Haun v. Don Mealy Imports, Inc.

Decision Date06 October 2003
Docket NumberCase No. 6:03-cv-929-Orl-18-JGG.
PartiesDonald A. HAUN, Plaintiff, v. DON MEALY IMPORTS, INC. d/b/a Courtesy Acura, and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

J. Gordon Blau, Patrick H. Willis, J. Gordon Blau, P.A., Orlando, FL, for Plaintiff.

Tracey L. Ellerson, Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson, P.A., Orlando, FL, George A. Borden, Luba Shur, Williams & Connolly, Washington, DC, Ronald R. Howell, Vernis & Bowling of Central FL., P.A., Deland, FL, for Defendants.

ORDER

G. KENDALL SHARP, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment by Defendant Don Mealy Imports, Inc., d/b/a Courtesy Acura ("Courtesy") (Doc. 16, filed 11 August 2003) and Defendant Liberty Mutual Insurance Company ("Liberty Mutual") (Doc. 18, filed 11 August 2003), to which Plaintiff Donald A. Haun ("Plaintiff") has responded in opposition (Doc. 21, filed 22 August 2003).

I. BACKGROUND

This cause of action arises from Plaintiff's attempt to purchase a used vehicle from Courtesy on 26 May 2003. On that day, Plaintiff came to Courtesy's place of business to inquire about a Chevrolet Sport Utility Vehicle he had seen advertised in the newspaper. A Courtesy sales representative told him that the advertised vehicle had already been sold, but showed Plaintiff a used 1999 Chevrolet Suburban ("the vehicle"). Plaintiff and the sales representative negotiated a cash price of $13,000.00 "together with" other fees. (Doc. 22, filed 22 August 2003, at ¶ 4; Doc. 17, filed 11 August 2003, at 2.)

Courtesy prepared a Retail Buyer's Order1 ("Buyer's Order"), which, among other things, included a section describing the terms of the warranty on the car, and another section listing several fees. (Doc. 22, Exhibit A.) Plaintiff signed the Buyer's Order.

Courtesy prepared a Retail Installment Sales Contract ("RISC"). (Doc. 22, Exhibit B.) The relevant contents of the RISC are as follows: A boxed-in section labeled "Itemization of Amount Financed," is made up of two columns. The left column contains descriptions of charges and the right column provides a space in which the amounts of the charges may be filled in. Line Four is divided into eight sections (4A-4H), and is entitled "Other Charges Including Amounts Paid to Others on Your Behalf." The following appears on Lines 4F and 4G (the bolded terms are those that were typed on the form):

                F Government License and/or Registration
                  Fees (Identify) LIC 248                 $248.000
                G Government Certificate of Title Fees    $N/A
                

Line 4H is designated "Other Charges (Seller must identify who is paid and describe purpose)." A three-column table makes up this subsection. The following appears:

                to WESTERN   for SERVICE CONT.     $1705.00
                to           for GAP INS           $ 499.00
                to           for                   $
                to           for VCP               $ 570.00
                

Plaintiff also signed a Bailment Agreement for Vehicle Spot Delivery ("Bailment Agreement"). (Doc. 22, Exhibit C.) Plaintiff alleges that the form was at the bottom of a pile of other forms and that all but the signature line of the form was covered up. Plaintiff also asserts that when he asked what the form was, a Courtesy representative told him it was a copy of a form Plaintiff had already signed. Plaintiff alleges that he signed the form without reviewing its terms in reliance on this representation.

Plaintiff signed other documents he does not identify in his Amended Complaint.2 He asked for a copy of all documents he had signed. Plaintiff alleges that the representative did not give him one of the Bailment Agreement. Plaintiff asserts that another representative told Plaintiff two days later that it was Courtesy's practice to not give customers copies of the Bailment Agreements.

Plaintiff wrote a check to Courtesy for $2,000.00 as a down payment and drove the vehicle home. Plaintiff states that comments made by Courtesy representatives and a clause in the RISC3 led him to believe that the sale was final.

On 28 May, Courtesy's assistant manager informed Plaintiff that Courtesy was having trouble getting financing approval for him. The assistant manager and Plaintiff agreed that Courtesy would make additional efforts to get Plaintiff approved and, to that end, Plaintiff would increase his down payment to half of the purchase price. The assistant manager indicated that another representative would try to get Plaintiff approved on 29 May.

On 29 May, a Courtesy representative called Plaintiff and told him to return the vehicle to Courtesy's vehicle lot because Plaintiff was not approved for financing. Plaintiff demanded that Courtesy have his $2000.00 available when Plaintiff returned the vehicle.

Plaintiff went to Courtesy's lot later that day. A Courtesy representative told Plaintiff that Courtesy had already deposited the down payment and that Courtesy's comptroller would mail Plaintiff the money at an unspecified date. He also told Plaintiff that he could do nothing more for him. After speaking with a second Courtesy representative, Plaintiff handed over the keys to the vehicle and left. On 18 June, Courtesy mailed Plaintiff a check for $2000.00. (Doc. 16, Declaration of Christena Buzard).

Plaintiff filed suit in the Seminole County Court in the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida. (Doc. 2, filed 7 July 2003.) Defendants thereafter removed the case to this court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. (Doc. 1, filed 7 July 2003.) Defendant Courtesy then submitted a "Motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, motion for summary judgment" (Doc. 16, filed 11 August 2003) and a memorandum in support of that motion (Doc. 17, filed 11 August 2003). Liberty Mutual incorporated Courtesy's memorandum into its own Memorandum (Doc. 19, filed 11 August 2003) in support of its "Motion to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment" (Doc. 8, filed 11 August 2003).

Plaintiff filed a "Memorandum of law in opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, motion for summary judgment" ("Memorandum in Opposition"). (Doc. 21, filed 22 August 2003.) On the same day, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. (Doc. 22, filed 22 August 2003.)

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is in six parts, the first five of which are against Courtesy: Claim I alleges fraud, Claim II alleges violations of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act ("DUTPA"), Claim III alleges violations of the federal Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), Claim IV alleges violations of the Florida Motor Vehicle Retail Sales Finance Act, and Claim V alleges breach of contract. Claim VI is a statutory surety bond claim against Liberty.

A. Failure to State a Claim

For purposes of a motion to dismiss, a court must view the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); Jackson v. Okaloosa County, 21 F.3d 1531, 1534 (11th Cir.1994). Furthermore, a court must accept all reasonable inferences from the complaint and consider all allegations as true. Id. A court may not, however, accept conclusory allegations and unwarranted factual deductions as true. Gersten v. Rundle, 833 F.Supp. 906, 910 (S.D.Fla.1993) (citing Associated Builders, Inc., v. Alabama Power Co., 505 F.2d 97, 100 (5th Cir.1974)). Only pleadings and attached written exhibits may be considered in making these determinations. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c); GSW, Inc., v. Long County, 999 F.2d 1508, 1510 (11th Cir.1993). Unless it appears beyond doubt that a plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to relief, a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Hunnings v. Texaco, Inc., 29 F.3d 1480, 1484 (11th Cir.1994).

A court may not assume, however, that plaintiff can prove facts that he has not alleged or that defendant has violated laws in ways that have not been alleged. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526, 103 S.Ct. 897, 74 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983); Beck v. Interstate Brands Corp., 953 F.2d 1275, 1276 (11th Cir.1992) (per curiam). Nor is the Court bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. See B.H. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986). Although the federal rules embrace a liberal pleading standard, bald assertions and conclusions of law will not defeat a properly supported motion to dismiss. See Leeds v. Meltz, 85 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir.1996).

B. Summary Judgment

A court will grant summary judgment if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see e.g., Edwards v. Acadia Realty Trust, Inc., 141 F.Supp.2d 1340, 1344-45 (M.D.Fla.2001). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case under the applicable substantive law. Disputed issues of material fact preclude the entry of summary judgment, but factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary do not. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The moving party bears the initial burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In determining whether the moving party has satisfied its burden, the Court considers all inferences drawn from the underlying facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and resolves all reasonable doubts against the moving party. Matsushita...

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