Hassan v. Hartford Insurance Group

• Decision Date: 09 April 1974
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 4215.
• Citation: 373 F. Supp. 1385
• Parties: Mahmoud HASSAN, Administrator of the Estate of Yameen Hassan, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. HARTFORD INSURANCE GROUP et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

373 F. Supp. 1385

Mahmoud HASSAN, Administrator of the Estate of Yameen Hassan, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. HARTFORD INSURANCE GROUP et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 4215.

United States District Court, D. Delaware.

April 9, 1974.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

C. Waggaman Berl, Jr., Wilmington, Del., for plaintiff.

Mason E. Turner, Jr., of Prickett, Ward, Burt & Sanders, Wilmington, Del., for defendants.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT

LATCHUM, Chief Judge.

The defendants have moved for summary judgment against the plaintiff pursuant to Rule 56, F.R.Civ.P., on the ground that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.¹

Plaintiff, a citizen of Michigan suing in his capacity as administrator of the Estate of Yameen Hassan (the "decedent"), seeks to recover $200,000 from the defendant insurance companies, all of which are incorporated and have their principal offices in Connecticut, for the decedent's pain and suffering and for the monetary loss to the decedent's estate due to his injury and death resulting from a fire allegedly caused by the negligence of the defendants. Jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizenship as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

The pertinent facts viewed most favorable to the plaintiff, Brough v. Strathmann Supply Co., Inc., 358 F.2d 374, 377 (C.A.3, 1966), are as follows: On April 22, 1970, the decedent was a paying guest of Clayton A. Stafford and Blanche Stafford (the "Staffords"), the owners and operators of the Delmar Motor Court Motel ("Delmar Motel"), which is located on U.S. Route 13 near New Castle, Delaware. On or about that date, a fire occurred in a room at the Delmar Motel which was rented to a person other than the decedent. The fire partially destroyed the Delmar Motel and severely burned the decedent, proximately causing his death seven days later on April 29, 1970.

Plaintiff first brought an action in this Court on October 12, 1970 ("the 1970 suit")² against the Staffords based on their allegedly negligent operation of the Delmar Motel. Plaintiff attempted to secure a judgment in the 1970 suit against the Staffords, first, to compensate for decedent's injuries and his pain and suffering from the time of his injuries until his death, as authorized by 10 Del.C. § 3704(a), and second, to compensate for the decedent's wrongful death, as provided by 10 Del.C. § 3704(b).

In the 1970 suit the plaintiff expected to prove that the Staffords "were negligent in maintaining a motel which was in violation of Delaware law and fire regulations in that there were no fire doors, no fire extinguishers, and no internal warning system." Plaintiff further expected to prove that the Staffords "were negligent in failing to notify the decedent when the fire was discovered, in time to permit him to vacate the premises."³

At trial, the jury was charged to

". . . limit your consideration of negligence to the claim that there were no fire doors, no internal warning system, and no warnings given adequately in time to Mr. Hassan . . . The Staffords as the owners and operators of the Delmar Motel, are not the insurers of the safety, quiet and repose of their guests. Their obligation was to exercise reasonable care for guest's safety . . .

If you find from the evidence that the defendants the Staffords did exercise reasonable care for the safety of their guests, consistent with the grade and quality of the accommodations offered, then the plaintiff cannot recover and your verdict must be for the defendants the Staffords." Trial transcript pp. 175-76, Hassan v. Stafford, Civil Action No. 3994 (D. Del.1971). Brackets added.

The jury returned a verdict for the Staffords. The verdict was affirmed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals⁴ and time for further appeal has expired.

In the present complaint, the plaintiff alleges:⁵ (1) that at the time of the fire, one or more of the defendants had written a policy of fire insurance on the Delmar Motel, (2) that at the time of the fire the Delmar Motel was being operated by the Staffords "in violation of safety regulations in general and in violation of regulations promulgated by the Fire Prevention Commission of the State of Delaware," (3) that before the policy was issued, the defendants failed to make an adequate inspection of the Delmar Motel, or having made an inspection, failed to make an adequate inspection and/or failed to require the Staffords to bring their premises into compliance with the general safety regulations in general and specifically the regulations promulgated by the Fire Prevention Commission of the State of Delaware, and (4) that as a result of the negligence of defendants the fire occurred in the Delmar Motel resulting in the injury and later the death of the decedent.

The defendants contend in their motion for summary judgment that the plaintiff has clearly failed to state any cause of action against those defendants which had no part whatsoever in writing any insurance policy on the Delmar Motel. In this respect, the facts are undisputed that none of the named defendants, other than Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company ("Hartford") has issued any insurance policy to the Staffords on the Delmar Motel.⁶ Indeed, plaintiff in these proceedings has recognized this fact, and therefore, no longer asserts any claim against those defendants that had no part whatsoever in writing insurance coverage on the motel.⁷ As a consequence, summary judgment will be entered in favor of the defendants, other than Hartford.

However, Hartford did issue a multiperil insurance policy, which included fire and liability coverage, to the Staffords on the Delmar Motel.⁸ Hartford contends that the 1970 suit bars the plaintiff from continuing the present suit on the basis of collateral estoppel since Hartford was in privity with the Staffords in the 1970 suit, the 1970 suit has reached a point of final judgment on the merits, and the issues in the 1970 suit are identical to the issues in the present suit. Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l. Trust and Savings Ass'n, 19 Cal.2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942) as approved in Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 91 S.Ct. 1434, 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1971). Hartford further contends that even if this Court were to conclude that the issues in the 1970 suit were not identical to those asserted by plaintiff in this suit, plaintiff has still failed to state a valid cause of action against Hartford since Hartford neither had a duty nor assumed a duty to make sure that the Delmar Motel met any particular safety specifications.

Rule 56(b) of the F.R.Civ.P. provides that:

"A party against whom a claim, counter-claim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof."

And Rule 56(c) goes on to require that:

". . . The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."

In the present case, defendants have moved with supporting affidavits⁹ and interrogatories¹⁰ and, therefore, the following portion of Rule 56(e) is applicable:

"When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."

To determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial the Court must first look to the substantive law of the case. Since jurisdiction is based solely upon diversity of citizenship, the conflict of laws rule to be applied by this Court must conform to that which prevails in the Delaware state courts. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941). In Delaware, substantive rights of the parties in a tort action are governed by the law of the place where the tort arose, Friday v. Smoot, 211 A. 2d 594, 595 (Del.Sup.Ct.1965); in the present case the injury and resulting death occurred in Delaware and therefore Delaware substantive law applies.

In general, to constitute "actionable negligence" under Delaware law, there must be a duty owed to the plaintiff and a violation thereof by the defendant resulting in damages. Robinson v. Meding, 2 Storey 578, 163 A.2d 272, 275 (Del.Sup.Ct.1960); Thompson v. Cooles, 7 W.W.Harr. 83, 180 A. 522, 527 (Del.Super.1935); Edmanson v. Wilmington & Philadelphia Traction Co., 2 W.W.Harr. 177, 120 A. 923 (Del. Super.1923).¹¹ However, the plaintiff has failed to articulate any direct duty owed to the decedent by Hartford and instead has merely alleged that Hartford was negligent in that,

1) it failed to make an adequate inspection of the Delmar Motel, or

2) having made an inspection, failed to make an adequate inspection, and/or

3) failed to require the Staffords to bring the Delmar Motel into compliance with general safety regulations in general and specifically the regulations promulgated by the Fire Prevention Commission of the State of Delaware.

Presumably, these three allegations of negligence must have been meant by the plaintiff to set out three duties owed or assumed by Hartford, the violation of any one or more of which created Hartford's liability. In short, the plaintiff alleges that Hartford is liable (1) for the failure to inspect Stafford's motel, or (2) for negligent performance of an alleged undertaking to inspect, or (3) for the failure to require the Staffords to maintain their motel consistent with particular safety standards.

Each of these allegations of negligence must be treated separately. The first allegation...