Hatch v. Hatch

Decision Date29 August 1914
Docket Number2623
CourtUtah Supreme Court
PartiesHATCH v. HATCH et al

Rehearing Denied May 8, 1915.

Appeal from District Court, Fourth District; Hon. A. B. Morgan Judge.

Action by Abram C. Hatch, as executor, against Edwin D. Hatch and others.

Judgment for defendants. Plaintiff appeals.

AFFIRMED.

E. A Walton, Chase Hatch and J. W. N. Whitecotton for appellant.

W. W. Ray and J. L. Rawlins for respondents.

FRICK, J. McCARTY, C. J., and STRAUP, J., concur.

OPINION

FRICK, J.

Abram C. Hatch, as executor of the last will and testament of his father, Abram Hatch, deceased, brought this action to cancel two deeds by which the deceased had conveyed to the respondent Edwin D. Hatch, a son of the deceased, and a half-brother of Abram C. Hatch, certain lands alleged and proved to be of the value of $ 6,000. The respondent Vernico Burton Hatch is the wife of Edwin, and Ruth Hatch is his mother. Ruth Hatch was the second wife of the deceased. The grounds for which the validity of the deeds is assailed are mental incapacity of the grantor and undue influence practiced upon him by Ruth Hatch, his wife. The pleadings are very long, containing many statements of evidentiary facts. The allegations of want of mental capacity and undue influence were denied, and the case was presented upon those issues.

One of the deeds was executed on the 31st day of January, 1908, by which the deceased conveyed fifteen acres to his son Edwin D. Hatch, and the other one was executed on the 1st day of June, 1908, by which he conveyed ninety acres adjoining the fifteen acres to the same son. It seems there had been two prior deeds executed by the deceased, one in 1900 and the other in 1903, one of which was made to another of his sons, a full brother of Edwin D. Hatch, and one to Edwin D., reserving a life estate, however, in the grantor, and which deeds have some bearing upon the questions involved. The deeds, and the terms thereof, are referred to by the witness Willis as will hereafter more fully appear.

It was made to appear from the evidence that both the plaintiff, Abram C. Hatch, and respondent, Ruth Hatch, were duly appointed executor and executrix of the last will of the deceased, which was executed by him on the 22d day of November, 1902, and after his death was duly admitted to probate. Abram C. Hatch, however, alone instituted this action for the reason that Ruth Hatch refused to join as a plaintiff, and therefore she was made a defendant.

The deceased departed this life on the 2d day of December, 1911, at the age of eighty-two years. He was married twice, and practically reared two families, and at his death left surviving him five children by his first wife, and five by Ruth Hatch, his second wife, who is his widow. The evidence is quite voluminous, and is principally directed to the mental condition of the deceased during the last few years of his life. We have carefully read the evidence, all of which is carefully preserved in the bill of exceptions. It is not practical to set forth here even a synopsis of the evidence, as to do so would make this opinion entirely too long. There is much evidence to the effect that during the last five or six years preceding his death the deceased suffered lapses of memory to the extent that in the same conversation he would ask the same question two or three times. A doctor, a grandson of the deceased, testified that his failing memory and his general mental condition was the result of a disease known as "arterial sclerosis," which, he said, caused a "hardening of the arteries," which resulted in what the doctor called attacks of epilepsy, or what are commonly called epileptic fits. It was shown that the deceased had several of such attacks, the first one along in 1906 and several more thereafter during the later years of his life. Indeed, it is contended that he suffered an attack the day or evening preceding the 1st day of June, 1908, the day the last deed in question here was executed, but from some other evidence the court was justified in entertaining some doubt with regard to that question. It was also made to appear that usually an attack would produce unconsciousness which would at times last for several hours, and that the attacks would affect the deceased's mind more or less for some time thereafter. A large number of witnesses testified with respect to the mental condition of the deceased, but we think the deductions from the facts detailed in the evidence are perhaps best reflected from the testimony of Abram C. Hatch, the plaintiff, the oldest son of the deceased, and who now is and for many years has been one of the prominent lawyers of this state and this court, and who for many years was connected in business with the deceased. In fact, their business relations continued to within a very short time before the latter's death. After the witness had stated the facts at considerable length he also stated his opinion, or made the following deductions from the facts. We copy his statements in that regard from the bill of exceptions as follows:

"There were times between 1906 and 1909 when his mind was much better than it was at other times, and I would say that at times during that period from 1906 up to 1909--up to December, 1908, I will put it--he might have been competent to transact ordinary business with which he was acquainted, and other times for quite lengthy periods of times when he was, in my opinion, absolutely incompetent; then from on or about December, 1908, until his death there were very great differences in his condition of mind. He had these attacks. I don't know what they were. During the attacks he was unconscious, and after it was reported that he had another attack, it was considerable time before he was what I would call rational, so that he could do business at all. And from 1904--I would say the latter part of 1903--I noticed from the latter part of 1903 that he was at times unfit and incompetent to transact business, but I will say that in my judgment from 1905 he was in a condition so that any one in whom he had confidence might have over reached him in a business transaction very well, very easily."

After a careful reading of all the statements made by this and other witnesses, I am impressed, as no doubt was the trial court, that the deductions and conclusions of the witness respecting the mental condition of the deceased at the time the deed was executed are stronger than the facts warrant.

Mr. Willis, also a lawyer, and who prepared and acknowledged the deed of June 1, 1908, was also called as a witness for the plaintiff. In view that we shall not set forth any other evidence, we shall quote somewhat freely from the evidence of this witness. It was made to appear that for twenty years or more the deceased maintained a business office in connection with his dwelling, and that much of his business was by him transacted there. It further appears that Mrs. Ruth Hatch asked Mr. Willis to prepare the deed in question and to bring it with him to the deceased's office or home and have it executed there. Mr. Willis prepared the deed, taking the description of the land from other deeds which he had theretofore prepared for the deceased, and on the morning of the 1st day of June, 1908, took it to the home of the deceased to have it executed. The witness states what transpired at that time in the following words:

"Mrs Hatch never employed me as an attorney herself; she did employ me as attorney for Mr. Hatch. I could not say the exact date without looking at the books, but it was about 1907. I took it that I was employed as a general attorney. I was employed to make collections and to institute suits in the courts on those collections. I prepared complaints, and Mr. Hatch signed them. Mr. Hatch appeared to know right at the time what he was at. I think that he understood what he was doing right up to the time of his death. I think that he understood transactions done through me right at the time. He had, as lots of people do, a failing of memory somewhat as people do when they grow older. I suppose he understood what he was doing when he executed those deeds, but I had reason to think otherwise from what he said afterwards. Right at the time he executed these deeds I think he knew what he was doing, and I accordingly took his acknowledgment, and I certified in that acknowledgment that he duly acknowledged to the execution of that deed. The conversation I had with him after the execution of that deed relating to the ninety-acre tract, the question of whether it included the fifteen acres or not, did not come up because that had been conveyed at a previous time. I don't think the deeds were executed at the same time. I remember two deeds. I would have to go to my books to refresh my recollection as to whether there were two deeds made at this time, but my recollection is that the deed to the fifteen acres was made some three months before. I would not be certain of the same. I made two deeds for him to what I understood to include the Priestly farm; one of them was for a fifteen-acre tract, and the other was for ninety acres. I think both tracts are called the Priestly farm. After signing the deed Mrs. Hatch went out of the room and Mr. Hatch said to me, 'Willis, what can I do for you?' And I told him that I came there to have him sign a deed, and that he had signed it. He asked me what the deed was, and what property it was for. I explained it, and he apparently understood it. Mrs. Hatch stated at that time that it was in fulfillment of arrangements made long prior to that time; she made that explanation to Mr. Hatch at the time or just prior to his signing the ninety-acre tract of land, and that prior transaction was called to...

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