Hasty v. Hasty

• Decision Date: 16 November 1981
• Docket Number: No. 2-1080A338,2-1080A338
• Citation: 427 N.E.2d 1119
• Parties: Arlen T. HASTY, Appellant (Petitioner Below), v. Linda L. HASTY, Appellee (Respondent Below).
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 1119

427 N.E.2d 1119

Arlen T. HASTY, Appellant (Petitioner Below), v. Linda L. HASTY, Appellee (Respondent Below).

No. 2-1080A338.

Court of Appeals of Indiana, Second District.

Nov. 16, 1981.

William E. Ervin, Peterson, Ervin & Barry, Hartford City, for appellant.

Robert C. Graves, Marion, for appellee.

SULLIVAN, Judge.

Arlen T. Hasty appeals from the trial court's division of property with respect to the payment of $404,177.00 in installments together with interest at the rate of 111/2%.

We affirm in part and reverse in part.

The Blackford Circuit Court on March 24, 1980 entered a decree of dissolution of the marriage of Arlen T. Hasty and Linda L. Hasty. The court found that the Hastys were the owners of interest in seven separate tracts of real estate in Grant County, Indiana. The court in its division of property set aside Tracts IV and VI for Linda, and Tracts I, II, III, V and VII for Arlen. Linda's real property interest was valued at $345,660 with an indebtedness of $40,720, and Arlen's interest was valued at $1,885,570 with an indebtedness of $651,394. Additionally, Linda was awarded personal property with a fair market value of $32,450 and Arlen was awarded $154,270. Linda had financial obligations totaling $65,260 and Arlen's obligations totaled $307,962. Because of the discrepancy in the amount of real property awarded to the appellant, the trial court ordered Arlen to pay Linda the sum of $404,177.00 in installments together with interest at 111/2% per year, the total sum being due on or before December 31, 1984.

Arlen argues inter alia that the 111/2% interest rate ordered by the trial court exceeds that interest permitted by law. He relies upon I.C. 24-4.6-1-101 (Burns Code Ed. Supp.1980) which provides:

"Interest on judgments for money whenever rendered shall be from the date of the return of the verdict or finding of the court until the same is satisfied at the rate agreed upon or the original contract sued upon but shall not exceed eight percent (8%) per annum even though a higher rate of interest may properly have been charged pursuant to contract prior to judgment, and if there be no contract by the parties, then at the rate of eight percent (8%) per annum." ¹

Until March 24, 1980, the date of the judgment, no sum of money relative to a distribution of property was owing by Arlen to Linda. We are not, therefore, here concerned with pre-judgment interest assessible as a means of assuring full compensation. Cf. Town & Country Mutual Insurance Co. v. Savage (2d Dist. 1981) Ind.App., 421 N.E.2d 704; Board of School Trustees of Bango Community Schools v. Indiana Education Employment Relations Board (3d Dist. 1980) Ind.App., 412 N.E.2d 807.

While we do not find fault with the trial court's apparent desire to fully compensate Linda for the delay in the enjoyment of her property represented by the principal amount of the note, we must nevertheless reverse with respect to this issue.

Payment of a money judgment may be delayed for any number of reasons. And that the trial court entered judgment for payment in installments is of no moment. The judgment is nevertheless a judgment upon which interest is limited by statute. Hatfield v. Higgins (1941) 108 Ind.App. 681, 31 N.E.2d 650.

Our holding is made in full realization that the current posture of the law encourages defendants to delay satisfaction of money judgments until the last possible moment. During the period he retains control of the judgment amount, a defendant may by investment earn thereon an amount far in excess of the statutory interest rate permitted. Remedial measures in this respect, however, lie within the sole prerogative of our General Assembly.

The appellant, Arlen Hasty, also challenges the payment of $404,177.00 in less than five years as...