Hatfield v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n

• Decision Date: 20 January 1917
• Docket Number: No. 30857.,30857.
• Citation: 180 Iowa 39,161 N.W. 123
• Parties: HATFIELD v. IOWA STATE TRAVELING MEN'S ASS'N.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

180 Iowa 39

161 N.W. 123

HATFIELD

v.IOWA STATE TRAVELING MEN'S ASS'N.

No. 30857.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Jan. 20, 1917.

Appeal from District Court, Polk County; Wm. H. McHenry and Charles A. Dudley, Judges.

Action at law to recover upon a policy or benefit certificate insuring William J. Hatfield, while a member of said association in good standing, against injury through external, violent, and accidental means, which injury shall “independently of all other causes result in death within ninety days from said injury.” The defendant contested the claim, and on trial to a jury there was a verdict for plaintiff. From the judgment rendered on the verdict the defendant appeals. Affirmed.Sullivan & Sullivan, of Des Moines, for appellant.

Dowell, McLennan & Zeuch, T. B. Hanley, and Parker, Parrish & Miller, all of Des Moines, for appellee.

WEAVER, J.

William J. Hatfield, a resident of Portland, Or., died at that place on June 14, 1913. At the time of his death he held three several policies or certificates of accident insurance issued, respectively, by the Iowa State Traveling Men's Association (defendant herein), the Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York, and Travelers' Protective Association of America. The widow of Hatfield, in her own right and as administrator of her husband's estate, made claim against each of these three companies or associations upon their several contracts of insurance, on the theory that his death was occasioned by accidental means within the terms of such contracts. These claims being denied, separate suits were brought in the district court of Polk county for their collection. In each case the plaintiff recovered judgment and in each an appeal was taken to this court. The cases have been prosecuted and defended by the same counsel throughout, and, subject to some minor exceptions, the issues presented are identical. The principal defense relied upon in all of them is that the death of Hatfield was not caused by accidental means within the terms of the contract, but that he died from disease or bodily infirmity. We have at this term considered the appeal in the case against the Fidelity & Casualty Company, and reached a conclusion affirming the judgment of the trial court. In that opinion we have stated, as far as seemed to be necessary, the substance of the testimony and of the record of the trial, and shall not extend this opinion for their repetition. We have also there given consideration to the several legal propositions advanced by counsel, and, so far as the same questions are raised in this case, that opinion must be considered as governing the result in this. Other features not common to the cases against the Fidelity & Casualty Company and against this defendant will now be noted.

[1] I. In the case at bar defendant admitted the membership of Hatfield in good standing at the date of his death, that plaintiff is his beneficiary, and that due notice and proofs of loss were given, thus in effect limiting the dispute between the parties to the actual cause of death of the insured. Appellant did not ask or submit special findings for answer by the jury, but in other respects the conduct of the defense was like that to which we have referred in disposing of the case first mentioned. Counsel for the defense did, however, present and ask to have submitted to the jury some 15 different instructions upon the law applicable to the issues of fact, and many of the propositions so stated were in words or in substance incorporated into the charge given by the court, and, having done so, we think appellant is not at liberty to say that the questions which it thus aided in submitting as matters of fact for the jury are, nevertheless, matters of law, and should be so considered on this appeal.

[2] We will also say, as suggested in the opinion referred to, that independently of the rule just applied we think the testimony concerning the death of the insured and the cause thereof was such as to make necessary its submission to the jury. In addition to the testimony concerning the autopsy which was offered in each case, both parties on this trial introduced additional medical witnesses, who expressed their opinions founded upon hypothetical questions embodying an assumption of facts claimed to have been developed from other sources of evidence or facts admitted or proved. As is not unusual, the experts offered by the defendant express their conviction that the disclosures made by the autopsy and the statements made in the hypothesis submitted to...