Hatfield v. Kijakazi

• Decision Date: 07 February 2022
• Docket Number: 6:20-CV-214-HAI
• Parties: JEFFERY ALLAN HATFIELD, Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky

JEFFERY ALLAN HATFIELD, Plaintiff,
v.
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

No. 6:20-CV-214-HAI

United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Southern Division, London

February 7, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Hanly A. Ingram United States Magistrate Judge

On December 29, 2017, Plaintiff Jeffery Allan Hatfield filed a protective Title II application for disability insurance benefits and a Title XVI application for supplemental security income. See D.E. 12-1 at 12.^[1] This was his second such application. His first application was denied by Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) decision on March 22, 2017. Id. at 55. For his second application, Hatfield dates the beginning of his disability period to December 29, 2017. Id. at 12.

Hatfield claims he is disabled due to anxiety, depression, a skin infection, a right hip disorder, a right shoulder disorder, a staph problem, and testicular pain. Id. at 17. The Social Security Administration denied Hatfield's claims initially on June 11, 2018, and upon reconsideration on November 13, 2018. Id. at 12. Then, on November 29, 2018, upon Hatfield's request, ALJ Jennifer Thomas conducted an administrative hearing. Id. The ALJ heard testimony from Hatfield and impartial vocational expert (“VE”) William J. Kiger. Id. He was

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found to not be disabled during the relevant period, December 29, 2017, to February 18, 2020, the date of the decision.

Hatfield brings this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c) to obtain judicial review of the ALJ's decision denying his application for disability insurance benefits. Both parties consented to the referral of this matter to a magistrate judge. D.E. 15. Accordingly, this matter was referred to the undersigned to conduct all proceedings and order the entry of a final judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. D.E. 14. The Court, having reviewed the record and for the reasons stated herein, DENIES Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (D.E. 21) and GRANTS the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment (D.E. 25).

I. The ALJ's Decision

Under 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920, an ALJ conducts a five-step analysis to evaluate a disability claim.^[2] The ALJ followed these procedures in this case. See D.E. 12-1 at 14-22.

At the first step, if a claimant is working at a substantial gainful activity, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). In this case, the ALJ found that Hatfield had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 29, 2017, the alleged onset date. D.E. 12-1 at 14.

At the second step, if a claimant does not have any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limit his physical or mental ability to do basic work activities,

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then he does not have a severe impairment and is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). The ALJ found that Hatfield experiences the severe impairments of adjustment disorder, right hip osteoarthritis, right should osteoarthritis, depressive disorder, skin disorder, and anxiety. D.E. 12-1 at 14.

At the third step, if a claimant's impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, then he is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). The ALJ found Hatfield failed to meet this standard. D.E. 12-1 at 15-16.

If, as here, a claimant is not found disabled at step three, the ALJ must determine the claimant's Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”), which is his ability to do physical and mental work activities on a sustained basis despite limitations from his impairments. The ALJ found Hatfield had the RFC

to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except he can frequently climb ramps and stairs occasionally climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; frequently stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. He can understand, remember and carry out simple instructions and procedures. He can maintain concentration, persistence and pace for the completion of simple instructions and procedures in 2 hour segments of time in an 8 hour workday. He can have occasional interaction with coworkers, supervisors and the general public. He should [sic] in an object focused setting

Id. at 16.

At the fourth step, if a claimant's impairments do not prevent him from doing past relevant work (given the ALJ's assessment of his residual functional capacity), he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). The ALJ found that Hatfield was “unable to perform any past relevant work.” D.E. 12-1 at 20.

At the fifth step, if a claimant's impairments (considering his RFC, age, education, and past work) do not prevent him from doing other work that exists in the national economy, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g). The ALJ found Hatfield was not disabled at this step.

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D.E. 12-1 at 21. The ALJ explained that she asked the VE at the hearing “whether jobs exist in the national economy for an individual with the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity.” Id. The ALJ accepted the VE's testimony that Hatfield could find work as, for example, a marker, housekeeping clerk, and router. Id. Because sufficient work existed in the national economy that Hatfield could perform, the ALJ found him “not disabled” as defined by the regulations. Id.

Accordingly, on February 18, 2020, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision, finding that Hatfield was not disabled, and was therefore ineligible for disability insurance benefits. D.E. 12-1 at 22. The Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ's decision on August 26, 2020. Id. at 1.

II. Framework for Judicial Review

Under the Social Security Act, a “disability” is defined as “the inability to engage in ‘substantial gainful activity' because of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment of at least one year's expected duration.” Cruse v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 502 F.3d 532, 539 (6th Cir. 2007). Judicial review of the denial of a claim for Social Security benefits is limited to determining whether the ALJ's findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards were applied. Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007). “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Cutlip v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994). The substantial evidence standard “presupposes that there is a zone of choice within which decision makers can go either way, without interference from the court.” Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (quotes and citations omitted).

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In determining the existence of substantial evidence, courts must examine the record as a whole. Id. (citing Kirk v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 535 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957 (1983)). However, courts are not to conduct a de novo review, resolve conflicts in evidence, or make credibility determinations. Id. (citations omitted); see also Bradley v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 862 F.2d 1224, 1228 (6th Cir. 1988). Rather, if the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed even if the reviewing court would decide the matter differently, and even if substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion. Her v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 389-90 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Casey v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1993); Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545; Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1983).

Under the current rules, all medical opinions are weighed in light of several factors: supportability, consistency, relationship with the claimant, specialization, and any other relevant factors. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c). Supportability and consistency “are the most important factors” in weighing medical opinions. Id. § 416.920c(b)(2).

Disability determinations often hinge on the claimant's credibility. The ALJ must consider statements or reports from the claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a). To determine whether statements of a claimant are credible, the following two-part test is used:

First, the ALJ will ask whether there is an underlying medically determinable physical impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant's symptoms. Second, if the ALJ finds that such an impairment exists, then he must evaluate the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms on the individual's ability to do basic work activities.

Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 247 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(a)).^[3] It is within the province of the ALJ, rather than the reviewing court, to evaluate

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the claimant's credibility. Rogers, 486 F.3d at 247 (citing Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997); Crum v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1990); Kirk v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 538 (6th Cir. 1981)). Even so, the credibility determinations of the ALJ must be reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. Rogers, 486 F.3d at 249.

Finally, issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived. United States v. Kerns, 9 F.4th 342, 351 (6th Cir. 2021); Strickland v. City of Detroit, 995 F.3d 495, 511 (6th Cir. 2021).

III. Analysis

Hatfield argues the ALJ “completely disregarded” or “failed to properly address” his skin disorder, why she found his “condition had improved from the time of the prior ALJ decision[, ]” and certain findings and opinions by state agency mental health consultant Leigh Ford, Ph.D., and treating physician Syed Raza, MD. D.E. 21-1 at 12-14. On the contrary, the ALJ addressed each of these, so none of them was “disregarded” or unaddressed. Instead, Hatfield...