Hatcher, Sec. of State, v. Meredith, Atty. Gen.
| Decision Date | 15 July 1943 |
| Citation | 295 Ky. 194 |
| Parties | Hatcher, Secretary of State, et al. v. Meredith, Atty. Gen. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Kentucky |
Page 194
v.
Meredith, Atty. Gen.
1. Statutes. — The act entitled "An Act to amend Section 246 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, relating to compensation for official services" does not contravene constitutional provision requiring the purposes of an act to be expressed in its title. Constitution secs. 51, 246; Acts 1942, c. 171.
2. Constitutional Law. — The exercise of the General Assembly's right to propose a constitutional amendment is not "legislative" and while the General Assembly's authority to suggest such amendments is plenary, the right differs widely from the General Assembly's function to enact laws. Constitution sec. 256.
3. Statutes. — If the title of an act sets out the number of a section to be amended, the act sufficiently accords with constitutional provision requiring the purposes of an act to be expressed in the title. Constitution sec. 51.
4. Constitutional Law. — The constitutional provisions that no constitutional amendment shall relate to more than one subject are intended to prevent submission as one amendment of two or more propositions which are so widely separated in meaning and purpose as to have no logical interdependence. Constitution secs. 51, 256.
5. Constitutional Law. — Where two or more unrelated propositions are submitted as one constitutional amendment, the proposed amendment violates constitutional provision forbidding constitutional amendments to relate to more than one subject, but if each provision of a proposed amendment is an integral part of a general plan, the amendment is not plural. Constitution sec. 256.
6. Constitutional Law. — The proposed constitutional amendment removing the salary limitation as to public officials and authorizing the General Assembly to regulate the compensation of such officials and employees, and providing that such regulation shall affect the compensation of those in or elected to office when amendment is adopted but that thereafter the compensation of such officials shall not be changed during their terms of office, does not violate constitutional provisions forbidding constitutional amendments to relate to more than one subject. Constitution, secs. 51, 161, 235, 246, 256; Acts 1942, c. 171.
Page 195
7. Constitutional Law. — That proposed constitutional amendment regulating the compensation of public officials and employees would temporarily suspend provision requiring compensation of public officials not to be changed during their terms of office did not establish that proposed amendment violated provision forbidding constitutional amendments to relate to more than one subject. Constitution secs. 51, 161, 235, 246, 256; Acts 1942, c. 171.
8. Constitutional Law. — That a proposed constitutional amendment impliedly repeals sections not mentioned therein does not render the proposed amendment improper as violating constitutional provision forbidding amendments to relate to more than one subject. Constitution secs. 51, 256.
9. Constitutional Law. — A constitutional amendment impliedly modifies any section of Constitution with which the amendment conflicts.
10. Constitutional Law. — The proposed constitutional amendment removing the salary limitation as to public officials and providing that the amendment shall apply to officials in, or elected to, office at its adoption does not violate provision that constitutional amendments shall be so submitted as to allow a separate vote upon each, where condition as to application of proposed amendment was a closely related part of a single plan. Constitution secs. 246, 256; Acts 1942, c. 171.
11. Elections. — The proposed constitutional amendment relating to regulation of compensation of public officials and employees does not violate constitutional provision that an election shall be free and equal. Constitution secs. 6, 246; Acts 1942, c. 171.
12. Elections. — The constitutional provision that elections shall be free and equal means that the voter shall not be physically restrained in the exercise of his right to vote. Constitution sec. 6.
13. Constitutional Law. — The courts should be reluctant to declare acts unconstitutional and will resolve doubts in favor of their validity and will sustain such acts unless they clearly conflict with constitutional limitations.
14. Municipal Corporations. — Municipal corporations are free from legislative control of their private affairs.
15. Officers. — The constitutional provision fixing the maximum compensation payable to "public officers" embraces public "employees." Constitution sec. 246; Acts 1942, c. 171.
16. Constitutional Law. — The proposed constitutional amendment removing the salary limitation as to public officials and conferring upon the General Assembly the power to regulate compensation for public services does not improperly deal with more than one subject because if adopted the power conferred might be exercised so as to interfere with municipal corporations' exclusive power to fix compensation of officers in charge of their private affairs. Constitution secs. 51, 246, 256; Acts 1942, c. 171.
Page 196
17. Constitutional Law. — Obscurity or wisdom of act proposing a constitutional amendment is in the first instance a question for the General Assembly and in the latter instance for the people.
18. Constitutional Law. — Where act proposing constitutional amendment did not express a purpose to repeal or to modify general statute enjoining upon the Attorney General the duty of preparing and certifying the question to the Secretary of State, and the machinery of the general statute was invoked by the act, subsection of act stating the question to be submitted to the voters was void. KRS 118.430; Constitution sec. 246; Acts 1942, c. 171.
19. Constitutional Law. — The constitutional provision imposing upon the Secretary of State alone the duty of publishing a proposed amendment prevails over statute purporting to impose such duty upon the Secretary of State and others. KRS 118.430; Constitution sec. 257.
WINN and BRADLEY, Special Judges, dissenting.
Appeal from Franklin Circuit Court.
G.L. Tucker for appellants.
Hubert Meredith for appellee.
Before W.B. Ardery, Judge.
Before LAFON ALLEN, Special Chief Justice, and ROY SHELBOURNE, ALLEN P. CUBBAGE, B.J. BETHURUM, VICTOR BRADLEY, ROBERT H. WINN, and I.B. ROSS, Special Associate Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY SPECIAL JUDGE CUBBAGE.
Reversing.
The General Assembly, at its regular 1942 session, passed an act, which is Chapter 171 of the Acts of 1942, submitting to the electorate a proposed amendment to the Constitution of Kentucky, to repeal Section 246 thereof and to substitute provisions which materially alter that section. On February 3, 1943, Honorable Hubert Meredith, as Attorney General, filed this action wherein said Act is assailed as being in conflict with several sections of the Constitution, and seeking a declaration of rights. The court was first called upon to determine whether the Act in question was constitutional, and, if the question of the constitutionality was determined adversely to the contentions of appellee (plaintiff below), then he prayed that the court adjudge whether the question to be submitted to the voters was to be stated on the ballot as set forth in the Act, or in the manner provided by Kentucky Revised Statutes, Section 118.430, which directs that the Attorney General shall formulate the question to be stated on the ballot, in a manner calculated to inform the voters of the substance of the proposed amendment in order that they may
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understandingly decide whether they favor or oppose the suggested change.
A general demurrer was filed to the petition, and the trial court overruled the demurrer. Appellants (defendants below) stood upon their demurrer and declined to plead further. Thus the parties pitched the case upon the determination of the legal questions aforesaid, and apparently there is no issue as to facts. Judgment was entered declaring the said Act unconstitutional and void, and ordering appellants not to advertise the amendment or cause it to be placed upon the ballot for the vote of the people, and from said judgment appellants have prosecuted this appeal.
We are first confronted with the issue as to whether the Act which seeks to submit the proposed amendment is offensive to Section 51 of the Constitution. The title to this act is as follows: "An Act to amend Section 246 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Kentucky relating to compensation for official services," and the position taken by appellee is that it is too limited in its scope and is not sufficiently broad to give notice of the full import of the provisions contained in the body of the Act. The right to propose a constitutional amendment has been granted to the Legislature by the framers of the Constitution, but the exercise of this right is not legislative in the ordinary sense, and indeed the Legislature is denied the privilege of amending the Constitution. That is a matter which can be determined only by the direct vote of the people as a whole. While the authority of the Legislature to suggest amendments to the Constitution is plenary, yet it differs widely from the function of the General Assembly to enact laws. The power to submit amendments to the vote of the electorate is special in its nature and may be exercised either by a bill, order, resolution or vote, as is provided by Section 256 of the Constitution, and, so far as the title is concerned, the passage of the bill would have been just as valid without any title at all, and an order or resolution would have served the same purpose. So far as we are advised this particular question has not previously been before the court of last resort in this State, but the decided weight of outside authority supports the views which we have herein...
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