Hauptmann v. Wilentz

• Decision Date: 11 August 1983
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 81-3177.
• Citation: 570 F. Supp. 351
• Parties: Anna HAUPTMANN, Plaintiff, v. David T. WILENTZ, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

570 F. Supp. 351

Anna HAUPTMANN, Plaintiff, v. David T. WILENTZ, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 81-3177.

United States District Court, D. New Jersey.

August 11, 1983.

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Robert R. Bryan, Trudy Maran, Newark, N.J., for plaintiff.

Irwin Kimmelman, Atty. Gen., State of N.J., by Eugene J. Sullivan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Trenton, N.J., William B. McGuire, Lum, Biunno & Tompkins, Newark, N.J., Ronald S. Diana, New York City, for defendants.

Gordon Deiger, Atty., Torts Branch, Civ. Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for U.S. Dept. of Justice.

OPINION

LACEY, District Judge.

Before the court are the motions of defendants David T. Wilentz, the State of New Jersey, the Hearst Corporation, Lewis J. Bornmann, John B. Wallace, William F. Horn, Joseph A. Wolf, Clinton L. Pagano, Brendan T. Byrne, James R. Zazzali, Hugo Stockburger, and Thomas H. Sisk to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.¹

INTRODUCTION

This case arises out of the prosecution and execution of Bruno Richard Hauptmann for the murder of Charles A. Lindbergh, Jr., over four decades ago. Charles A. Lindbergh, Jr., the twenty-month-old son of the famous aviator Charles Lindbergh and his wife, the writer Anne Morrow Lindbergh, was kidnapped from his home near Hopewell, New Jersey, on the night of March 1, 1932. Charles Lindbergh paid a $50,000 ransom on April 2, 1932; however, the child was not returned. On May 12, 1932, the remains of a child, later identified as those of Charles A. Lindbergh, Jr., were found in a shallow grave about five miles from Hopewell. Over two years later, on September 19, 1934, Hauptmann was arrested in New York after passing one of the bills included in the ransom payment. He was interrogated in New York and was extradited to New Jersey on October 19, 1934. He was incarcerated in Flemington, Hunterdon County, New Jersey.

Defendant David T. Wilentz served as Attorney General for the State of New Jersey during Hauptmann's trial and during all post-trial proceedings. He was responsible for prosecuting the State's case against Hauptmann. The trial began in Flemington on January 2, 1935, and continued for six weeks. Justice Thomas W. Trenchard presided over the trial, at which Hauptmann was represented by counsel. On February 13, 1935, the jury returned its verdict, finding Hauptmann guilty of first degree murder. The jury made no recommendation for a life sentence. This left available to the court the option of ordering execution.

Hauptmann appealed his conviction to the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals, which affirmed. State v. Hauptmann, 115 N.J.L. 412, 18 A. 809 (E. & A. 1935). His petition to the United States Supreme Court for certiorari was denied. Hauptmann v. New Jersey, 296 U.S. 649, 56 S.Ct. 310, 80 L.Ed. 461 (1935).

According to the State, Hauptmann petitioned the United States Circuit Court in Trenton for a writ of habeas corpus on January 13, 1936, and his petition was denied on January 14, 1936, but the records of that proceeding are not available. Plaintiff does not dispute these assertions. Hauptmann also petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus, but this too was denied. Ex parte Hauptmann, 297 U.S. 693, 56 S.Ct. 385, 80 L.Ed. 985 (1936). He filed two petitions for clemency with the New Jersey Court of Pardons; these were rejected as well. After several postponements, Hauptmann was executed in the electric chair at Trenton State Prison on April 3, 1936.

Plaintiff Anna Hauptmann, the widow of Richard Hauptmann, instituted this action on October 14, 1981. She subsequently filed an amended complaint on November 23, 1981, a second amended complaint on February 25, 1982, a third amended complaint on January 19, 1983, and a fourth amended complaint on March 7, 1983.² Plaintiff seeks relief for alleged violations of both her own and her late husband's civil rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986; she also asserts pendent state law claims. Although the complaint, in its various versions, is lengthy and diffuse, its gist is that Hauptmann was denied a fair trial and suffered violations of his first, fourth, fifth, sixth, eighth and fourteenth amendment rights.

I. Claims Against Former Attorney General Wilentz

Plaintiff has sued former Attorney General Wilentz "individually, in his official capacity, in his investigative capacity, and in his continuing capacity as a Member of the New Jersey State Bar." Amended Complaint ¶ 6.³ The claims against Wilentz will be discussed in more detail below. Briefly, however, plaintiff alleges that Wilentz knowingly presented perjured, false, and misleading testimony at trial; that he deliberately withheld exculpatory evidence; that he conspired with defendant Hearst Corporation (Hearst) to deprive Hauptmann of his right to a fair trial; and that he conspired with State Police officers who carried out illegal searches and seizures, contaminated the jury, and deprived Hauptmann of his right to privacy and his right to counsel. Plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment, compensatory and punitive damages, costs, and attorneys' fees.

Defendant Wilentz argues that the court should dismiss the complaint against him, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), because all of the claims against him fall within the zone of absolute immunity afforded to prosecutors by Imbler v. Patchman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976).⁴ In addition, Wilentz argues that the claims are barred by the statute of limitations⁵ and that some of the plaintiff's allegations fail to state claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.⁶ Plaintiff argues that Wilentz is entitled only to qualified immunity because his actions exceeded the traditional prosecutorial function of initiating and presenting the state's case; under the standard set out in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed.2d 396 (1982), she contends, Wilentz is not immune. She also asserts that her claims are not time-barred, and are cognizable under § 1983.⁷

For convenience, the court will divide plaintiff's claims against Wilentz into four categories: claims based on concealment of exculpatory evidence and presentation of perjured, false and/or misleading testimony at trial; claims based on authorization of illegal investigative techniques; all other claims, with the exception of a due process claim based on the theory that the entire prosecutorial process was a mockery of justice; and the due process claim.

A complaint may be dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) when "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); accord Paolino v. Channel Home Centers, 668 F.2d 721, 722 (3d Cir.1981). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the district court is to limit its consideration to the facts alleged in the complaint. Conley, supra, 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. at 102; Biesenbach v. Guenther, 588 F.2d 400, 401 (3d Cir.1978). All the well pleaded material factual allegations of the complaint are to be taken as true, and the complaint is to be read in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 740, 96 S.Ct. 1848, 1850, 48 L.Ed.2d 338 (1976); Paolino, supra, 668 F.2d at 722.

A. Claims Based on Concealment of Exculpatory Evidence and Presentation of Perjured, False and/or Misleading Testimony

The starting point for any discussion of prosecutorial immunity is Imbler v. Pachtman, supra. The plaintiff in Imbler had been convicted of murder after a jury trial. He brought suit under § 1983 against the prosecutor who had presented the State's case against him, alleging that the prosecutor had knowingly used false testimony at trial and had concealed exculpatory evidence. The Supreme Court held that a prosecutor is absolutely immune from § 1983 suits for damages on claims arising out of his initiation of a prosecution and his presentation of the State's case at trial. Id. 424 U.S. at 431, 96 S.Ct. at 995.⁸ The court reasoned that, although § 1983 provides a cause of action against "every person" who acts under color of state law to deprive another of a constitutional right, prosecutors have always been immune from suit at common law, and the policies underlying common law prosecutorial immunity apply with equal force to § 1983 actions. The Court found absolute immunity necessary because, if the prosecutor received only qualified immunity, he would be constrained in the performance of his duties, and his time and energy would be diverted from criminal prosecutions to the defense of civil suits which "could impose unique and intolerable burdens upon a prosecutor responsible annually for hundreds of indictments and trials." Id. at 425-26, 96 S.Ct. at 992-93. In addition, the Court found that the ultimate fairness of the criminal justice system itself would be weakened if the prosecutor's immunity were not absolute, since the triers of fact in criminal cases would be denied relevant evidence and post-conviction review could be skewed. Id. at 426-28, 96 S.Ct. at 993-94. The Court pointed out that absolute prosecutorial immunity would not leave the public powerless, since prosecutors guilty of misconduct could be punished under the criminal law or by disciplinary action of professional associations. Id. at 428-29, 96 S.Ct. at 994.⁹

In Imbler, the Court found that the activities which formed the bases of the plaintiff's claims against the prosecutor were "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, and thus were functions to which the reasons for absolute immunity apply with full force." Imbler, supra, 424 U.S. at 430, 96 S.Ct. at...