Hauser v. Rhode Island Dept. of Corrections, C.A. No. 08-428 S.

• Decision Date: 04 August 2009
• Docket Number: C.A. No. 08-428 S.
• Citation: 640 F.Supp.2d 143
• Parties: Stephen HAUSER, John Santagata, Norman Vermette, John Prior, and Anthony Lucca, Plaintiffs, v. State of RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

640 F.Supp.2d 143

Stephen HAUSER, John Santagata, Norman Vermette, John Prior, and Anthony Lucca, Plaintiffs, v. State of RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendant.

C.A. No. 08-428 S.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

August 4, 2009.

Carly B. Iafrate, Esq., Providence, RI, Gerard P. Cobleigh, Esq., Cobleigh & Giacobbe, Warwick, RI, Attorneys for Plaintiffs.

Thomas A. Palombo, Rhode Island Attorney General's Office, Providence, RI, Attorneys for Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

WILLIAM E. SMITH, District Judge.

This dispute arises from an allegation that the State of Rhode Island Department of Corrections (DOC) fails to adequately compensate five officers who care for police dogs. The State moves to dismiss Plaintiffs' two claims: violation of the Rhode Island Minimum Wage Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-12-1 et seq.; and violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. After careful consideration, the Court concludes that no private right of action exists under the Rhode Island Minimum Wage Act, and that the State has not waived its sovereign immunity as to the FLSA claim.

I. Background

Stephen Hauser, John Santagata, Norman Vermette, John Prior and Anthony Lucca are correctional officers who perform "K9" duties. They transport and care for the dogs, including boarding, feeding, exercising, bathing, and grooming (even while in "non-duty" status). In November of 2008, Plaintiffs sued in Rhode Island state court, claiming the State had failed to appropriately compensate them for canine-related work during off-duty hours.¹ The State promptly removed the two-count action to this Court per 28 U.S.C. § 1441, urging federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Following an initial conference, the State filed the instant motion.

II. Count I: Rhode Island Minimum Wage Act

The State first maintains Plaintiffs cannot state a claim for overtime violations because R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-12-1 et seq. provides no private, independent cause of action for an aggrieved employee. Thus, the State argues, under the statute, only the Rhode Island Department of Labor & Training, Division of Labor Standards ("DOL") has the authority to prosecute a violation of the state wage law. Plaintiffs, of course, disagree with this interpretation and suggest that the administrative scheme in § 28-12 by which an aggrieved employee may claim a wage violation at the DOL is an optional, not exclusive, remedial track.

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the Court determines whether the complaint states any claim upon which relief can be granted. In so doing, the Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, taking all sufficiently precise factual allegations as true and giving Plaintiffs the benefit of all reasonable inferences. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); Buck v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 476 F.3d 29, 32-33 (1st Cir.2007). To pass through the initial gauntlet, the complaint must allege "a plausible entitlement to relief." Thomas v. Rhode Island, 542 F.3d 944, 948 (1st Cir.2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

While the Minimum Wage Act is silent as to whether an individual private right of action exists, it does speak to enforcement. Section 28-12-13 provides: "Responsibility for enforcement—[t]he provisions of this chapter shall be carried out by the division of labor standards"; and § 28-12-14(7) provides: "Enforcement powers—[t]he director or the commissioner or any authorized representative of either shall have the authority to: [b]ring all actions, suits, complaints, and prosecutions for the violation of any of the provisions of this chapter."

These provisions, combined with the lack of an express private right to sue, indicate that the General Assembly did not intend to provide an individual right of action to aggrieved employees. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19, 100 S.Ct. 242, 62 L.Ed.2d 146 (1979) ("[I]t is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it."); In re John, 605 A.2d 486, 488 (R.I.1992) (noting that when a statute "does not plainly provide for a private cause of action, such a right cannot be inferred"); Narragansett Pellet Corp. v. City of East Providence ex rel. Fitzgerald, C.A. No. 06-464 ML, 2007 WL 2821538, at *6-7 (D.R.I. Sept. 25, 2007) (no private right of action where statute prescribed a particular enforcement process). There can be little doubt that had the General Assembly deemed it appropriate or necessary to afford employees a private right of action against employers to enforce the minimum wage law, it would have expressly done so. Compare, e.g., R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 28-5-24.1, 28-29 (setting forth framework for individual claims under Fair Employment Practices Act). Absent any indication from the statute itself or in the legislative history that this is what the legislature intended, it would be clearly inappropriate to create such a right by judicial fiat.²

Plaintiffs seek to escape the bonds of this statutory straightjacket through a different chapter, chapter 14 (Payment of Wages), which, upon a cursory glance, appears to create a private right of action for chapter 12 challenges such as these officers' overtime complaint. Plaintiffs point to § 28-14-18.1 (Relief and damages) ("A person who alleges a violation of this chapter may bring a civil action.") and § 28-14-18.4 (Extension of protection) ("The protections set forth in § 28-14-18 and the relief and damages for violations set forth in §§ 28-14-18.1 and 28-14-18.2 shall also apply to chapters 3, 6, 12, and 18 of this title.") (emphasis added). This argument, however, glosses over the precise language of these sections. Read in their appropriate context, it becomes clear that they apply only to whistleblowing actions. As the Legislative Council to the General Assembly explained, the provisions were added to "provide protections to employees who report violations of labor laws or regulations." See "Explanation By The Legislative Council Of An Act Relating To Labor And Labor Relations-Protection Of Employees," attached to 1992 R.I. Pub. Laws 890 (explanation available electronically) (emphasis added). The "Extension of protection" does not create a private cause of action with respect to any and all violations of the listed chapters; rather, it allows employees who complain about or report violations of those listed chapters (e.g., Employment of Women and Children, Wage Discrimination Based on Sex, and Minimum Wages) and are retaliated against by their employers to sue as whistleblowers under § 28-14-18 and 18.1. This is in essence what Senior Judge Lagueux held in Trs. of the Local Union No. 17 Sheet Metal Workers' Apprenticeship Fund v. May Eng'g Co., 951 F.Supp. 346, 350-51 (D.R.I.1997) (§ 28-14-18.1 was not intended to broadly apply to wage payment violations; a private right of action is available "only for violations of the whistleblowing protection set forth in the immediately preceding and following sections."); see also § 28-14-18.1(d) (employee [whistleblower] must show by clear and convincing evidence that a report of a violation was about to occur). Plaintiffs offer no compelling reason for this Court to disagree with Judge Lagueux's sound statutory interpretation, which the plain language and context support. The lack of a private right of action thus bars Count I and it must be dismissed.

III. Count II: FLSA

Count II presents a more nuanced issue. Congress enacted the FLSA to "achieve a uniform national policy of guaranteeing compensation for all work or employment engaged in by employees covered by the [FLSA]." Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 602, 64 S.Ct. 698, 88 L.Ed. 949 (1944). The State concedes canine work is compensable,³ but maintains the FLSA claim is barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.

At the outset, it is beyond serious dispute that under the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) a state enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court for an FLSA claim.⁴ See Abril v. Virginia, 145 F.3d 182, 185-89 (4th Cir.1998) (affirming dismissal of FLSA action by state prison employees); Powell v. Florida, 132 F.3d 677, 678 (11th Cir.1998) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of FLSA claim for unpaid wages against state); Quillin v. Oregon, 127 F.3d 1136, 1138-39 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that federal courts lack jurisdiction over FLSA claims against states absent waiver of immunity); Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d 37, 48-49 (1st Cir.1997) (rejecting argument that Congress properly abrogated state immunity under FLSA); Raper v. Iowa, 115 F.3d 623, 624 (8th Cir.1997) (affirming dismissal of FLSA action by state employees for unpaid overtime); Balgowan v. New Jersey, 115 F.3d 214, 217-18 (3d Cir.1997) (refusing to exercise jurisdiction over FLSA claim against state); Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 206-11 (6th Cir. 1996) (barring action by state employees under FLSA)

The issue in this case, however, is not so easily dispatched because of an interesting procedural wrinkle: whether the State waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity as to an FLSA claim by removing the action from Rhode Island Superior Court to federal court?

A state may consent to suit by a clear declaration of its intention to submit itself to federal court jurisdiction, and may waive immunity to suit by voluntarily invoking federal court jurisdiction. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670, 675, 119 S.Ct. 2219, 144 L.Ed.2d 605 (1999); Lombardo v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 540 F.3d 190, 195-96 (3d Cir. 2008). The "test for determining whether a State has waived its...