Hatter v. Dyer

• Citation: 154 F.Supp.3d 940
• Decision Date: 31 December 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:14–cv–616–AG (GJS)
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: Claudell Hatter, Plaintiff v. Daniel Dyer, Defendant.

154 F.Supp.3d 940

Claudell Hatter, Plaintiff

v.Daniel Dyer, Defendant.

Case No. 2:14–cv–616–AG (GJS)

United States District Court, C.D. California.

Signed December 31, 2015

Claudell Hatter, Los Angeles, CA, pro se.

Timothy J. Kral, Manning and Kass Ellrod Ramirez Trester LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant.

ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ANDREW J. GUILFORD

, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636

, the Court has reviewed the Complaint and all pleadings, motions, and other documents filed in this action, the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge (“Report”), Plaintiff's Objections to the Report, and Defendant's Response. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the Court has conducted a de novo review of those portions of the Report to which objections have been stated.

Nothing in the Objections affects or alters the analysis and conclusions set forth in the Report.

The Court accepts the findings and recommendations set forth in the Report. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that: Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED; and the Complaint is dismissed with leave to amend by no later than forty-five days after the date of this Order, remedying the deficiencies discussed in the Report in a “First Amended Complaint.” The First Amended Complaint must be complete and without reference to the prior complaint or any other already-filed document.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GAIL J. STANDISH

, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

United States Magistrate Judge Gail J. Standish submits this Report and Recommendation under 28 U.S.C. § 636

and General Order No. 05–07 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California to the Honorable Andrew J. Guilford, United States District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

On February 4, 2014, Hatter filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983

civil rights complaint asserting that Dyer violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to remediate mold and prevent gross jail overcrowding. [Dkt. 3.] On May 6, 2015, Dyer moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

because the Complaint fails to properly allege sufficient facts to satisfy the “subjective prong” of the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference test. [Dkt. 27.]¹ Hatter opposed, and Dyer replied. [Dkts. 32 & 33.] For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends that the District Judge GRANT the motion to dismiss and GRANT Hatter leave to amend.

ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT²

According to the Complaint, Hatter has been “forced to suffer damage to [his] physical health in Los Angeles County Men's Central Jail, where [he] had to breathe in the mold from the walls,” which resulted in trips to the hospital for medical treatment. [Compl. at 5.] In addition, Hatter alleges that jail overcrowding of dormitory 9500 has caused him to experience “stress, tension, and communicable diseases.” [Id. ] Hatter says that he complained in writing to Los Angeles County Sheriff Captain Dyer, but that he received “no results from him as head of the jail.” [Id. ]

The Complaint asserts that Dyer has violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, and that Hatter should be paid $750,000 in compensation. [Id . at 5, 6.]

GOVERNING STANDARDS

Rule 12(b)(6)

requires dismissal when a complaint fails to state a cognizable legal theory or alleges insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir.2013). On such review, the Court accepts all facts alleged in a complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Gant v. Cnty. of L

os

A

ngeles

, 772 F.3d 608, 614 (9th Cir.2014). Because Hatter proceeds pro se, this Court must hold his complaint “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and “construe the pleadings liberally,” “particularly” because this is a “civil rights case[.]” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir.2010) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. Hatter Was Required to Sufficiently Allege Deliberate Indifference to Plead His Eighth Amendment Claim, And Failed to Do So.

As a threshold matter, the parties dispute whether Hatter was required to plead deliberate indifference. Under the Complaint as currently pled , the answer is clear. Hatter alleges a violation of the Eighth Amendment, specifically that Dyer failed to respond to Hatter's complaints about the mold on the walls of the County Jail and overcrowding conditions. [Compl. at 5.] It is well settled that “a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994)

; see

Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir.2014). This standard requires more than “gross negligence” or even “recklessness.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836, 836 n. 4, 114 S.Ct. 1970.

Here, the Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to show deliberate indifference. The only fact Hatter alleges in the Complaint related to Dyer's mindset is that Hatter “ha[d] written complaint forms to Los Angeles County Sheriff Captain Dyer about this problem [of overcrowding], with no results from him, as head of the jail.” [Compl. at 5.] This does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference because it does not allege that Dyer actually believed that a substantial risk of harm existed to Hatter, nor does it demonstrate anything more than a failure of ordinary care.³ Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1441 n. 8 (9th Cir.1991)

(en banc ), abrogated on other grounds,

Farmer, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (abrogation recognized in Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1085 (9th Cir.2014) ) (“ ‘[A]ccidents' and ‘inadvertent failure’ do not rise to the level of deliberate indifference.”). Thus, allegations of mere inaction by Dyer are insufficient, without more, to demonstrate his wrongful mental state.

II. When Repleading His Claim Under the Fourteenth Amendment, Hatter Must Allege Deliberate Indifference.

Hatter's opposition to the motion to dismiss raises a more difficult question about the standard governing his claim. In his opposition, Hatter explains that, “at the time of the alleged deprivation by Dyer, plaintiff had not been convicted yet”—i.e., he was a pretrial detainee. [See Dkt. 32 at 5–6.] And, as Hatter correctly notes, a pretrial detainee is protected from conditions constituting punishment under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1971)

; Redman, 942 F.2d at 1440 n. 7 (“Thus, while the eighth amendment proscribes cruel and unusual punishment for convicted inmates, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment proscribes any punishment of pretrial detainees.”). Hatter argues that, accordingly, he need not demonstrate deliberate indifference. Dyer contends that, regardless of whether Hatter was a pretrial detainee (bringing his claim under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause) or a convicted prisoner (bringing a claim predicated on an Eighth Amendment violation), “the ‘deliberate indifference’ test is the same for pretrial detainees and for convicted prisoners.”

[Dkt. 33 at 4 (citing Clouthier v. Cty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1242–43 (9th Cir.2010)

.] If Hatter is correct, the Court could simply recommend constructive amendment of his Complaint to present a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause claim instead of an Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause claim.

Accordingly, this Court must determine the proper standard governing a Fourteenth Amendment “conditions of confinement” claim brought by a pretrial detainee.

A. Survey of Relevant Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit Precedent

1. Early Supreme Court Precedent

The Supreme Court first decided the standard for a pretrial detainee challenging conditions of confinement under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause in Bell v. Wolfish

: “In evaluating the constitutionality of conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention that implicate only the protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law, ... the proper inquiry is whether those conditions amount to punishment of the detainee.” 441 U.S. 520, 535, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). “Not every disability imposed during pretrial detention amounts to ‘punishment’ in the constitutional sense.” Id. at 536, 99 S.Ct. 1861. The Court further provided the following “useful guideposts in determining whether particular restrictions and conditions accompanying pretrial detention amount to punishment”:

A court must decide whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose. Absent a showing of an expressed intent to punish on the part of detention facility officials, that determination generally will turn on whether an alternative purpose to which the restriction may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned to it. Thus, if a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to “punishment.” Conversely, if a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary or purposeless—a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua

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