Hatch v. Riggs National Bank

• Decision Date: 20 May 1966
• Docket Number: No. 19707.,19707.
• Citation: 361 F.2d 559
• Parties: Anna P. HATCH, Appellant, v. The RIGGS NATIONAL BANK et al., Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

361 F.2d 559 (1966)

Anna P. HATCH, Appellant, v. The RIGGS NATIONAL BANK et al., Appellees.

No. 19707.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued January 12, 1966.

Decided May 20, 1966.

Mr. Marion Edwyn Harrison, Washington, D. C., for appellant.

Mr. Frederick M. Bradley, Washington, D. C., for appellee Riggs Nat. Bank. Mr. James E. Murray, Washington, D. C., also entered an appearance for appellee Riggs Nat. Bank.

Mr. Thomas A. Flannery, Washington, D. C., guardian ad litem, for appellee Francesca Hall.

Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, and TAMM and LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judges.

LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judge.

Appellant seeks in this action to obtain modification of a trust she created in 1923. The income terms of the trust instrument are of a spendthrift character, directing the trustees to pay to the settlor for life all the income from the trust estate "for her own use and benefit, without the power to her to anticipate, alienate or charge the same * * *." Upon the death of the settlor-life tenant, the trustees are to pay over the corpus as the settlor may appoint by will; if she fails to exercise this testamentary power of appointment, the corpus is to go to "such of her next of kin * * * as by the law in force in the District of Columbia at the death of the * * * settlor shall be provided for in the distribution of an intestate's personal property therein." No power to appoint the corpus by deed, nor any power to revoke, alter, amend or modify the trust, was expressly retained by appellant, and the instrument states that she conveys the property to the trustees "irrevocably."

Appellant does not claim that the declaration of trust itself authorizes her to revoke or modify the trust. In effect she invokes the doctrine of worthier title, which teaches that a grant of trust corpus to the heirs of the settlor creates a reversion in the settlor rather than a remainder in his heirs. She claims that since she is the sole beneficiary of the trust under this doctrine, and is also the settlor, she may revoke or modify under accepted principles of trust law.

The District Court, while sympathizing with appellant's desire to obtain an additional stipend of $5000 a year, out of corpus, "to accommodate recently incurred expenses, and to live more nearly in accordance with her refined but yet modest tastes,"¹ felt that denial of the requested relief was required by this court's decision in Liberty National Bank v. Hicks, 84 U.S.App.D.C. 198, 173 F.2d 631, 9 A.L.R.2d 1355 (1948). Summary judgment was granted for appellees. We affirm.

I

The Hicks case involved a spendthrift trust created by Hicks in which all income was reserved to the settlor for life; at his death, half of the corpus was to go, by detailed provisions not relevant here, to his children or their issue, and the other half according to his will or, lacking a will, to his heirs at law according to the statutes of descent of the District of Columbia. The trust, by the terms of the trust agreement, was irrevocable. Hicks subsequently executed an instrument revoking the trust and demanded that the trustees turn over the corpus to him. The bank refused, and Hicks brought an action to have the trust declared void as a spendthrift trust against public policy. The court, noting that any rules against spendthrift provisions were for the protection of creditors, held that the settlor could not invoke the invalidity of his own trust to revoke it. It further held that revocation was not effected because, with request to both halves of the trust, Hicks had not obtained the consent of all beneficiaries.² With respect to the second half of Hicks' trust, analogous to the one set up by appellant in the case at bar, the court stated (84 U.S.App.D.C. at 202, 173 F.2d at 635):

* * * Hicks reserved no right of disposition except by last will, in the absence of (failing) which it is to pass to his heirs-at-law. This provision of the trust shows, we think, that as to it Hicks intended to and did reserve only the right to dispose of it by testamentary appointment. This right continues, but, except as it provides, Hicks in creating this trust retained no control or estate, save his life interest in the income. His present effort, contrary to the terms of the trust, to alter and amend its limitations, must, therefore, be held for naught. This is the rule applied by the Maryland Court of Appeals in Allen v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 177 Md. 26, 7 A.2d 180, which we adopt and approve.

In neither the Hicks case nor the Allen case which it followed did the court address itself to the doctrine of worthier title. The abbreviated discussion in Hicks may be taken as an implied rejection of that doctrine, though it was not discussed, for if the doctrine of worthier title were applicable, then the gift over to heirs-at-law would not be effective to create a remainder interest making their consent, as beneficiaries, a condition to revocation of the trust. This appeal squarely raises the question, and we deem it appropriate that we rely not on the aura of Hicks, but on an express consideration of the applicability of the doctrine of worthier title.

The doctrine of worthier title had its origins in the feudal system which to a large extent molded the English common law which we inherited. In its common law form, the doctrine provided that a conveyance of land by a grantor with a limitation over to his own heirs resulted in a reversion in the grantor rather than creating a remainder interest in the heirs. It was a rule of law distinct from, though motivated largely by the same policies as, the Rule in Shelley's Case. Apparently the feudal overlord was entitled to certain valuable incidents when property held by one of his feoffees passed by "descent" to an heir rather than by "purchase" to a tranferee. The doctrine of worthier title — whereby descent is deemed "worthier" than purchase — remained ensconced in English law, notwithstanding the passing of the feudal system, until abrogated by statute in 1833.³

The doctrine has survived in many American jurisdictions, with respect to inter vivos conveyances of both land and personalty, as a common law "rule of construction" rather than a "rule of law." In Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N.Y. 305, 122 N.E. 221 (1919), Judge Cardozo's landmark opinion reviewed the common-law history of the doctrine and concluded that its modern relevance was as a rule of construction, a rebuttable presumption that the grantor's likely intent, in referring to his own heirs, was to reserve a reversion in his estate rather than create a remainder interest in the heirs. Evidence might be introduced to show that the grantor really meant what he said when he spoke of creating a remainder in his heirs. "Even at common law," wrote Cardozo, "a distinction was taken between grants to the heirs as such, and grants where the reference to heirs was a mere descriptio personarum." But to overcome the presumption that a reversion rather than a remainder was intended, "the intention to work the transformation must be clearly expressed." 122 N.E. at 222.

In the decades that followed, the worthier title doctrine as a rule of construction with respect to inter vivos transfers won widespread acceptance.⁴ The "modern" rationale for the rule is well stated in an opinion of the Supreme Court of California:

It is said that where a person creates a life estate in himself with a gift over to his heirs he ordinarily intends the same thing as if he had given the property to his estate; that he does not intend to make a gift to any particular person but indicates only that upon his death the residue of the trust property shall be distributed according to the general laws governing succession; and that he does not intend to create in any persons an interest which would prevent him from exercising control over the beneficial interest. * * * Moreover, this rule of construction is in accord with the general policy in favor of the free alienability of property, since its operation tends to make property more readily transferable.⁵

While the weight of authority, as just indicated, supports the retention of the doctrine of worthier title (unlike its common-law brother, the Rule in Shelley's Case) as a rule of construction, there has been substantial and increasing opposition to the doctrine.⁶

The views of the critics of the doctrine, which we find persuasive against its adoption, and borne out by the experience of the New York courts in the series of cases which have followed Doctor v. Hughes, supra, may be summarized as follows. The common-law reasons for the doctrine are as obsolete as those behind the Rule in Shelley's Case.⁷ Retention of the doctrine as a rule of construction is pernicious in several respects.

First, it is questionable whether it accords with the intent of the average settlor. It is perhaps tempting to say that the settlor intended to create no beneficial interest in his heirs when he said "to myself for life, remainder to my heirs" when the question is revocation of the trust, or whether creditors of the settlor's heirs should be able to reach their interest. But the same result is far from appealing if the settlor-life beneficiary dies without revoking the trust and leaves a will which makes no provision for his heirs-at-law (whom he supposed to be taken care of by the trust). In short, while the dominant intent of most such trusts may well be to benefit the life tenant during his life, a subsidiary but nevertheless significant purpose of many such trusts may be to satisfy a natural desire to benefit one's heirs or next of kin. In the normal case an adult has a pretty good idea who his heirs will be at death, and probably means exactly what he says when he states in the trust instrument, "remainder to my heirs."

It is said that the cases in which such is the grantor's intent can be discerned by an examination into his intent; the presumption that a gift over...