment against the plaintiff Homola for violating a building permit ordinance and ordered that city officials conduct inspections of Homola's property. Homola refused to comply with the court's orders, and the court eventually held him in contempt and ordered his arrest. Id. In a series of federal court actions, Homola sued the city, the city attorney who had prosecuted him, the judge was had ordered his arrest and the city official charged with carrying out the judge's inspection order. Id. Homola sought damages for having been sued, arrested and jailed. Id. The Seventh Circuit held that federal court review of Homola's claims was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because his claims rested entirely on the alleged unlawfulness of the state court's orders. Id. at 650-51. The Seventh Circuit further stated that, had Homola sued the arresting officers, such claims would also have been barred because the alleged injuries also resulted solely from the court's order that Homola be arrested. Id. at 650.
The present case is indistinguishable from Homola. Plaintiff alleges that as a result of Municipal Court Judge Robert Michelson's orders, he was arrested, incarcerated and forced to pay forfeitures. His alleged injuries all resulted from the judge's orders. He complains of no injuries that are distinct from those resulting from the court's orders. Plaintiff alleges, for example, that the arresting officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights, but he bases this claim solely on the fact that the officers executed Judge Michelson's orders. Cf. Nesses v. Shepard, 68 F.3d 1003, 1005 (7th Cir.1995).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine would not bar federal review if, during the state court proceedings, plaintiff had no reasonable opportunity to raise the claims that he now raises. Brokaw v. Weaver, 305 F.3d 660, 668 (7th Cir.2002). However, plaintiff could have raised the claims he raises here in municipal court, see Wis. Stat. §§ 800.02(1), 800.04, 800.095, 800.115(2), or he could have appealed the municipal court judgments, id. § 800.14. Indeed, in at least one instance plaintiff did, in fact, raise some of his present claims in state court. State of Wis. ex rel. Haas v. McReynolds, 252 Wis.2d 133, 136-39, 142^4, 643 N.W.2d 771 (2002) ().
Because plaintiffs suit seeks review by a federal court of the orders of a state court, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives me of jurisdiction. However, in the event that I am mistaken on the question of subject matter jurisdiction, in the interest of judicial economy, I will also address defendants' motions to dismiss.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Dismissal of an action under such a motion is warranted if the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims that would entitle him to relief. Gen, Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1080 (7th Cir.1997); see Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). The essence of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not that the plaintiff has pleaded insufficient facts, it is that even assuming all of his facts are accurate, he has no legal claim. Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Med. Ctr., 184 F.3d 623, 627 (7th Cir.1999). The facts alleged in the complaint are assumed to be true, and all facts, and all reasonable inferences flowing from those facts, are read in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Busk, 918 F.2d 1323, 1326 (7th Cir.1990).
Judges are absolutely immune from suits for damages, Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 10, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991), including actions raising constitutional challenges under 42 U.S.C. §...
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