Haussman v. Burnham

• Decision Date: 12 June 1890
• Citation: 59 Conn. 117,22 A. 1065
• Parties: HAUSSMAN v. BURNHAM et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

22 A. 1065

59 Conn. 117

HAUSSMAN

v. BURNHAM et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

June 12, 1890.

Case reserved from superior court, Hartford county.

Suit by Jacob Haussman against Maria Burnham and others for the reformation of a deed and for the removal of a cloud on plaintiff's title. The complaint alleged that the deed was made by plaintiff's deceased wife to a third person, who was to, and did, convey to plaintiff, but that by inadvertence plaintiff was not joined with his wife as a grantor in the deed to such third person; by reason of which failure to join plaintiff, defendants claimed an interest in the land, they being the children of plaintiff's wife by a former marriage. It was also alleged that the premises in controversy had been conveyed by plaintiff to his wife in consideration o! her promise to reconvey on his request, and that the deed sought to be reformed was executed pursuant to that agreement. A demurrer to the complaint was overruled, and while the case was pending plaintiff died, his death was suggested on the record, and his administrator entered to prosecute the suit. The case was heard on a defense filed by defendants, and the court made the following finding of facts-"The plaintiff, Jacob Haussman, died December 10, 1888, being then in his seventy-eighth year. He was intestate. He left three children, issue of his first marriage, who are his heirs at law. An administrator on his estate was duly appointed, his death was suggested on the record, and the administrator entered. Mary Haussman, a widow, having children by her prior marriage, was married to Jacob about twenty-one years before his death, and died July 31, 1888, intestate, leaving two children, a son and daughter, surviving her. At the time of their marriage Jacob was the owner, in fee and unincumbered, of the real estate described in the complaint. It was, and until his death continued to be, his residence. He had purchased it about a year previous to the marriage, paying therefor $3,500, which he had earned, and which comprised his accumulations. His last wife brought him no means, but, on the contrary, was in debt, which debts he discharged. In December, 1885, by reason of his advanced age and impaired health, it seemed probable, and he and his wife believed, that she, being more vigorous, would long survive him. Together they consulted a lawyer in reference to some provision by which the property would be assured to her in case of his death. The attorney explained the law to them fully. A will was first talked of, then a deed, reserving a life use, similar to the one actually drawn. He had no wish to disinherit his children, and neither wished that hers should profit by the transaction. The attorney explained the contingencies under Which such a result might happen, but they thought it not likely, as it seemed probable that the property would be exhausted in her support. The deeds were determined upon. A little previous to the time of this interview Mr. and Mrs. Haussman had occasion to consult him on another matter. A Mrs. Miller, a tenant in a portion of the house, claimed to have fallen upon the cellar stairs, tripping upon a flower-pot left there by Haussman, and to have been injured. She asked that some compensation should be made her. Mr. Haussman did not consider this demand just, and did not wish to accede to it. For some reason he and his wife thought Mrs. Miller would be less likely to press this claim if the title to the property stood in the wife's name. In the conversations on the subject the wife promised the husband that if he would convey the property to her she would reconvey it to him at any time when he should so request. These facts, that is, this belief, and the promise of the wife to reconvey, were not communicated to the attorney, and he never knew of them, but they were the controlling reasons and cause which induced the making of the deed instead of the will, and without such promise the deed would not have been made. No third person was present at the time of such promise, nor was there any writing or memorandum of it. The evidence from which it is found is the deposition of Jacob Haussman, taken before his death, and read in evidence, and testimony of sundry witnesses as to the declarations of both Mr. and Mrs. Haussman. The attorney, from the conversations had in his presence at the time of the transaction, believed, though I do not find that it was expressly agreed, that the parties would soon return, and have a will drawn by Mrs. Haussman in favor of her husband. In the summer of 1888, Mrs. Haussman's health became impaired, and it then seemed probable that her husband would survive her. Here quested a reconvey mice, which she readily agreed to, and arrangements were made and a time fixed for going to an attorney's office for that purpose. Before the day arrived, however, she was so much worse as to lie unable to leave the house, and an attorney was sent for. A will was first spoken of, but deeds were decided upon. A deed to the attorney was drawn by him and read to Mrs. Haussman, and she executed and acknowledged it. She was weak physically, and, although she knew how to write, was able to sign by mark only. Her mind was also weak, but, in view of all the facts, including the previous request, promise, and appointment to reconvey, the transaction was a simple one, and I find that she understood and was mentally competent to perform it. Her daughter, Mrs. Burnham, signed the deed as an attesting witness. The attorney assured her and her husband that it was a valid conveyance. She fully intended it as such, and believed it to be so. The husband did not join, or offer to join, in the deed, because of his reliance upon the attorney and the statement of the latter. He never knew, in the life-time of the wife, that such joinder was called for or necessary. All parties present, including the attorney, supposed the deed a valid one, or, if the attorney knew otherwise, it did not then occur to him that it might be invalid. After the death of Mrs. Haussman the attorney sent for Mrs. Burnham, informed her of the error, and requested her to allow its correction by signing a quitclaim deed. This she utterly refused to do. Mrs. Burnham was an inmate of the family prior to and at the time of her mother's death. Her presence was not desired by Mr. Haussman. He complained that she did not treat him kindly, but the fact did not appear. She was of no benefit to him. Her brother has for many years resided out of the state. Any claims which the children of Mrs. Haussman have upon this property, either in her or their own right, are purely legal. Any equities in their favor were not apparent to the court." Defendants objected to the admission of any testimony as to Mrs Haussman's promise to reconvey, her motives in making the reconveyance, and her declarations as to the ownership of the property. They also objected to the admission of the deed from Mrs. Haussmau to the attorney, and from him to Mr. Haussman. The questions as to the admissibility of this evidence, and as to the judgment to be rendered on the facts, were reserved for the supreme court of errors.

W. F. Henney, for plaintiff.

R. Welles and E. Johnson, for defendants.

PHELPS, J. The facts material to the issue in this case are these [The facts being fully stated, the statement of them by the judge is omitted.]

The plaintiff claimed in his complaint: (1) Pecuniary damages; (2) a reformation of the deed from Mrs. Haussman to the attorney, so as to join Mr. Haussman as grantor with his wife; (3) the removal of the cloud on the plaintiff's title by commanding the defendants to convey to Mr Haussman any title or interest in the premises which they may have; and (4) such other and further relief as to equity may appertain. The question is whether by this action there is a remedy for those who by the aforesaid mistake have been deprived of an estate which was by both parties intended for them, and which but for such mistake they would have received. It is scarcely possible that a case could be made which would present clearer or stronger equities, and it would seem that the consequences of such a mistake should be relieved against unless there are insurmountable obstacles in the way, and a court of equity should be astute and diligent in its efforts to prevent such manifest injustice. The underlying "question in the case is whether the promise by Mrs. Haussman to reconvey the property was valid. That the legal and equitable title, subject to the reserved life-estate in Mr. Haussman, was vested in her, is conceded. Indeed, the defendants claim and derive whatever title or interest they possess in the property through the deed from Mr. Haussman to his wife, which was made pursuant to the agreement between them, a part of which was the promise of Mrs. Haussman to reconvey. That husband and wife may during coverture make contracts for the conveyance of property between themselves which will be good in equity, has long been settled, both in Great Britain and here. The court will examine them with great care, and when they are found to contain the essential requisites which exist in the case before us they Will, always be upheld. Slanning v. Stvle, 3 P Wms. 334; Lucas v. Lucas, 1 Atk. 270; Lady Arundell v. Phipps, 10 Ves. 146; Livingston v. Livingston, 2 Johns. Ch. 537; Shepaid v. Shepard, 7 Johns. Ch. 57; Wallingsford v. Allen, 10 Pet. 594; Hinman v. Parkis, 33 Conn. 197, 198. The consideration for the promise of Mrs. Haussman was the conveyance to her, and the provision for her support secured by it. That it was valuable and adequate cannot be questioned, nor that it was made for the benefit of herself and her estate. It was reasonable and certain in its terms, and would not if executed interfere with the rights of creditors, and she might well have made the reconveyance in pursuance of it. If it was void at law, its validity in equity...