Hathaway v. Merchants' Loan & Trust Co.

• Decision Date: 20 December 1905
• Citation: 218 Ill. 580,75 N.E. 1060
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: HATHAWAY et al. v. MERCHANTS' LOAN & TRUST CO.

218 Ill. 580

75 N.E. 1060

HATHAWAY et al.

v.MERCHANTS' LOAN & TRUST CO.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 20, 1905.

Error to Appellate Court, First District.

In the matter of the estate of Charles A. Morrill. From an order allowing the claim of the Merchants' Loan & Trust Company, which allowance was affirmed by the Appellate Court, Charles Hathaway and others bring error. Affirmed.

Merrick & Ramsay and Millard & Hale, for plaintiffs in error.

McCulloch & McCulloch, for defendant in error.

On December 31, 1902, Charles A. Morrill died testate. On January 13, 1903, letters testamentary were issued by the probate court of Cook county to the Merchants' Loan & Trust Company, the defendant in error, being the executor named in the will. The March term, 1903, of the probate court of Cook county was selected as adjustment term for all claims against the estate. The claim of Charles Hathaway & Co., plaintiffs in error, in the sum of $38,789, was allowed on June 25, 1903. On May 15, 1903, an amendment to section 70 of chapter 3 of Hurd's Revised Statutes was passed by the Legislature, which went into effect on July 1, 1903 (Laws 1903, p. 3), and required all claims against estates to be filed within one year from the date of the issue of latters testamentary, instead of within two years, as formerly required. On May 2, 1904, the defendant in error filed its claim in the probate court against the estate of Morrill, based upon eight notes, and on July 25, 1904, the claim was allowed in the sum of $41,065.77 of the seventh class. Plaintiffs in error appealed from this judgment to the circuit court, and on August 26, 1904, upon a hearing before the court without a jury, the claim was allowed for the sum of $42,088.83. It was contended by the plaintiffs in error that the claim should not have been allowed, because it was not filed in the probate court within one year from the granting of letters testamentary. This contention was presented to the circuit court by three propositions of law, all of which were refused. From the judgment of the circuit court an appeal was prosecuted to the Appellate Court for the First District, where the judgment was affirmed, and the case is brought to this court by writ of error.

WILKIN, J. (after stating the facts).

The sole question is whether the claim of plaintiffs in error is barred by the amendment of May 15, 1903, it not having been filed within one year from the date of the issue of letters testamentary, or whether the statute which existed prior to the amendment was in force as to such claims, entitling the claimant to two years from the date of the issue of letters in which to file its claim. On April 11, 1903, the Legislature amended section 7 of chapter 148, entitled ‘Wills' (Laws 1903, p. 355), reducing the time from two years to one year within which a bill could be filed to contest a will. In the case of Sharp v. Sharp, 213 Ill. 332, 72 N. E. 1058, we held that this amendment applied to all bills filed after the act took effect, notwithstanding the wills contested were probatedbefore that time. It is insisted by plaintiffs in error that the two acts are in pari materia and will be construed alike, and that, as we held that the amendment to the statute of wills applied to all bills filed after its enactment we should also hold that the amendment to section 70 of chapter 3 (Laws 1903, p. 3) applied to all claims filed after its enactment, and hence the claim of defendant in error should be held barred.

There is a material distinction between a statute conferring jurisdiction and fixing a time within which it may be exercised, and a statute of limitations. A court of equity has no power to entertain a bill to set aside a will independently of statutory enactment conferring such jurisdiction. When jurisdiction is thus conferred, it can only be exercised in the manner and under the limitations prescribed by the statute. The time within which a bill may be filed under the statute by any person interested is not a limitation law, and the statute in force at the time of the filing of the bill is the statute conferring jurisdiction, and must govern. Spaulding v. White, 173 Ill. 127, 50 N. E. 224; Sharp v. Sharp, supra. We have held in many cases that section 70 of chapter 3 is not a statute conferring jurisdiction, but is a statute of limitations, governed by the laws and rules applicable to such statutes. Baird v. Chapman, 120 Ill. 537, 12 N. E. 73;Roberts v. Flatt, 142 Ill. 485, 32 N. E. 484;Snydacker v. Swan Land Co., 154 Ill. 220, 40 N. E. 466. While it is undoubtedly within the power of the Legislature to pass a statute of limitations or to change the period of limitation previously fixed and to make such statute or changes applicable to existing causes of action, yet such a statute is not to be readily construed as having a retroactive effect, but is generally deemed to apply merely to causes of action arising subsequent to its enactment, and the presumption is against any intent on the part of the Legislature to make the statute retroactive. 19 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d Ed.) p. 174; Robertson v. Wheeler, 162 Ill. 566, 44 N. E. 870; Spaulding v. White, supra. The statute will only be given a retroactive effect when it was clearly the intention of the Legislature that it should so operate. Fisher v. Green, 142 Ill. 80, 31 N. E. 172. And even where this intention clearly appears, it will not be given effect, if to do so would render it unreasonable or unjust. If a reasonable time is given for bringing a suit or filing claims after the...