Hastings v. State

• Decision Date: 09 October 1990
• Docket Number: No. 61A01-9001-CR-13,61A01-9001-CR-13
• Parties: Linda HASTINGS, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 664

560 N.E.2d 664

Linda HASTINGS, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).

No. 61A01-9001-CR-13.

Court of Appeals of Indiana,

First District.

Oct. 9, 1990.

David O. Thomas, Public Defender, Brazil, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Louis E. Ransdell, Deputy Atty. Gen., Office of Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

ROBERTSON, Judge.

Linda Hastings appeals her conviction for neglect of a dependent, a class B felony. ¹ We reverse.

On April 23, 1988, Linda Hastings' two-year-old son, Jimmy, was injured by Hastings' boyfriend, Richard Kelley. While Kelley had injured Jimmy on a prior occasion. When Kelley confessed to the 1988 arm-breaking episode, he also confessed that on July 14, 1987, while on a visit to his parents' house in Hendricks County, he had "flipped" Jimmy onto the bed when the boy would not stop crying. As a result of this treatment, both Jimmy's legs were broken. Hastings was not at Kelley's parents' house when this incident took place.

Hastings went to get food for the threesome, she left Jimmy with Kelley for approximately twenty-five minutes. When Hastings returned, Jimmy had suffered a broken arm. Kelley initially said that Jimmy broke his arm when running toward his mother as she left the house. However, on June 4, 1988, Kelley confessed that he had "jerked Jimmy up by his arm" when the boy would not stop crying, and in the process broke Jimmy's arm.

On July 16, 1987, a CHINS ² action was commenced pursuant to IND.CODE 31-6-1-1 et seq. on behalf of Jimmy, based on the July 14, 1987, incident in which Jimmy's legs were broken. Also based on this incident, Hastings was charged with neglect of a dependent to which she pleaded guilty on November 16, 1987. Jimmy was placed in foster care. During the course of the CHINS action Hastings was required by court order and under statutory law to meet and cooperate with Salley Curley, the welfare worker assigned to Jimmy's case, in order to regain custody of Jimmy.

During the CHINS hearing, Hastings was advised that one possible result of the proceedings could be termination of her parental rights and that her cooperation was necessary to avoid such an outcome. During one of these meetings, Curley asked Hastings whether or not she suspected Kelley of having broken Jimmy's legs in 1987. Curley testified at trial that Hastings responded that "she was suspicious but she didn't want to think that he had done it," and that Kelley had had the "opportunity" to have injured Jimmy because Kelley was alone with Jimmy on the day the injury occurred. Salley Curley testified that this discussion took place prior to the April 23, 1988, incident in which Kelley broke Jimmy's legs. ³ Pursuant to the welfare department's orders, Hastings was required to keep Jimmy away from Kelley when Jimmy was visiting his mother.

On May 17, 1988, Hastings was charged by information with neglect of a dependent based on the April 23, 1988, incident in which Kelley broke Jimmy's arm. On October 27, 1988, the Parke County Department of Welfare filed a petition to terminate Hastings' parental rights in regard to Jimmy. This petition was granted, and is presently undergoing appeal. On August 21, 1989, Hastings was convicted for neglect of a dependent and was eventually sentenced to ten (10) years imprisonment, all of which was suspended. Hastings was placed on probation for a period of five years.

Hastings argues on appeal that Curley should not have been permitted to testify concerning statements made by Hastings during the CHINS proceeding because such testimony violated Hastings' constitutionally protected right against self-incrimination. Hastings also argues that the trial court erred in allowing into evidence her prior conviction for criminal neglect.

In order to obtain a conviction for neglect of a dependent, the State must show that the accused was subjectively aware of a high probability that the accused In an effort to prove that Hastings possessed the requisite state of mind, the State had welfare caseworker Curley testify as to the content of conversations held with Hastings during the course of the CHINS proceeding. Prior to the April, 1988, arm-breaking incident and prior to the filing of neglect charges against Hastings, Hastings told Curley that she did have suspicions that Kelley was responsible for breaking Jimmy's legs on July 14, 1987. At trial, Hastings objected to Curley's testimony, alleging Curley's revelation violated Hastings' right against self-incrimination and constituted an involuntary confession because Hastings was under compulsion when she made the statements recited by Curley at trial.

                placed the dependent in a dangerous situation.  I.C. 35-46-1-4(a)(1);  Hill v. State (1989), Ind., 535 N.E.2d 153, 154;  Fisher v. State (1990), Ind.App., 548 N.E.2d 1177, 1179.   To make such a showing the State need only prove that the accused was aware of facts which would alert a reasonable parent under the circumstances to take affirmative action to protect the child.  Smith v. State (1980), Ind.App., 408 N.E.2d 614, 621.   Such a determination requires that the fact finder resort to inferential reasoning to ascertain the mental state of the accused.  Hill, 535 N.E.2d at 154.   The courts will look to all the surrounding circumstances of the case when making this determination.  Id
                

Hastings correctly notes that the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, as well as Art. I, Sec. 14 of the Indiana Constitution, provides that persons shall be free from being compelled to make disclosures that might subject them to criminal prosecution or that might aid in convicting them. See Dickson v. State (1989), Ind., 533 N.E.2d 586, 587 (quoting Corder v. State (1984), Ind.App., 467 N.E.2d 409, 415). When reviewing cases involving involuntary disclosures, the Supreme Court of the United States has stated that "[t]he range of inquiry in this type of case must be broad," and that "judgment in each instance [must] be based upon consideration of 'the totality of the circumstances.' " Blackburn v. Alabama (1960), 361 U.S. 199, 80 S.Ct. 274, 4 L.Ed.2d 242; see Light v. State (1989), Ind., 547 N.E.2d 1073, 1077; Smith v. State (1989), Ind., 543 N.E.2d 634, 637. A review of constitutional involuntariness is a question of law, not of fact, and will be decided by the court rather than the trier of fact. Light, 547 N.E.2d at 1077. To admit a confession into evidence in the State of Indiana, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right not to incriminate himself. Stanger v. State (1989), Ind.App., 545 N.E.2d 1105, 1109. In determining whether the State has met this burden, a court on appeal will take into consideration the entire record. Light, 547 N.E.2d at 1077.

Those confessions made through inducement, violence, threats or other improper influences meant to overcome the free will of the accused will be deemed involuntary. Townsend v. State (1989), Ind., 533 N.E.2d 1215, 1222, cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1327, 108 L.Ed.2d 502; see also Smith, 543 N.E.2d at 637 (confession not voluntary if it is the product of threats, physical abuse, or direct or implied promises.) An objection to the general voluntariness of a confession requires application of the constitutional standard of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which forces this court to focus on whether the behavior of the State's law enforcement officials was such as to overcome the defendant's "will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined." Rogers v. Richmond (1961), 365 U.S. 534, 81 S.Ct. 735, 5 L.Ed.2d 760; Smith, 543 N.E.2d at 637. In making this determination, the Supreme Court noted that "coercion can be mental as well as physical, and that the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition." Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 206, 80 S.Ct. at 280; 4 L.Ed.2d at 248. Furthermore, "[t]here is torture of the mind as well as the body; the will is as much affected by fear as by force." Watts v. Indiana (1949), 338 U.S. 49, 52, 69 S.Ct. 1347, 1349, 93 L.Ed. 1801. In short "The ultimate test remains that which has been the only clearly established test in Anglo-American courts for two hundred years: the test of voluntariness. Is the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used against him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due process."

Culombe v. Connecticut (1961), 367 U.S. 568, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037.

In reviewing Hastings' claims that her statements concerning her suspicions about Kelley's responsibility for Jimmy's injuries should not have been allowed into evidence because such statements constituted an involuntary confession, we must address two questions: (1) was the caseworker who questioned Hastings pursuant to the CHINS proceeding acting as "an agency of the government in the course of securing a conviction" Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 206, 80 S.Ct. at 280, 4 L.Ed.2d at 248; and (2) was Hastings' statement given involuntarily?

The Fifth Amendment guarantee against self-incrimination protects defendants from official state misconduct which results in an involuntary confession. In the present case, the caseworker testified that she understood that she was obligated to cooperate with the prosecutors and to turn over any evidence received concerning the criminal charges against Hastings. Further, I.C. 31-6-4-8(c) requires an intake officer in a CHINS proceeding to send to the prosecutor or county attorney a copy of the preliminary inquiry made by the caseworker. Additionally, I.C. 31-6-2-1.1(c)(1) states that "[a] juvenile court has concurrent original jurisdiction in cases involving adults charged...