Haught v. The Louis Berkman, LLC

• Decision Date: 05 July 2005
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A.5:03 CV 109.,CIV.A.5:03 CV 109.
• Parties: Sharon HAUGHT, Darlene Kemp and Joyce Leonard, Plaintiffs, v. THE LOUIS BERKMAN, LLC, West Virginia d/b/a Follansbee Steel, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of West Virginia

377 F.Supp.2d 543

Sharon HAUGHT, Darlene Kemp and Joyce Leonard, Plaintiffs, v. THE LOUIS BERKMAN, LLC, West Virginia d/b/a Follansbee Steel, Defendant.

No. CIV.A.5:03 CV 109.

United States District Court, N.D. West Virginia.

July 5, 2005.

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Timothy F. Cogan, Cassidy, Myers, Cogan, Voegelin & Tennant, LC, Wheeling, WV, Michael J. Hoare, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Larry W. Blalock, Jackson & Kelly, Wheeling, WV, Christina Henagen Peer, Susan C. Hastings, WM. Michael Hanna, Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, LLP, Cleveland, OH, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF JOYCE LEONARD'S DECLARATION AND EEOC CHARGE AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING CLAIMS OF JOYCE LEONARD

STAMP, District Judge.

I. Procedural History

On July 28, 2003, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in this Court asserting claims against the defendant for unlawful sex discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e, et seq., the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), and related West Virginia statutes. On August 19, 2004, the defendant filed an answer to the complaint. The defendant later filed an amended answer and counterclaim against plaintiff, Joyce Leonard ("Leonard"). This counterclaim includes three counts: misappropriation of trade secrets (Count One), breach of confidentiality (Count Two), and breach of the duty to act only as authorized (Count Three). Leonard filed a reply asserting counterclaims that include discrimination and retaliation (Count One) and abuse of process (Count Two).

On September 13, 2004, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment with respect to the claims relating to Leonard. Leonard responded in opposition to this motion and the defendant replied. On October 21, 2004, the defendant filed a motion to strike Leonard's declaration and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") charge, to which Leonard responded and the defendant replied.

The defendant's motions for summary judgment and to strike Leonard's declaration and EEOC charge are now fully briefed and ripe for review. This Court also heard oral argument on defendants' motion for summary judgment on November 15, 2004. After considering the parties' memoranda, oral argument as to the summary judgment motion and the applicable law, this Court finds that the defendant's motion to strike Leonard's declaration and EEOC charge should be denied and the defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to Leonard's claims should be granted in part and denied in part.

II. Facts

This action arises from the plaintiffs' employment relationship with the defendant, The Louis Berkman, LLC, West Virginia d/b/a Follansbee Steel ("Follansbee Steel"). The plaintiffs contend that the defendant has maintained a policy and practice of discrimination against its female employees. Further, the plaintiffs assert that the defendant has subjected the plaintiffs to unlawful retaliation, including termination.

In the complaint, Leonard alleges sexual harassment, failure to promote, discriminatory compensation practices, and retaliation. She seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, prejudgment interest, and attorney's fees and costs.

III. Undisputed Facts

Jay Carey ("Carey") hired Leonard to work as a secretary in Follansbee Steel's Terne Division in 1991. At that time, Carey was the senior executive for the Terne Division. Carey was later promoted to the position of President, making him responsible for managing the operations of both the Terne and Sheet Metal Specialties Divisions. Carey served as the senior executive of the company and answered only to its owner, Louis Berkman ("Berkman"). In June 1996, Carey promoted Leonard to the position of Administrative Assistant. He promoted Leonard again in April 2000 to the position of Director of Marketing for the Sheet Metal Division. In August 2000, he gave Leonard the additional responsibility of managing sales for the Sheet Metal Division. Throughout her employment, Carey served as Leonard's immediate supervisor.

In December 2001, Leonard's department moved to the Sheet Metal building. She remained in the Terne building and became the Director of Marketing for the Terne Division. The defendant eliminated Leonard's position on July 18, 2003 when it began outsourcing the marketing functions for the Terne Division.

IV. Applicable Law

A. Motion to Strike

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) states in relevant part:

Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within 20 days after the service of the pleading upon the party or upon the court's own initiative at any time, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.

The standard upon which a motion to strike is measured places a substantial burden on the moving party. "A motion to strike is a drastic remedy which is disfavored by the courts and infrequently granted." Clark v. Milam, 152 F.R.D. 66, 70 (S.D.W.Va.1993). Generally, such motions are denied "unless the allegations attacked have no possible relation to the controversy and may prejudice the other party." Steuart Inv. Co. v. Bauer Dredging Constr. Co., 323 F.Supp. 907, 909 (D.Md.1971). Moreover, "where there is any question of fact or any substantial question of law, the court should refrain from acting until some later time when these issues can be more appropriately dealt with." United States v. Fairchild Industries, Inc., 766 F.Supp. 405 (D.Md.1991).

B. Motion for Summary Judgment

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing the absence of any genuine issues of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with facts sufficient to create a triable issue of fact." Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 718 (4th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1095, 112 S.Ct. 1172, 117 L.Ed.2d 417 (1992)(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). However, as the United States Supreme Court noted in Anderson, "Rule 56(e) itself provides that a party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial — whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Id. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir.1979)(Summary judgment "should be granted only in those cases where it is perfectly clear that no issue of fact is involved and inquiry into the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law." (citing Stevens v. Howard D. Johnson Co., 181 F.2d 390, 394 (4th Cir.1950))).

In Celotex, the Court stated that "the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Summary judgment is not appropriate until after the non-moving party has had sufficient opportunity for discovery. See Oksanen v. Page Mem'l Hosp., 912 F.2d 73, 78 (4th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1074, 112 S.Ct. 973, 117 L.Ed.2d 137 (1992). In reviewing the supported underlying facts, all inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

IV. Discussion

A. Defendant's Motion to Strike Leonard's Declaration and EEOC Charge

The defendant argues that Leonard's declaration and EEOC charge must be stricken because the charges contained therein contradict her answers to interrogatories and her deposition testimony. In addition, the defendant argues that these documents contain inadmissible conclusory statements, opinions, and hearsay. The defendant contends that these documents are inadmissible at trial and cannot be used by this Court in deciding the defendant's motion for summary judgment. For these reasons, the defendant argues that they should be stricken from the record.

In response, Leonard argues that her EEOC questionnaire does not contradict her interrogatory answers¹ and deposition testimony — rather, she asserts that her earlier responses demonstrated an innocent failure to recall. Further, Leonard argues that she incorporated by reference the EEOC questionnaire into her October 11, 2004 declaration. Finally, she argues that the operative portions of the EEOC questionnaire are obviously the product of her personal knowledge.

First, this Court will address the EEOC questionnaire. The defendant argues that the allegations Leonard makes in her EEOC questionnaire contradict her deposition testimony because she failed to mention numerous incidents...