Hauser Lake Rod & Gun Club, Inc. v. City of Hauser, an Idaho Mun. Corp.
Decision Date | 09 June 2017 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 44095 |
Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Parties | HAUSER LAKE ROD AND GUN CLUB, INC., an Idaho non-profit corporation, Petitioner-Appellant, v. The CITY OF HAUSER, an Idaho municipal corporation, Respondent on Appeal, and Kootenai County, a political subdivision of the State of Idaho, Respondent. |
James, Vernon & Weeks, PA, Coeur d'Alene, for appellant. Susan P. Weeks argued.
William Mark Appleton, Coeur d'Alene, for respondent.
This appeal from Kootenai County concerns attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-117. The district court held that Hauser Lake Rod and Gun Club, Inc. was not entitled to attorney fees under section 12-117 because, even though it had prevailed against the City of Hauser in a code violation dispute, the administrative tribunal that reviewed the dispute was staffed with both County and City officials. According to the district court, section 12-117's definition of "political subdivision" does not include administrative review tribunals staffed with officials from multiple governmental entities. We reverse.
The district court summarized the relevant facts giving rise to this "procedural nightmare for all involved" as follows:
In August 2013, the Joint Board reversed the Joint Commission.2 The Joint Board held that the City lacked jurisdiction to issue a code violation to the Club because it was not a resident of the City. The Club requested attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-117. The Joint Board made no findings concerning whether section 12-117 was applicable, declaring instead that it "was not inclined to award attorney fees as requested by [the Club]." The Club moved for reconsideration of the attorney fees ruling. The Joint Board never ruled on the motion.
In September 2013, the Club appealed the Joint Board's attorney fees ruling to the district court. As is relevant here, the district court concluded the Joint Board had erred by making no findings concerning attorney fees and remanded the case with instructions to determine whether the Club was entitled to attorney fees.3 The Club moved for reconsideration of that order, questioning "the finality of the judgment and the premature issuance of the remittitur before the time for appeal had [run], and seeking clarification if the decision was intended to be final," but the district court never ruled on the motion.
On remand, the Joint Board found that the Club had prevailed but declined to award attorney fees under section 12-117. Even though the City lacked jurisdiction to enforce its code on the Club since it was not a resident of the City, the Joint Board found that the City had acted with a reasonable basis in fact or law. Again, the Club appealed the Joint Board's attorney fees ruling to the district court. The primary issue raised was whether the Joint Board abused its discretion in denying the Club's attorney fee request by concluding the City had acted with a reasonable basis in fact or law. The district court consolidated the Club's two appeals, noting the Club's outstanding motion for reconsideration and that the issues in both appeals were substantively the same. Although the district court affirmed that attorney fees were improper, the district court did not reach whether the City had acted with a reasonable basis in fact or law. Instead, the district court held that section 12-117 did not authorize attorney fees against the City because the Joint Board was not a "political subdivision" since it was staffed with both County and City officials.4 The Club timely appealed to this Court.
1. Did the district court erroneously interpret Idaho Code section 12-117 by concluding the Joint Board was not a "political subdivision?"
2. Should the district court be affirmed on the alternative basis that the Joint Board did not abuse its discretion in denying the Club's request for attorney fees?
3. Is the prevailing party entitled to attorney fees on appeal?
We exercise free review over the interpretation of a statute because it is a question of law. E.g. , Hayes v. City of Plummer , 159 Idaho 168, 170, 357 P.3d 1276, 1278 (2015). This appeal concerns Idaho Code section 12-117, which provides:
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the state agency, political subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding, including on appeal, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
We start by recognizing that section 12-117(1) expressly indicates that it applies to "any proceeding" involving a state agency or political subdivision and a person as adverse parties. In the proceedings before the Joint Board, the City and the Club were adverse parties. The City is—by statutory definition—a "political subdivision." I.C. § 12-117(5)(b).5 Likewise, the Club is defined by the statute as "a person." I.C. § 12-117(5)(a).6 Thus, if the Joint Board constitutes a "state agency, political subdivision or the court[,]" it was charged with awarding attorney fees and other costs if the losing party acted without a reasonable basis in law or fact. In this case, the district court correctly focused on whether the Joint Board is a "political subdivision." The district court held that the Joint Board did not constitute a "political subdivision" because the Joint Board was staffed with both County and City officials.
We cannot agree with the district court's conclusion in this regard. The municipal and county ordinances creating the Joint Board unambiguously declare that the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners was the only entity that possessed the authority to decide the dispute between the City and the Club. The City's ordinance expressly provides that City officials serving on the Joint Board "shall not have the authority to make motions(s) [sic] or vote." Instead, "[t]he role of city elected officials is limited to an advisory capacity to the Board of County Commissioners." Kootenai County Ordinance No. 289 uses identical language to identify the respective roles of the County Commissioners and City officials. Thus, the decision of the Joint Board was, in fact, a decision of the Board of County Commissioners.
The decision of the Board of County Commissioners was the act of a political subdivision. The statutory definition of a political subdivision expressly includes counties. I.C. § 12-117(5)(b) ( ). As with any corporate body, a county may only act through its human agents. Under Idaho law, those agents are the Board because a county's "powers can only be exercised by the board of county commissioners, or by agents and officers acting under their authority, or authority of law." I.C. § 31-602. For these reasons, the district court erred when it held that the Joint Board was not a political subdivision.
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Hauser Lake Rod & Gun Club, Inc. v. City of Hauser
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