Hausman v. Holland Am. Line-U.s.a.
| Decision Date | 05 January 2016 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. CV13-0937 BJR |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington |
| Parties | JAMES R. HAUSMAN, Plaintiff, v. HOLLAND AMERICA LINE-U.S.A., et al. Defendants. |
Defendants, Holland America Line-U.S.A. and other related corporate entities (collectively "Defendants"), move to vacate the judgment entered in this case and to dismiss the matter with prejudice. Dkt. No. 216. Alternatively, they request a new trial. Plaintiff opposes the motion. Dkt. No. 240. Having considered the parties' submissions, testimony, and relevant legal authority, the Court concludes that: (1) Defendants have established by clear and convincing evidence that Plaintiff, James R. Hausman, engaged in discovery misconduct, and (2) the misconduct substantially interfered with Defendants' ability to fully and fairly prepare for and proceed to trial. Therefore, the Court will VACATE the judgment and ORDER a new trial. The Court's reasoning follows.1
In 2011, Mr. Hausman embarked on an eight-month, around-the-world cruise operated by Holland America Line. Dkt. No. 24 at ¶¶ 3-5, 12. The first leg of the cruise was a ten-week expedition that began in Seattle, Washington, traveled to Russia, China, Southeast Asia, and the South Pacific Islands, before returning to Los Angeles, California. Mr. Hausman alleges that when the cruise ship was approaching Honolulu, Hawaii, an automatic sliding glass door on the ship improperly closed and struck his head. Id. at ¶¶ 15, 38. He claims that this incident resulted in a brain injury that causes him to have seizures, dizziness, forgetfulness, and loss of balance, among other ailments. Id. at ¶ 16.
Thereafter, in May 2013, Mr. Hausman filed a negligence action against Defendants, seeking compensation for his alleged injuries. The matter proceeded to a two-week jury trial in October 2015. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of Mr. Hausman, awarding five million in compensatory damages and 16.5 million in punitive damages. Dkt. No. 201. Accordingly, this Court entered judgment for Plaintiff on November 4, 2015. Dkt. No. 207.
However, the matter did not end there. Approximately two weeks after the trial concluded, Defendants were approached by Mr. Hausman's former personal assistant, Amy Mizeur, who informed them that Mr. Hausman had deliberately sabotaged Defendants' pre-trial discovery efforts. Ms. Mizeur's allegations are numerous, but can be generally categorized as follows: (1) Mr. Hausman deleted and/or failed to disclose the existence of emails that he knewwere relevant to this lawsuit, (2) he tampered with witness testimony, (3) he fabricated and/or exaggerated the extent of his alleged injuries, and (4) he testified falsely at trial. See, generally, Dkt. No. 219.
Thereafter, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Vacate Judgment and for Dismissal or, in the Alternative, Motion to Vacate Judgment and for a New Trial (hereinafter, "the Motion"). Dkt. No. 216. In support of the Motion, Defendants filed a declaration from Ms. Mizeur that details the specifics of her allegations. Dkt. No. 219. Defendants also produced copies of emails written by Mr. Hausman that allegedly Ms. Mizeur was able to recover after they had been deleted. After reviewing the Motion and supporting documents, the Court determined that an evidentiary hearing was warranted and one was held on December 10 -11, 2015. Prior to the hearing, the Court instructed the parties to focus on Ms. Mizeur's claim that Mr. Hausman had destroyed and/or failed to disclose emails responsive to Defendants' discovery requests. See Dkt. No. 265. Accordingly, this decision also primarily focuses on that allegation.
Ultimately, it is the trial judge's responsibility to ensure that a party is not a victim of a miscarriage of justice. Murphy v. City of Long Beach, 914 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1990) (). To that end, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize a trial judge to vacate a judgment and grant a new trial, either upon a party's motion or sua sponte. Chen v. City of Medina, No. C11-2179TSZ, 2013 WL 4511411, *4 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 23, 2013) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A) & (d)); see also Murphy, 914 F.2d at 187. 1. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60(b)(3)
Here, Defendants move for relief pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60(b)(3).2 When misconduct in discovery is alleged, courts apply the Rule 60(b)(3) standard for both Rule 59 and 60(b) motions. Jones v. Aero/Chem Corp., 921 F.2d 875, 878 (9th Cir. 1990). Rule 60(b)(3) permits a court to relieve a party of a final judgment obtained through "fraud misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party." Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3). To prevail under Rule 60(b)(3), the moving party must establish by clear and convincing evidence that a judgment was obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct, and that the conduct complained of prevented the moving party from fully and fairly presenting the case. Lafarge Conseils Et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement & Gypsum Corp., 791 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Bunch v. United States, 680 F.2d 1271, 1283 (9th Cir. 1982)). The rule is aimed at judgments that were unfairly obtained, not at those that are merely factually incorrect. In re M/V Peacock on Complaint of Edwards, 809 F.2d 1403, 1405 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1339 (5th Cir. 1978)).
In the context of discovery disputes, "['f]ailure to disclose or produce materials requested in discovery can constitute 'misconduct' within the purview of [Rule 60(b)(3)].'" Jones, 921 F.2d at 879 (quoting Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910, 923 (1st Cir. 1988)). Rule 60(b)(3) Anderson, 862 F.2d at 923, see also United States v. One Douglas A-26B Aircraft, 662 F.2d 1372, 1374-75 n. 6 (11th Cir. 1981) (); Bros, Inc. v. W.E. Grace Manuf. Co, 351 F.2d 208, 211 (5th Cir.1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966) (). But see, Jordan v. Paccar, Inc., 97 F.3d 1452 (6th Cir. 1997) ( ).
"[W]hen the case involves the withholding of information called for by discovery, the adverse party need not establish that the result in the case would be altered." Jones, 921 F.2d at 879 (citing Bunch, 680 F.2d at 1283). However, courts "do 'not lightly ... disturb[]' a jury verdict returned after a trial on the merits." West v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 803 F.3d 56, 67 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Anderson, 862 F.2d at 924). In order to warrant such a drastic remedy, the moving party must demonstrate that the alleged discovery misconduct "substantially...interfered" with the "aggrieved party's ability fully and fairly to prepare for and proceed at trial." West, 803 F.3d at 67 (quoting Anderson, 862 F.2d at 924) (emphasis in original). "Substantial interference may be shown in at least two ways." West, 803 F.3d at 67. First, the moving party may establish that the discovery misconduct "precluded inquiry into a plausible theory of liability, denied it access to evidence that could well have been probative onan important issue, or closed off a potentially fruitful avenue of direct or cross examination." Id. (). Second, substantial interference may be established through "a presumption of interference." West, 803 F.3d at 67 (quoting Anderson, 862 F.2d at 925).
In determining whether "a presumption of interference" is warranted, the court must consider the non-disclosing party's intent. Anderson, 862 F.2d at 925. Nondisclosure "comes in different shapes and sizes: it may be accidental or inadvertent, or considerably more blameworthy (though still short of fraud or outright misrepresentation)." Id. "Thus, 'where concealment was knowing and purposeful, it seems fair to presume that the suppressed evidence would have damaged the nondisclosing party.'" West, 803 F.3d at 67 (quoting Anderson, 862 F.2d at 925). "And '[i]t seems equally logical that where discovery material is deliberately suppressed, its absence can be presumed to have inhibited the unearthing of further admissible evidence adverse to the withholder, that is to have substantially interfered with the aggrieved party's trial preparation.'" Id. (quoting Anderson, 862 F.2d at 925). If the court determines that a presumption of interference is appropriate, the presumption is a rebuttable one. Id. (quoting Anderson, 862 F.2d at 925). To rebut the presumption, the nondisclosing party must adduce "clear and convincing evidence demonstrating that the withheld material was in fact inconsequential." Id. at 68 (quoting Anderson, 862 F.2d at 925).
Defendants make their presentation in support of the instant Motion through documents and witness...
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