Hatfield v. Daugherty
| Decision Date | 24 May 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-6490,93-6490 |
| Citation | 25 F.3d 1048 |
| Parties | NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit. Kenny K. HATFIELD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Hon. Hunter DAUGHERTY and Hon. Chris Gorman, Respondents-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Before: BOGGS, SUHRHEINRICH and DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judges.
The question presented in this habeas corpus appeal is whether equal protection and due process require a bifurcated procedure for the guilt and penalty phases in cases where the defendant is charged with a subsequent offense for driving under the influence of intoxicants pursuant to Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. Sec. 189A.010 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993). Petitioner Kenny K. Hatfield was charged with, and convicted of, a second violation of Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. Sec. 189A.010 (Baldwin 1984). Acknowledging that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require bifurcated proceedings, see Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967), reaffirmed, Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 n. 6 (1983), petitioner nonetheless maintains that bifurcation is constitutionally mandated here because Kentucky now affords such procedures to defendants in all drug cases. See Clay v. Commonwealth, 818 S.W.2d 264 (Ky.1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1304 (1992). Because we conclude that petitioner has procedurally defaulted on his equal protection claim, and that his due process claim has been answered by Spencer, we AFFIRM.
In April of 1991, petitioner Kenny K. Hatfield was arrested in Garrard County, Kentucky, and charged with a second offense in violation of Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. Sec. 189A.010. Petitioner filed a pretrial motion to bifurcate as to the issues of guilt and penalty. The Garrard County District Court denied the motion on the basis of existing precedent. Petitioner then entered a conditional plea of guilty to a seven-day sentence, to be stayed pending appeal. 1 Petitioner appealed to the Garrard Circuit Court, which affirmed the district court. Both the Kentucky Court of Appeals and the Kentucky Supreme Court denied discretionary review. Upon exhaustion of his state court remedies, petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied relief, and granted a certificate of probable cause.
Petitioner was charged under the following version of Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. Sec. 189A.010:
(1) No person shall operate a motor vehicle anywhere in this state while under the influence of alcohol or any other substance which may impair one's driving ability.
(2) Any person who violates the provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall:
(a) For the first offense, be fined not less than two hundred dollars ($200) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500) or be imprisoned in the county jail for not less than forty-eight (48) hours nor more than thirty (30) days or both....
(b) For the second offense within a five (5) year period, be fined not less than three hundred fifty dollars ($350) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500) and shall be imprisoned in the county jail for not less than seven (7) days nor more than six (6) months and, in addition to fine and imprisonment, may be sentenced to community labor for not less than ten (10) days nor more than six (6) months.
(c) For the third or subsequent offense within a five (5) year period, be fined not less than five hundred dollars ($500) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), and shall be imprisoned in the county jail for not less than thirty (30) days nor more than twelve (12) months and may, in addition to fine and imprisonment, be sentenced to community labor for not less than ten (10) days nor more than twelve (12) months.
Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. Sec. 189A (1984). 2
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has interpreted this statute as permitting the introduction of evidence of prior similar convictions during the guilt phase of the underlying charge. Ratliff v. Commonwealth, 719 S.W.2d 445, 449 (Ky.Ct.App.1986). See also Asher v. Commonwealth, 763 S.W.2d 153 (Ky.Ct.App.1988) (following Ratliff ). Despite its "fundamental agreement" with the appellants as to the "substantial prejudice [which would] unavoidably result from the premature introduction of evidence of this nature," the Ratliff court held that decisions by the Kentucky Supreme Court indicated that in cases similar to the one before it, evidence of earlier convictions was admissible regardless of its prejudicial effect. Id. at 449. The Ratliff court specifically referred to Wahl v. Commonwealth, 490 S.W.2d 769 (Ky.1972), in which the Kentucky Supreme Court allowed the introduction of the appellant's five earlier convictions under the state's former Habitual Criminal Act, Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. Sec. 431.190. The Ratliff court noted that Sec. 431.190, like Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. Sec. 189A, also provided for enhanced sentences for repeat offenders, but did not mandate trial by means of a bifurcated proceeding. Ratliff, 719 S.W.2d at 449 n. 3. 3 The Ratliff court also pointed out that in Carver v. Commonwealth, 634 S.W.2d 418 (Ky.1982), the Supreme Court held that bifurcated trials in local option cases are not constitutionally mandated, but rather, as in persistent felony offender cases, are the product of statutory enactment. Thus, because Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. Sec. 189A did not contain a requirement for a bifurcated trial, neither the constitution nor the statute would be violated by introduction of evidence of prior convictions before a determination of guilt on the underlying charge.
In 1987, the Kentucky Supreme Court decided Commonwealth v. Reneer, 734 S.W.2d 794 (Ky.1987), which signalled a shift in the court's thinking regarding legislative efforts to mandate bifurcation in criminal proceedings. In Reneer, the court held that because Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. Sec. 532.055, 4 which requires that the jury deliberate separately on the issue of guilt and punishment, is an encroachment by the legislature on the rule making authority of the Kentucky Supreme Court, it violates the separation of powers doctrine found in Section 28 of the Kentucky Constitution. Reneer, 734 S.W.2d at 796. Notwithstanding, the court found that Sec. 532.055 could be accepted under the principles of comity because it did not interfere with the orderly functioning of the courts. Id. at 797.
Just prior to the date set for petitioner's trial, the Kentucky Supreme Court issued Clay, 818 S.W.2d 264. In Clay, the court ruled that in all drug cases in which a subsequent offense is charged, no reference shall be made to the prior offense until the sentencing phase of the trial, and that the trial shall be bifurcated in accordance with the Truth-In-Sentencing Act (Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. Chapter 532). The court observed that Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. Sec. 218A.990, 5 the provision for enhancing the penalty of subsequent offenders of drug-related offenses, is nothing more than a sentencing statute, and unlike the offense of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. Sec. 527.040(1), which makes the proof of a prior conviction a necessary part of the guilt phase of the trial, the commission of the prior drug-related offense(s) is not an element necessary to determine guilt. The court also explicitly overruled its earlier decision in Smith v. Commonwealth, 707 S.W.2d 342 (Ky.1986), which held that the question of whether bifurcated jury trials are required in persistent felony cases is a matter for the legislature, and because there was no legislative requirement, bifurcation was not required in such cases. Id. at 343.
Petitioner argues that the Clay case "has now set out a rule of procedure for subsequent-offense drug trials." Petitioner therefore suggests that because Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. Sec. 189A.010(2) is nothing but a sentencing statute, applicable to persons convicted of driving under the influence as defined in Sec. 189A.010(1), which does not require proof of a prior offense as part of the primary charge, the ruling in Clay should be applied here. Petitioner also points out that in overruling Smith, the Kentucky Supreme Court unequivocally laid to rest the reasoning in Smith, as well as in Wahl and Carver, and therefore Ratliff, that the question of bifurcated jury trials is a matter of public policy to be addressed by the legislature and not the courts, as is further reflected by the court's decision in Reneer, 734 S.W.2d 794. Thus, even if Ratliff were rightly decided, subsequent developments in Kentucky jurisprudence warrant its overruling. Petitioner contends that the Commonwealth has offered no rational reason why DUI defendants should be denied a protection afforded to other drug offenders.
Petitioner also argues that his due process rights have been violated because, although not constitutionally required to do so, Kentucky has decided that bifurcation is necessary to protect defendants who are charged with subsequent offenses. Thus, it may not arbitrarily deny that same protection to DUI defendants without offending due process.
II. Analysis
Federal courts have jurisdiction to entertain a state prisoner's petition for habeas relief solely on the grounds that the prisoner's confinement violates the Constitution, law, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(a) (1988); 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2241(c)(3) (1988); Wright v. West, 112 S.Ct. 2482, 2486 (1992); Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480 (1991). In addition, a petitioner must "fairly present" the substance of each of his federal constitutional claims to the state courts before the federal courts will entertain them. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(b), (c). Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4 (1982); Levine v. Torvik, 986 F.2d 1506,...
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