Hastings v. MaCe

• Decision Date: 06 December 1892
• Citation: 157 Mass. 499,32 N.E. 668
• Parties: HASTINGS v. MACE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

157 Mass. 499

32 N.E. 668

HASTINGS v. MACE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

December 6, 1892

COUNSEL

M.J. McNeirny, for plaintiff.

Sumner A. York and Chas. A. Russell, for defendant.

OPINION

BARKER J.

Francis Mayo died on October 17, 1863, and his widow, now Elizabeth Mace, became entitled to dower in the land in which she asks to have dower assigned.She occupied the land with the heirs and received the rents, the heirs not objecting, until August or September, 1890, since which time the rents have been against her protest, paid to one of the heirs.Her petition was filed on August 15, 1891.The question reserved is whether her right to file the petition more than 20 years after her husband's death is saved by Pub.St c. 124, § 13, or barred by Id.§ 14.^[1] So far as it affects this question, Pub.St. c. 124, § 14, is identical with Gen.St. c. 90, § 6, from which it purports to have been derived; and that section was taken from St.1858, c. 56.Before the passage of St.1858, c. 56, a widow's right to dower was not subject to any statute of limitations.Parker v. Obear, 7 Metc.(Mass.) 24. Pub.St. c. 124 § 13, so far as it affects dower, is of the same effect as Gen.St. c. 90, § 7, from which it purports to be derived, and the latter section is substantially identical with Rev.St. c 60, § 6.This section was derived from St.1816, c. 84, with, as the commissioners who drafted the Revised Statutes say in their note, "some change of the language to make it express more clearly the intention of the legislature, as understood by the court."St.1816, c. 84, was considered in the cases of Gibson v. Crehore, 3 Pick. 475, andGibson v. Crehore, 5 Pick. 146.By its terms a widow was entitled to have and receive one undivided net third of the rents, incomes, and profits of the estate of which her husband died seised, until her dower should be actually assigned and set out to her by the heir or by a court.In Gibson v. Crehore, 3 Pick. 475, a widow sued in assumpsit to recover one third of the rents and profits received by one who at an administrator's sale had purchased lands subject to a mortgage.Owing to the mortgage, she could not enforce her dower at law, and no construction of the statute was necessary; but the court said that there was reason to believe "that this new remedy was intended only to be applied against the heirs of the deceased," and that it was "doubtful whether an action of assumpsit was intended to be given."In the second case, ( Gibson v. Crehore, 5 Pick. 145,) which was a bill in equity between the same parties, the court say that the language of the statute"is rather obscure, but its meaning seems to be to enlarge the widow's claim on the heirs, but not to affect the rights of bona fide purchasers."With the alterations made by the commissioners who prepared the Revised Statutes, the provision, as it appears there and in the General Statutes, seems clear; and we know of no reason why the language used in the corresponding provision of Pub.St. c. 124, § 13, so far as dower is concerned, should not have its natural and obvious signification and effect.Thus construed, it enlarges the widow's rights by making legal her continued occupation of lands of which her husband died seised, and her receipt of one third of the rents, without having dower assigned, so long as the heirs do not object; and it says in terms that, whenever the heirs or any of them deem it proper to hold or occupy their share in severalty, she may claim her dower, and have it assigned.If these provisions stood alone, there could be no possible contention that when, after an acquiescence on the part of the heir in the right of the widow to dower, for 20 years or more after her husband's death, evidenced either by allowing her to occupy the lands with the heir or to receive her share of the rents, she was then to be barred of all claim or remedy.Such an injustice could never have been intended.The purpose of statutes of limitation is to quiet stale demands, which, having been neither enforced by the owner nor acknowledged by the adverse party, may well be presumed to have been satisfied or released, and is not to destroy or to bar the enforcement of rights which have been long and constantly enjoyed and acknowledged.It is not possible that St.1858, c. 56, could have been intended to work a change in the law, by which a widow who, without objection from the heirs of her deceased husband, had for 20 years or more after his death continued with them in the occupation of lands of which he died seised, or in the receipt of her third of the rents, would be then barred of all claim or action to enforce her rights, if the...