Hatch v. State

• Decision Date: 08 February 1906
• Citation: 144 Ala. 50,40 So. 113
• Parties: HATCH v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

40 So. 113

144 Ala. 50

HATCH v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

February 8, 1906

Appeal from City Court of Mobile; O. J. Semmes, Judge.

"To be officially reported."

Alfred Hatch was convicted of an assault with intent to commit murder, and he appeals. Reversed.

Charge 18, requested by the defendant and refused, is in the following words: "The defendant sets up an alibi in this case, and the burden of proof is not changed when he undertakes to prove it; and if, by reason of the evidence in relation to such alibi, you should entertain a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, he should be acquitted, although you may not be able to find that the alibi has been fully proven."

Denson and Dowdell, JJ., dissenting.

Foster K. Hale and Leslie B. Sheldon, for appellant.

Massey Wilson, Atty. Gen., for the State.

DENSON J.

It is not made to appear by the record that any question was raised in the city court as to the organization of the grand jury which found the indictment. Therefore, under the express provisions of section 4325 of the Code of 1896, it is not necessary that the transcript should show the organization of the grand jury which found the indictment. Tipton's Case 140 Ala. 39, 37 So. 231.

Charge 18, refused to the defendant, is the same as charge 47 which was refused in the case of Pickens v. State, 115 Ala. 42, 22 So. 551. In the Pickens Case it was held that the refusal of the charge was error. The only comment made by the court on the charge was in this language: "The instruction numbered 47, in relation to the burden of proving an alibi, and the degree of evidence supporting it, is in accordance with the principles stated in Prince v State, 100 Ala. 144, 14 So. 409, 46 Am. St. Rep. 28, and should have been given." In the Prince Case, the court charged the jury "that the burden of proof is on the defendant to establish his alibi and that it must be done to your satisfaction." The court, through Coleman, J., said of the charge that the proof exacted of the defendant was too high, in that it omitted the word "reasonable." Said the court: "If the jury were reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the defendant was elsewhere, and not at the place where the offense was committed, at the time it was committed, the burden cast upon him by the law is fully met. The defense of alibi is as legitimate and effective as any other, and whenever the evidence introduced supports this defense, and its effect is to create a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury of the defendant's guilt, he is as much entitled to an acquittal as if the reasonable doubt had been created or produced by any other legitimate evidence." The foregoing are the principles referred to by Judge Brickell, upon which he held charge 47 in the Pickens Case good. But Judge Brickell's opinion omits any reference to the clauses in the opinion which immediately follow what we have above quoted from the Prince Case, and which is in this language: "We would not be understood as saying that the jury may disregard other evidence in this case, and consider only that in relation to alibi. The whole evidence should be duly considered and weighed, and if, after considering the whole evidence, the jury have a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, arising out of any part of the evidence, they should acquit." It is manifest that the charge in the Prince Case and the one in the case at bar "might have misled the jury to the conclusion that if they had a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt growing out of the evidence relating to alibi they should acquit, even though such doubt were dissipated by other evidence or did not exist upon a consideration of the whole evidence."

In the case of Pate v. State, 94 Ala. 14, at bottom of page 18, 10 So. 665, at page 666, the court, speaking through Justice Coleman, with respect to the manner in which evidence to support an alibi should be weighed by a jury, uses this language: "We lay down the rule to be that evidence to support an alibi should be weighed and considered by the jury with the other evidence in the case, and as other facts are weighed...