Haubrich v. Johnson, No. 47946

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
• Writing for the Court: THOMPSON
• Citation: 50 N.W.2d 19,242 Iowa 1236
• Decision Date: 13 November 1951
• Docket Number: No. 47946
• Parties: HAUBRICH v. JOHNSON et al. (two cases).

Page 19

50 N.W.2d 19 242 Iowa 1236 HAUBRICH
v.
JOHNSON et al. (two cases). No. 47946. Supreme Court of Iowa. Nov. 13, 1951.

Page 20

[242 Iowa 1238] John D. Beardsley and Robert M. Underhill, of Onawa, for appellants.

Edward E. Baron, of Sioux City, for appellees.

THOMPSON, Justice.

The plaintiffs, W. J. Haubrich and Martha M. Haubrich, are husband and wife, and in 1949 were each the owners of certain real estate in the town of Mapleton, in Monona County. They prosecuted separate appeals to the board of review from 1949 tax assessments; and upon confirmation of the assessments by the board, each appealed to the district court. The cases were consolidated for trial, and upon decree being entered reducing the assessments against three parcels of the realty,

Page 21

the defendants have appealed to this court. The petitions filed in the district court by each plaintiff were identical, except as to the property described, and the issues are the same.

Plaintiffs made several complaints of illegality of the assessments, and there were involved other pieces of realty than those upon which the trial court reduced the amounts. However, reductions were made upon three parcels only, and the one ground upon which plaintiff's contention was sustained was that the properties were assessed for more than the value authorized by law, and in excess of the real value, and the assessable value. But plaintiffs have not appealed from the ruling of the court refusing to reduce the assessments upon their other properties, or in rejecting their other claimed grounds of illegality; nor do they complain or argue these matters here. The issue therefore resolves itself into an examination of the correctness of the decree reducing the assessments upon the three properties above referred to upon the sole ground of the excessiveness of the amount fixed.

Two of the properties are separate buildings known jointly as the Brown apartments, while the third appears in the record as the Olson building. The 1949 assessment on one of the Brown apartments was $4,200.00; on the other $6,680.00, and on the Olson building $2,060.00, each actual value. The district court reduced the amounts, respectively, to $3,200.00, $5,000.00, and $1,500.00.

Defendants assign two errors: That plaintiffs did not properly present their objections to the County Board of Review, and that the district court therefore had no jurisdiction to hear the [242 Iowa 1239] appeals; and second, that as a fact question, the court was in error in reducing the assessments upon the evidence of values presented.

I. Defendants' first assignment of error divides into two parts: First, that plaintiffs did not follow the procedure laid down for appeals prescribed by 1946 Code, sections 405.22 and 405.24, I.C.A., which are said to be mandatory to confer jurisdiction upon the district court; and second, that, even if these sections do not apply, but section 442.5 still governs, plaintiffs did not sufficiently state their objections to the board of review, and so no appeal could be taken from it.

1. The determination of the first complaint set forth in the preceding paragraph involves a construction of section 3, Chapter 240 of the Acts of the 52nd General Assembly, enacted in 1947, now appearing as section 442.1 of the Code of 1950, I.C.A. Chapter 240 is the law creating the offices of county assessor and county boards of review. It is apparent that the former section 442.1, providing for local boards of review, was no longer appropriate and that its repeal was necessary when county boards of review were brought into being. But section 3 says, among other things, that, 'The provisions of sections 405.22 and 405.24, Code 1946 [I.C.A.] shall also apply to appeal from county boards of review.' (Italics supplied.) It is this clause which forms the basis of appellants' argument at this point.

Chapter 405, brought into being by the 49th General Assembly, is generally known as the 'Des Moines' assessor law. It provides for city assessors in cities having a population of 125,000 or more. If it were not for the above provision of section 3, Chapter 240, as enacted by the 52nd General Assembly, sections 405.22 and 405.24 would therefore clearly have no application to real estate in the town of Mapleton. We take judicial notice that it is not a city having 125,000 or more population, or, indeed, since Chapter 405A permits cities of 10,000 or more population to come under Chapter 405 if they so elect, that it is also not within that class. Knudson v. Linstrum, 233 Iowa 709, 712, 8 N.W.2d 495. In addition there is evidence that at the time of the assessments Mapleton had a population of about 1800.

Section 405.22 provides that a property owner aggrieved by his assessment must bring his objections before the board of review[242 Iowa 1240] in writing, and that his protest must be based upon one or all of five designated grounds. It will be noted that this provides for an appeal to the board of review, rather than from it. Section 405.24 is set out herewith: 'Appeals from the local

Page 22

board of review and to the district court, shall be followed as provided in sections 442.6 to 442.11, inclusive. No new grounds in addition to those set out in the protest to the local board of review as provided in section 405.22, can be pleaded, but additional evidence to sustain said grounds may be introduced. The assessor shall have the same right to appeal and in the same manner as an individual taxpayer, public body or other public officer as provided in section 442.10.' (Italics supplied.) This section deals with appeals from the board of review to the district court. Defendants' argument is that, since section 405.22 says that objections must be in writing, and are limited to five specific grounds, and section 405.24 says that no new grounds can be pleaded upon appeal to the district court from the board of review, and since section 3, Chapter 240 above referred to makes the provisions of sections 405.22 and 405.24 applicable to appeals from boards of review, it follows that all procedure, both in filing protests with the board of review and in appealing from its findings, is governed by the two latter sections. It is urged that section 442.5, Code of 1946, I.C.A., is necessarily repealed by implication, because it is repugnant to and in irreconcilable conflict with section 3, Chapter 240, and sections 405.22 and 405.24.

We set out section 442.5, so far as material, herewith: 'Any person aggrieved by the action of the assessor in assessing his property may make oral or written complaint thereof to the board of review, which shall consist simply of a statement of the errors complained of, with such facts as may lead to their correction,' * * *. (Italics supplied.) This section of the code has appeared in our statutory law for many years; and it is defendants' argument that, since it is incompatible with and repugnant to the other three sections above quoted, under the familiar rule under such circumstances the legislature must be deemed to have inteded to repeal the [242 Iowa 1241] earlier statute; in this case section 442.5. Concededly, plaintiffs did not comply with sections 405.22 and 405.24 in making their case before the Monona county board of review and in taking their appeal; so that if defendants are correct in their view of the applicable statutes, the district court was without jurisdiction.

It is evident that the procedures...