Haugen v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 08 December 1892
• Citation: 53 N.W. 769,3 S.D. 394
• Parties: HAUGEN v. CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. CO.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

53 N.W. 769

3 S.D. 394

HAUGEN v. CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of South Dakota

December 8, 1892

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The qualifications of a juror, when challenged for cause, become a question of fact for the trial court.

2. The statute having prescribed the grounds for disqualification when either of these grounds is found to exist, it is the duty of the trial court to reject the juror; but if, after a full examination of the juror personally, or by the testimony of other persons, the trial court finds that none of the statutory disqualifications exist, and accepts the juror, its decision will not be reversed, unless it is made to appear that there was no legal evidence to support its judgment.

3. The word "bias," as used in subdivisions 6, 7, § 5040 Comp. Laws, in reference to the disqualification of a juror to sit in a case, means such a leaning of the mind or propensity towards an object as does not leave the mind indifferent, but shows that it is under an influence which sways it to one side, and will tend to prevent the juror from deciding the case according to the evidence.

4. An unqualified opinion or belief as to the merits of the action founded upon knowledge of the material facts or some of them disqualifies a person from sitting as a juror. This is the language of the Code. Subdivision 6, § 5040, Comp. Laws.

5. The theory of the law is that a juror who has formed an opinion cannot be impartial, but every opinion he may entertain need not necessarily have that effect. The opinion, to disqualify, must be an abiding bias of the mind, based upon the substantial facts in the case, in the existence of which he believes.

6. An unqualified opinion or belief, as used in the Code, is such a settled conviction in the mind of the juror, founded upon a knowledge of the facts of the case, as would raise a strong presumption of partiality; but a hypothetical opinion, founded on hearsay or information, and unaccompanied with malice or ill will, will not support a challenge for bias.

7. In determining the impartiality of a juror, the trial judge is clothed with large discretion, and his finding is not to be determined by any inflexible rules. Much must depend upon the character of the juror as disclosed by his bearing, and upon his relation to the parties. The standard is a man who will act with entire impartiality as a juror in a given case. From the surroundings the trial judge must determine, and from that judgment there is no appeal if it is not exercised in an arbitrary manner, but is a fair, legal judgment, deduced from the facts as they are presented.

8. A juror swore that he had formed an opinion, but it was based upon conversations had with persons who knew nothing about any of the facts in the case. The conversations were general current talk. Notwithstanding his opinion, based, as it was, he could and would sit as a juror in the case, unprejudiced and unbiased, and render a verdict according to law and evidence. Held, the trial court committed no error in permitting the juror to sit on the panel.

9. In an action against a railroad company for damages caused by fire, when the complaint alleges negligence in managing an engine, whereby combustibles on its right of way and on lands adjacent were set on fire, from which the fire, without any negligence of the plaintiff, spread to plaintiff's lands, and plaintiff's property was destroyed, it is not necessary to aver negligence of the defendant in permitting the fire to escape from its right of way.

10. A complaint alleging that the defendant company so carelessly and negligently managing its engine and train as to set fire to dry grass on land adjoining its right of way, which, without negligence on plaintiff's part, spread and caused the damage conplained of, charges actionable negligence against the company.

11. When errors in the admission or rejection of testimony could in no way have affected the result, they are not grounds for reversal.

12. A trial court will direct a verdict only when there is a total absence of evidence upon some essential issue, or where there is no conflict, and the evidence is susceptible of only one construction.

Appeal from circuit court, Turner county; E. G. SMITH, Judge.

Action by Otto P. Haugen against the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company for causing the destruction of plaintiff's property by fire. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Winsor & Kittredge and E. C. Kennedy, for appellant. Palmer & Rogde, for respondent.

BENNETT P. J.

This is an action brought by the plaintiff based upon the charge that the defendant negligently and carelessly permitted combustibles to accumulate upon its right of way and roadbed; that sparks from its engine ignited this material, and that this fire was communicated to plaintiff's property, and destroyed it; whereby he was damaged to the extent of $1,476. The answer of defendant, except as to some formal matters, was a general denial. Upon the trial a verdict was rendered in favor of plaintiff, and damages assessed at the sum of $978.90, and judgment rendered for the amount. From this judgment the appeal is taken.

The first and second assignments of error are that the court below erred in permitting Jurors Sterling and Lahey to remain on the panel after being challenged for cause. We will proceed to the consideration of the objections to these jurors, to ascertain if the rights of the defendant were in any way impaired or violated by the action of the court in refusing to reject them from the panel. Juror Sterling was examined by counsel for the defendant when he was called as a juror, as follows: "Question. Mr. Sterling, you say you have an unadjusted claim for damages against the defendant company; have you now? Answer. I have, for those cattle that were run over. Q. You have put in a claim against the company for those cattle, and it has not been paid? A. I did put in a claim. Examined by plaintiff: Q. Mr. Sterling, I will ask you whether or not the fact that you have a claim against the company, the claim being unadjusted, would be a bias or prejudice against the defendant in this action or any other action? A. I don't think it would. Q. Notwithstanding that fact, you can hear this case without bias or prejudice, and render a verdict according to law and evidence, and will you do so? A. I would. By the Court: Q. The claim which you have referred to against the defendant is not a claim arising out of any transaction set forth in the complaint in this action? A. No, sir. Q. It has no connection whatever with the matters involved in this suit? A. Not that I am aware of; no." The challenge for cause was overruled. When the juror Lahey was called he was examined by counsel for defendant, as follows: "Question. Mr. Lahey, from your conversation relating to the fire, you formed an opinion, did you not? Answer. Yes, sir. Q. You still have the same opinion that you then formed? A. Yes, sir. Q. And it would require the evidence of witnesses to change that opinion, would it? A. Yes, sir." The defendant then challenged the juror for cause. He was then examined by plaintiff: "Question. Will you state whether or not you ever had any conversation with the plaintiff in regard to this fire? Answer. No, sir. Q. Did you have any conversation with any one who claimed to know the facts of the case? A. I did not. Q. The opinion you formed is from what you have heard,--general, current talk? A. Yes, sir; that is all. Q. From parties you have seen, or have you read of it in the papers? A. I have not seen anything in the papers. What I heard was what Miles McLaughlin told. Q. A general description of the fire and what he saw? A. That is all I know about it. Q. Notwithstanding the opinion you formed, could you and would you sit as a juryman in this case, unprejudiced and unbiased, and render a verdict according to the evidence and the law in this case? A. Yes, sir. By defendant: Q. This Miles McLaughlin you had the conversation with; was he burned out at the same time? A. The same day, I understand. I was not at home at that time. By the Court: Q. Mr. Lahey, from your conversation with the party named there, Miles McLaughlin, did you form any opinion as to the question of liability of the defendant in this case, on account of that fire? A. No, sir. Q. Have you any opinion now as to whether the plaintiff ought to recover, or whether the defendant is liable or not? A. No, sir; I don't know anything about that case. I don't know where this fire was set. Q. You have no opinion as to that? A. As to which of them was liable for the damage done? Q. Have you any opinion as to whether the defendant is or is not liable,--not what it may be, but whether you have any such opinion? A. No, sir; I don't, because I don't know the circumstances. Q. Did this party with whom you talked tell you how the fire originated? A. He didn't know, because he was eight or nine miles from the railroad track at this time. He was up in the country teaching school. Q. He didn't pretend to know the circumstances out of which the fire originated? A. No, sir." Challenge overruled. This presents all there is in the record which can be considered as touching the challenges of these two jurors by the defendant for cause.

The challenge of Juror Sterling raises the question of bias or prejudice; that of Juror Lahey the question of having formed an opinion from what he had heard by current talk in the vicinity where the fire which caused the damage occurred. Among the causes for challenge prescribed by our Code is that the proposed juror has "an unqualified opinion or belief as to the merits of the action, founded upon knowledge of its material facts or some of them," or that there is "the existence of...