Haumont v. Haumont, 880655-CA
| Decision Date | 24 May 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 880655-CA,880655-CA |
| Citation | 793 P.2d 421 |
| Parties | Paul Edmond HAUMONT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Miche Jean Arnold Evans HAUMONT, Defendant and Appellee. |
| Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
Kent M. Kasting, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.
Patrick H. Fenton, Cedar City, for defendant and appellee.
Before BILLINGS, GARFF and GREENWOOD, JJ.
Appellant Paul Edmond Haumont appeals the terms of his divorce from appellee Miche Jean Arnold Haumont. We reverse and remand.
Appellant and appellee were married on November 30, 1984, and separated in July 1987. No children were born from their three and one-half year marriage. Both parties had previously been married and divorced.
Appellee brought into the marriage a house located in Nebraska, valued at $59,000 with a mortgage of $27,000, and a $14,000 IRA. She had three children from her previous marriage, two of whom lived with the parties during their marriage. She received a $750 per month child support payment for the two children and a property settlement payment of $425 per month from her previous husband. Prior to her marriage to appellant, she had also been receiving permanent alimony of $510 per month. Although she was a registered nurse in Nebraska, she did not work during her marriage to appellant. At the time of trial, she had worked for several days as the director of a nursing home in Nebraska for $11.54 per hour. She testified, however, that this job was in jeopardy because of her absence for the trial.
Appellant, who invested in real estate for a living, brought substantial real and personal property into the marriage. During the marriage, additional property was acquired, including the Grand Canyon Motel in Fredonia, Arizona, which appellant purchased from proceeds derived from selling property he owned prior to the marriage. He also sold another previously-acquired piece of property for approximately $16,000, which proceeds he placed in a joint bank account along with other funds of the parties.
During the marriage, the parties first lived in appellee's Nebraska residence and then, in 1987, attempted to move to appellant's Kanab residence, renting out the Nebraska residence. One of the problems leading to the divorce was the conflict that developed over the location of the parties' home because appellant's business interests were primarily located in Utah and appellee's teenage children had ties to schools and friends in Nebraska which they refused to leave.
Appellant managed the parties' finances during the marriage and commingled appellee's support and property settlement income with his own income, including that derived from the sale of previously-owned properties. He had several bank accounts, all of which appellee had access to and which she used for household expenses. The parties had a high income during the marriage, making $84,038 in 1984, $83,946 in 1985, $124,643 in 1986, and $78,588 in 1987.
On February 5, 1989, the court ordered appellant to pay appellee $1,000 per month in temporary alimony, $1,000 in temporary attorney fees, the utilities on the Kanab residence, and the $515 monthly payment on the Nebraska residence. Appellant complied with this order. Prior to the trial, appellee vacated the Kanab residence and returned to her residence in Nebraska.
The trial was held in Kanab on September 12, 1988. Both parties were present, represented by counsel, and presented evidence concerning their irreconcilable differences, standard of living, premarital property, and respective financial situations. Appellee's counsel proffered an affidavit showing the amount of his attorney fees, which indicated a rate of $120 per hour plus costs.
The trial court found that the parties had irreconcilable differences and awarded a divorce decree to appellee but not to appellant. It found that each party had premarital property and awarded each party his or her own property, with the exception of the Grand Canyon Motel and the $18,000 joint savings account in which appellant had deposited $16,000 from the sale of a piece of property owned by him prior to the marriage. The court ordered appellant to pay appellee $510 per month in permanent alimony, appellee's moving expenses to Nebraska, and $10,000 to apply toward her attorney fees. Appellant subsequently brought this appeal.
On appeal, appellant claims that the trial court erred in: (1) requiring him to pay $510 per month permanent alimony to appellee; (2) granting appellee a one-half interest in the Grand Canyon Motel and the $18,000 bank account; (3) awarding $10,000 in attorney fees to appellee; and (4) awarding a decree of divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences only to appellee. Appellee requests an award of attorney fees on appeal.
Appellant argues that he should not be required to pay permanent alimony of $510 per month to appellee because she did not show that she had any financial need for it. He alleges the trial judge awarded alimony to her on the impermissible grounds that appellee had lost $510 per month permanent alimony when she married appellant and, thus, improperly shifted appellee's former husband's obligation to appellant. Appellee defends the award of alimony, stating that the trial court considered appellee's financial needs, and that, in fact, appellee's financial needs and accustomed standard of living indicate that a $510 per month alimony award is insufficient.
Trial courts have broad discretion in awarding alimony. Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 791 P.2d 895, 896 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (per curiam). We will not disturb the trial court's alimony award so long as the trial court exercises its discretion within the standards set by the appellate courts. Id.
"The purposes of an alimony award include enabling the receiving spouse to maintain, as nearly as possible, the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage," and preventing him or her from becoming a public charge. Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 121 (Utah Ct.App.1990); see also Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1988); Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah Ct.App.1988); Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah Ct.App.1988). To this end, it is well established that in setting an award of alimony, a trial court must consider the following three factors: (1) the financial condition and needs of the receiving spouse, (2) the ability of the receiving spouse to produce sufficient income for him or herself, and (3) the ability of the responding spouse to provide support. Munns, 790 P.2d at 121; Noble, 761 P.2d at 1372.
If the trial court considers these factors in setting an award of alimony, we will not disturb its award absent a showing that such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. Munns, 790 P.2d at 121. However, in considering these factors, the trial court is required to make adequate factual findings on all material issues, unless the facts in the record are "clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment." Throckmorton, 767 P.2d at 124 (quoting Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)).
In its findings of fact, the trial court found only that "as a result of said marriage, the Defendant lost alimony in the sum of $510 per month," and that "alimony should be granted in favor of the Defendant and against the Plaintiff in the sum of $510 per month." It made no findings as to appellee's financial condition and needs, appellee's ability to provide support for herself, what standard of living was enjoyed during the parties' marriage, or appellant's ability to provide support. Although there is substantial, controverted evidence in the record as to these factors, the evidence is not necessarily clear nor does it lend itself to a finding only in favor of the judgment. Absent adequate findings, we are unable to review the alimony award and, therefore, must reverse and remand for findings and a resetting of the award based upon the required findings. See Johnson v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 696, 699-70 (Utah Ct.App.1989); Throckmorton, 767 P.2d at 124.
Appellant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding appellee an interest in two items of property, the Grand Canyon Motel and the $18,000 joint checking account, both of which were acquired during the parties' marriage but from proceeds of property previously owned by appellant. He states that there were no circumstances in the present case which would justify deviation from the general rule that premarital property and its proceeds should be awarded to the party that brought it into the marriage. Appellee defends the trial court's action, alleging that because all the parties' funds were commingled, these properties were jointly-acquired assets. She further justifies the trial court's action on the basis of the parties' differences in earning capacity.
In dividing a marital estate, the trial court has considerable discretion to enter equitable orders concerning property distribution. Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 119 (Ct.App.1990); Weston v. Weston, 773 P.2d 408, 410 (Utah Ct.App.1989). Such orders will not be disturbed so long as the trial court exercises its discretion in accordance with the standards set by this state's appellate courts, Munns, 790 P.2d at 119; Weston, 773 P.2d at 410, "except where to do so would work a manifest injustice or inequity." Noble, 761 P.2d at 1373 (quoting Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 119 (Utah 1986)). The major purpose of a property division, in conjunction with an alimony award, "is to achieve a fair, just, and equitable result between the parties." Id.
As a general rule, equity requires that each party retain the separate property he or she brought into the marriage. Painter v. Painter, 752 P.2d 907, 908 (Utah Ct.App.1988); see, e.g., Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 328-29 (Utah 1980).
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