Hastings v. Thomas

• Decision Date: 26 July 2016
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 2:13-CV-418-WHA (WO)
• Parties: RAYMOND D. HASTINGS, #135351, Plaintiff, v. KIM THOMAS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

RAYMOND D. HASTINGS, #135351, Plaintiff, v. KIM THOMAS, et al., Defendants.

CASE NO. 2:13-CV-418-WHA (WO)

DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA NORTHERN DIVISION

July 26, 2016

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Raymond D. Hastings ("Hastings"), a state inmate and practitioner of the Native American Religion, asserts that the defendants committed actions during his confinement at the Easterling Correctional Facility ("Easterling") which hindered his ability to practice his religion in violation of his constitutional rights.¹ Amendment to Compl. - Doc. No. 11; Second Amendment to Compl. - Doc. No. 20. Hastings also alleges that Lt. Kenneth Drake acted in a retaliatory manner and deprived him of due process with respect to issuance of a behavior citation on June 4, 2013, Amendment to Compl. - Doc. No. 11 at 3; Second Amendment to Compl. - Doc. No. 20 at 13, and subjected him to excessive force on June 12, 2013.² Compl. - Doc. No. 1 at 1-2.The defendants in this cause of action are Kim Thomas, former commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections, Gwendolyn Mosley, Kenneth Sconyers, Capt. Nathaniel Lawson, Lt. Kenneth Drake and Chaplain Anthony Askew.³ Hastings seeks a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief and monetary damages for the alleged violations of his constitutional rights.

The defendants filed a special report, supplemental reports and supporting evidentiary materials addressing the claims presented by Hastings. In these documents, the defendants deny acting in violation of the Hastings's constitutional rights. In addition, they assert that those claims raised by Hastings alleging infringement of the right to practice his religion are due to be dismissed because prior to filing this cause of action Hastings failed to properly exhaust an administrative remedy available to him at Easterling with respect to such claims. Defs.' Suppl. Special Report - Doc. No. 70 at 1-2; Defs.' Suppl. Special Report - Doc. No. 81 at 2-3. The defendants base their exhaustion defense on Hastings's failure to file a grievance with the chaplain and/or a request for religious assistance from the Religious Activities Review Committee as permitted by Administrative Regulation No. 313 prior to filing the complaint in this case.

The court issued orders directing Hastings to file responses in opposition to these reports. Order of July 31, 2013 - Doc. No. 38; Order of May 5, 2016 - Doc. No. 82. The first order specifically cautioned Hastings that unless "sufficient legal cause" is shown within fifteen days of entry of this order "why such action should not be undertaken, . . . the court may at any time [after expiration of the time for his filing a response] and without further notice to the parties (1) treat the special report and any supporting evidentiary materials as a motion for summary judgment and (2) after considering any response as allowed by this order, rule on the motion for summary judgment in accordance with the law." Doc. No. 38 at 2-3. The subsequent order provided Hastings an opportunity to file a response to the defendants' supplemental report(s) in which he was advised to "specifically address the defendants' assertion that . . . [h]is claims regarding a denial of the free exercise of his religion are due to be dismissed because he failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)" prior to filing this federal civil action. Doc. No. 82 at 1 (footnote omitted).

"[A]n exhaustion defense . . . is not ordinarily the proper subject for a summary judgment [motion]; instead, it should be raised in a motion to dismiss, or be treated as such if raised in a motion for summary judgment." Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1374-1375 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted); Trias v. Florida Dep't of Corr., 587 F. App'x 531, 534 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that the district court properly construed the defendant's "motion for summary judgment as a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies[.]"). Thus, the court finds it appropriate to treat the supplementalspecial reports (Doc. No. 70 and Doc. No. 81) as a motion to dismiss with respect to the claims alleging infringement of religious practice/exercise. The court likewise deems it appropriate to treat the defendants' reports as a motion for summary judgment on the claims challenging the behavior citation and the allegation of excessive force.

Upon consideration of the motion to dismiss the religious exercise claims on exhaustion grounds, the court concludes that the motion is due to be granted. As to the motion for summary judgment, the court concludes that the motion is due to be granted in part and denied in part.

II. ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY

To the extent Hastings lodges claims against the defendants in their official capacities, the defendants are entitled to absolute immunity from monetary damages. Official capacity lawsuits are "in all respects other than name, . . . treated as a suit against the entity." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U. S. 159, 166 (1985). "A state official may not be sued in his official capacity unless the state has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 908, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984), or Congress has abrogated the state's immunity, see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, , 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1125, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996). Alabama has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted), and Congress has not abrogated Alabama's immunity. Therefore, Alabama state officials are immune from claims broughtagainst them in their official capacities." Lancaster v. Monroe Cty., 116 F.3d 1419, 1429 (11th Cir. 1997).

The defendants are state actors entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for claims seeking monetary damages from them in their official capacities. Lancaster, 116 F.3d at 1429; Harbert Int'l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 1998) (state officials sued in their official capacities are protected from suit for damages under the Eleventh Amendment); Edwards v. Wallace Cmty. Coll., 49 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995) (damages are unavailable from state official sued in his official capacity). The court will henceforth address the claims presented against the defendants in their individual capacities.

III. LACK OF EXHAUSTION - RELIGIOUS EXERCISE CLAIMS

In addressing the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e with respect to exhaustion, the Eleventh Circuit has

recognized that "[t]he plain language of th[is] statute makes exhaustion a precondition to filing an action in federal court." Higginbottom v. Carter, 223 F.3d 1259, 1261 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (quoting Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 643-44 (6th Cir. 1999)). This means that "until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted," a prisoner is precluded from filing suit in federal court. See id. (affirming dismissal of prisoner's civil rights suit for failure to satisfy the mandatory exhaustion requirements of the PLRA); Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) ("reaffirm[ing] that section 1997e(a) imposes a mandatory requirement on prisoners seeking judicial relief to exhaust their administrative remedies" before filing suit in federal court), modified on other grounds, 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Miller v. Tanner, 196 F.3d 1190, 1193 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that under the PLRA's amendments to § 1997e(a), "[a]n inmate incarcerated in a state prison . . .must first comply with the grievance procedures established by the state department of corrections before filing a federal lawsuit under section 1983."); Harper v. Jenkin, 179 F.3d 1311, 1312 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of prisoner's civil suit for failure to satisfy the mandatory exhaustion requirements of § 1997e(a)); Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 1998) (affirming dismissal of prisoner's Bivens action under § 1997e(a) for failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit in federal court).

Leal v. Georgia Dep't of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original). The Eleventh Circuit further determined that "the question of exhaustion under the PLRA [is] a 'threshold matter' that [federal courts must] address before considering the merits of the case. Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004). Because exhaustion is mandated by the statute, [this court has] no discretion to waive this requirement. Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1325-26 (11th Cir. 1998)." Myles v. Miami-Dade Cty. Corr. and Rehab. Dep't, 476 F. App'x 364, 366 (11th Cir. 2012). Based on the foregoing, the court will "resolve this issue first" as it relates to the religious exercise/practice claims. Id.

"When deciding whether a prisoner has exhausted his remedies, the court should first consider the plaintiff's and the defendants' versions of the facts, and if they conflict, take the plaintiff's version of the facts as true. 'If in that light, the defendant is entitled to have the complaint dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, it must be dismissed.' Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir.2008) (citing Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1373-74). If the complaint is not subject to dismissal at this step, then the court should make 'specific findings in order to resolve the disputed factual issues related to exhaustion.' Id. (citing Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1373-74, 1376)." Myles, 476 F. App'x at 366.Consequently, a district court "may resolve disputed factual issues where necessary to the disposition of a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust [without a hearing]. See [Turner, 541 F.3d at 1082]. The judge properly may consider facts outside of the pleadings to resolve a factual dispute as to exhaustion where doing so...