Hatch v. Optum Servs.
| Decision Date | 11 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | 4:21-CV-1097-LPR |
| Parties | TAQUILLA HATCH PLAINTIFF v. OPTUM SERVICES, INC. DEFENDANT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas |
TAQUILLA HATCH PLAINTIFF
v.
OPTUM SERVICES, INC. DEFENDANT
No. 4:21-CV-1097-LPR
United States District Court, E.D. Arkansas, Central Division
October 11, 2022
ORDER
LEE P. RUDOFSKY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff Taquilla Hatch has filed this lawsuit against her former employer, Optum Services, Inc. She alleges that Optum racially discriminated against her in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and breached an oral contract to hire her full-time after six to nine months of satisfactory job performance.[1] Optum filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss or Stay this Case.[2] For the reasons provided below, Optum's Motion is DENIED.[3]
BACKGROUND
Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc. acts as a staffing agency for multiple corporate clients in need of employees.[4] Optum is one of Maxim's clients.[5] In September of 2018, Maxim hired Ms.
Hatch to work as a temporary Community Health Worker at Optum.[6]
As part of the hiring process, Maxim and Ms. Hatch entered into a Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate (“Agreement”).[7] The Agreement is signed by Ms. Hatch and Maxim.[8] Optum is not a signatory to the Agreement. The specific language of the Agreement is important to the resolution of the pending Motion. So the Court attaches the full Agreement to this Order. The Agreement opens as follows:
In return for the mutual agreement to arbitrate contained herein and my application for and/or my employment with MAXIM HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC. or any affiliated company and/or any of its parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, agents officers, directors, successors, agents, assigns, employees (hereinafter referred to as “MAXIM”), Employee (referred to in this Agreement as “EMPLOYEE” “me”, or “my”) and MAXIM (collectively, “the parties”) agree that
Any disputes, claims, complaints or controversies (“Claim(s)”) between me and MAXIM arising out of and/or directly or indirectly related to my application for employment with MAXIM, my employment with MAXIM, the terms and conditions of my employment with MAXIM, and/or the termination of my employment with MAXIM, will be resolved by arbitration and NOT by a court or jury as set forth herein.
MAXIM believes that it is in the best interest of both EMPLOYEE and MAXIM to resolve Claim(s) without litigation. Most Claims are resolved internally through MAXIM's grievance and complaint processes. When such Claims are not resolved internally, EMPLOYEE and MAXIM agree to resolve through final and binding arbitration as described below.[9]
The Agreement then identifies the “Claims covered by [the] Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate.”[10]
Specifically, the Agreement provides:
EMPLOYEE and MAXIM mutually agree to arbitrate before a neutral arbitrator exclusively on an individual basis (and not on a class, collective or representative basis) any and all Claims between EMPLOYEE and MAXIM, that arise out of or relate to EMPLOYEE's recruitment, application, employment or separation from employment with MAXIM, including Claims involving any current or former officer, director, shareholder, agent or employee of MAXIM, whether the Claims arise under common law, or in tort, contract, or pursuant to a statute, regulation, or ordinance now in existence or which may in the future be enacted or recognized.
Including, but not limited to, the following Claims ....[11] A long (but non-exhaustive) list of claims follows, including “Claims for . . . breach of contract” and “Claims for discrimination . . . under any and all federal, state, or local statutes ....”[12]
In a later section of the Agreement-titled “Class, collective or representative action waiver”-the parties agree that “[t]he arbitrator's authority to resolve disputes and make awards under this Agreement to arbitrate is limited to disputes between: (i) EMPLOYEE and MAXIM; and (ii) EMPLOYEE and any current or former officers, directors, employees and agents, if such individual is sued for conduct arising out of the[] scope of his/her employment with MAXIM.”[13]They further agree that “[n]o arbitration award or decision will have any preclusive effect as to issues or Claims in any dispute with anyone who is not a named party to the arbitration.”[14]
Closer to the end of the document, the Agreement also notes that it “supersedes any prior agreement between the parties concerning the subject matter of Claims resolution, including any disputes, claims, complaints or controversies arising between EMPLOYEE and MAXIM, arising out of and/or directly or indirectly related to [the EMPLOYEE'S] employment with MAXIM, the
terms and conditions of [that] employment, [the EMPLOYEE'S] application for employment and/or termination of [that] employment.”[15]
One does not have to be clairvoyant to see the $64,000 question coming down the pike here. The Agreement is replete with specific references to Maxim.[16] It is also replete with specific references to claims between an employee and Maxim.[17] But Maxim is not a defendant in our case. Optum is. And Optum is (therefore) the one seeking to force arbitration based on the Agreement. Can Optum do so? That is a harder question than it seems. In any event, before turning to that question, a little more background is necessary.
During her time at Optum, Ms. Hatch worked as a Mental Health Assessor.[18] In that capacity, she performed mental health assessments on patients in “homes, hospitals, and juvenile detention facilities ....”[19] Ms. Hatch alleges in her Complaint that “Optum dictated [her] work schedule, and . . . provided [her] with . . . a computer, cell phone, and internet hot spot.”[20] If Ms. Hatch needed time off or to arrive to work tardy, she would coordinate with Optum officials.[21]According to Ms. Hatch, she only dealt with Maxim “to receive her paycheck[,] to take a [tuberculosis] skin test once per year,” and when Optum notified Maxim of performance issues.[22]
Ms. Hatch alleges that, at the beginning of her work with Optum, an Optum manager or supervisor told her that she would be converted from a part-time temporary employee to a fulltime employee within six to nine months of her hire.[23] Conversion to full-time employment would have brought with it enhanced benefits, including a pay raise, bonuses, new insurance benefits, paid time off, holiday time off, and a 401(k).[24] Understandably, after nine months, Ms. Hatch sought conversion to a full-time employee position. But she was not successful.
According to Ms. Hatch, she spoke multiple times with her first Optum supervisor, Mr. David Eidt, about obtaining full-time employee status.[25] She alleges that Mr. Eidt told her that she had “exemplary” performance and that he would “submit her name for recommendation to move to a full-time position.”[26] Sometime later, in February of 2021, Ms. Hatch's new supervisor, Ms. Wanda Collins, allegedly told her similar things.[27] Still, she was not hired (i.e., converted to) fulltime. Because of this, Ms. Hatch resigned her position with Optum on April 1, 2021.[28]
Ms. Hatch maintains that she was not hired full-time because she is black. She notes that her white female colleague, Ms. Jennifer Richards, was converted to a full-time employee within
nine months of employment.[29] She further notes that this occurred despite (1) what Ms. Hatch saw as Ms. Richards's “substandard work performance” and (2) Ms. Richards's husband “call[ing] and curs[ing] out [an Optum] management official.”[30]
Ms. Hatch filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on April 9, 2021.[31] The EEOC issued a Dismissal and Notice of Rights letter on August 16, 2021.[32] Ms. Hatch filed this lawsuit on November 15, 2021.[33]
DISCUSSION
Optum's Motion to Compel Arbitration implicates the Federal Arbitration Act. Under that Act, and controlling Eighth Circuit precedent, the general rule for the Court to follow in resolving this Motion is clear: “[W]hen reviewing an arbitration clause, [the Court] ask[s] only (1) whether there is a valid arbitration agreement and (2) whether the particular dispute falls within the terms of that agreement.”[34] Neither party argues that the Agreement is invalid. And there is nothing on the face of the Agreement or in the record that in any way suggests the Agreement is invalid.[35]Accordingly, for purposes of this Order, the Court assumes that the Agreement is valid. The real question is “whether the particular dispute falls within the terms of that agreement.”[36]
One aspect of that question is easy to decide. The Agreement is quite clear that Title VII discrimination and breach-of-contract claims fall within its scope.[37] But there is another aspect of the question that is more difficult. The Agreement is between only Maxim and Ms. Hatch. Moreover, the Agreement only expressly covers claims “between” Maxim and Ms. Hatch.[38] Does a claim between Optum and Ms. Hatch “fall[] within the terms of [such an] agreement”?[39] To answer this query, the Federal Arbitration Act instructs courts to look to state law.[40] In this case, the arbitration agreement at issue includes a choice-of-law provision.[41] Such a provision is “binding, unless it can be shown that the enforcement of the clause would be unreasonable and unfair.”[42] Neither party has alleged the Agreement's choice-of-law clause is unreasonable or unfair.[43] So the Court will follow the choice-of-law clause.[44] That clause calls for the application of Maryland law in the “interpretation, . . . construction, enforcement and performance” of the Agreement.[45]
Optum argues that, under Maryland law, it can essentially step into the shoes of Maxim and force Ms. Hatch to arbitrate pursuant to the Agreement-even though Optum itself did not sign the Agreement. To support its position, Optum invokes two judicial doctrines that allow (in limited circumstances) a...
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