Haughwout v. Tordenti
Decision Date | 30 July 2019 |
Docket Number | SC 20076 |
Citation | 211 A.3d 1,332 Conn. 559 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | Austin HAUGHWOUT v. Laura TORDENTI et al. |
Mario Cerame, Hartford, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Ralph E. Urban, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was George Jepsen, former attorney general, for the appellees (defendants).
Rebecca E. Adams filed a brief for the Connecticut Association of Boards of Education as amicus curiae.
Robinson, C.J., and Palmer, McDonald, Mullins, Kahn, Ecker and Vertefeuille, Js.
In this appeal, we consider the limits of free speech on a public university campus in light of recent history that has led federal and state courts to describe threats of gun violence and mass shootings as the twenty-first century equivalent to the shout of fire in a crowded theater once envisioned by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.1 See, e.g., Ponce v. Socorro Independent School District , 508 F.3d 765, 772 (5th Cir. 2007) ; Milo v. New York , 59 F. Supp. 3d 513, 517 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) ; In re A.S. , 243 Wis. 2d 173, 194, 626 N.W.2d 712 (2001). The plaintiff, Austin Haughwout, brought the present action seeking to challenge his expulsion from Central Connecticut State University (university). The plaintiff now appeals2 from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendants, Laura Tordenti, Ramón Hernández, Christopher Dukes, and Densil Samuda, the university officials involved in that decision.3 On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court incorrectly determined that the various statements and gestures with respect to gun violence and mass shootings that led to his expulsion from the university were true threats that are not protected by the first amendment to the United States constitution, rather than hyperbolic and humorous statements on a matter of public concern. Although a public university campus is a unique forum for the free exchange of controversial, unpopular, and even offensive ideas, we nevertheless conclude that the plaintiff's statements and gestures were true threats. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Following an investigation by Dukes, the university commenced disciplinary proceedings against the plaintiff on the ground that his actions had violated four separate provisions of the university's student code of conduct prohibiting the following: physical assault, intimidation, or threatening behavior; harassment; disorderly conduct; and offensive or disorderly conduct. A hearing was held before a panel consisting of two administrators and a professor, at which the plaintiff largely denied making the statements and gestures attributed to him. See footnote 18 of this opinion. The hearing panel found, however, that the plaintiff was responsible on all charges, and decided to expel him from the university's campus. The hearing panel's decision to expel the plaintiff from the university6 was subsequently upheld after an internal appeal.7
The plaintiff subsequently brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages. The plaintiff also sought a writ of mandamus reinstating him as a student at the university, expungement of misconduct allegations from his record, and a refund of tuition and fees that had been withheld by the defendants. The plaintiff claimed that his expulsion constituted a breach of contract, contravened an implied covenant of duty of good faith and fair dealing, and violated his state and federal constitutional rights to due process of law and to freedom of speech.
After a hearing,8 the trial court issued a memorandum of decision in which it rejected the plaintiff's contractual and due process claims,9 and further concluded that the defendants did not violate the plaintiff's free speech rights under the federal and state constitutions. The trial court concluded that the plaintiff's "statements and gestures while in the student center at [the university] fit the definition of ‘true threats,’ " and "were certainly not statements that sought ‘to communicate a belief or idea.’ "10 Because the plaintiff had "denied almost all of these statements," and, therefore, "the record contains no direct evidence from him as to his intentions in making them"; see footnote 17 of this opinion; the trial court relied on their content and "his repeated utterances of them in a public place like the student center," and found that the plaintiff (Citation omitted.) Given the "spate" of mass shootings at schools and universities around the country, the trial court determined that (Citation omitted; footnote omitted.) Accordingly, the trial court rendered judgment for the defendants. This appeal followed.11
On appeal, the plaintiff, emphasizing that the first amendment "doesn't protect just the good jokes," claims that the statements, gestures, and images that he made were not true threats and, therefore, were a constitutionally protected exercise of his right to free speech.12 Relying heavily on the principles...
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