Havard v. Perdue Farms, Inc.

• Decision Date: 12 December 2005
• Docket Number: No. CIV. AMD 05-614.,CIV. AMD 05-614.
• Citation: 403 F.Supp.2d 462
• Parties: James HAVARD, Plaintiff v. PERDUE FARMS, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

Page 462

403 F.Supp.2d 462

James HAVARD, Plaintiff v. PERDUE FARMS, INC., Defendant.

No. CIV. AMD 05-614.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

December 12, 2005.

Peter A. Wimbrow, III, Ocean City, MD, Edward C. Gill, Law Office of Edward C. Gill PA, Georgetown, DE, for Plaintiff.

Ernest I. Cornbrooks, III, Webb Burnett Cornbrooks and Wilber, Salisbury, MD, Timothy Sean Brunick, Clarke Dolph Rapaport Hardy and Hull PLC, Norfolk, VA, for Defendant.

AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION

DAVIS, District Judge.

Plaintiff, James Havard, instituted this one-count personal injury action against defendant Perdue Farms, Inc., seeking damages for an incident which occurred at a Perdue facility in Virginia. Jurisdiction is premised on diversity of citizenship. Discovery has concluded and now pending is defendant's alternative dispositive motion, which seeks dismissal with prejudice. No hearing is needed. The motion shall be granted for the reasons stated within.

I.

The material facts, in the light most favorable to plaintiff, may be summarized as follows. At all times relevant to his claim, plaintiff, a citizen of Delaware, was an employee (a welder) for non-party General Refrigeration Company, a Delaware corporation which performed work throughout the Mid-Atlantic region for companies in the food processing industry. Defendant is a Maryland corporation which grows, processes, and markets food items, including chickens. Defendant operates a facility in Accomac, Virginia, described as a "prepackage and ice package plant."

In March 2003, not long after he had been hired by General Refrigeration, plaintiff traveled to the Accomac facility with other employees of General Refrigeration in connection with the installation by General Refrigeration of a new ice maker, compressor and condenser. While at the Accomac facility, General Refrigeration officials undertook to assist Perdue officials in a task separate from the other contracted work, namely, the lifting and repositioning of several large pieces of sheet metal, measuring approximately four-by-eight feet by 1/2 inch thick, from among a stack of such material that was customarily stored in a grassy area near a parked "fan trailer," part of the equipment used in Perdue's chicken processing operations. The fan trailer had begun to sink into the soft ground and the sheet metal was used to support it.

General Refrigeration had leased a large crane for its use in the performance of its contract with Perdue. As mentioned above, it agreed to deploy some of its employees, together with certain Perdue employees and the crane operator, to lift and reposition the sheet metal. Havard suffered crush injuries to his hand as he assisted in this operation, viz., as he helped load the sheet metal onto a fork lift device attendant to the repositioning of the sheet metal. Havard has received workers' compensation benefits under Delaware law through his employment with General Refrigeration. He filed this action against Perdue as a third party tortfeasor.

II.

Defendant's pending dispositive motion has been styled "Defendant's Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Rule 56(c) for Summary Judgment." In its motion, defendant seeks application of the Virginia workers' compensation act (sometimes hereinafter "the Virginia Act" or "the Act") and, specifically, it contends that, as a matter of fact and/or of law, it is entitled to immunity under the Act as Havard's "statutory employer."

A.

I will first explain why I believe the motion must properly be treated as one for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 rather than a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1).

Defendant insists that a "statutory employer" defense under the Virginia Act may be asserted as an attack on a federal district court's subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) in a case filed under the diversity of citizenship statute. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has so held in affirming a district court's treatment of the statutory employer defense as properly asserted pursuant to a motion challenging subject matter jurisdiction in a diversity case. Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., a Div. of Standex Intern. Corp., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir.1999). In so holding, however, the Fourth Circuit relied on Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765 (4th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 984, 112 S.Ct. 1667, 118 L.Ed.2d 388 (1992). But Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R. Co. was a case in which the United States challenged a district court's subject matter jurisdiction on the basis that the claim against it was barred by limitations under the Quiet Title Act, and that therefore its limited, conditional waiver of sovereign immunity deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 768-69.¹ The Supreme Court has often reiterated that a challenge to a claim by the United States asserted against it, resting on sovereign immunity, is a jurisdictional challenge. E.g., United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 77 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983) (holding that "the Tucker Act effects a waiver of sovereign immunity" and that "the existence of consent [to be sued] is a prerequisite for jurisdiction"); see also Williams v. United States, 50 F.3d 299, 304 (4th Cir.1995). Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R. Co. hardly seems to be sound authority for the proposition that a claim properly arising under the diversity statute between private parties may be defeated jurisdictionally.

The notion that the "statutory employer" issue is "jurisdictional" derives from the incident of Virginia law, apparently first recognized in Lucas v. Biller, 204 Va. 309, 130 S.E.2d 582 (1963), that only the Virginia workers' compensation commission, and not the state's common law courts, has "subject matter jurisdiction" over a claim against one found to be a statutory employer. Cf. Lilly v. Strawderman, 64 Va. Cir. 452, 2004 WL 1175423, *1(Va. Cir. Ct., May 27, 2004) ("It is true that [Virginia's] Circuit Courts have general jurisdiction to hear personal injury actions .... However, it is equally true that the legislature has effectively withdrawn a part of that jurisdiction by enacting [the workers' compensation act].")(treating challenge based on "statutory employer" defense as jurisdictional).

In any event, I do not understand federal "case or controversy" requirements (let alone the diversity of citizenship statute) to import such Virginia procedural law into its jurisprudence. Accordingly, I shall treat Perdue's motion as a motion for summary judgment. Accord Graves v. Cook, 2002 WL 598416, *1 n. 1(W.D.Va., April 17, 2002); see also Rice v. VVP America, Inc., 137 F.Supp.2d 658 (E.D.Va.2001) (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment on the issue of "statutory employer"). But see Nelson v. United States Postal Service, 189 F.Supp.2d 450 (W.D.Va.2002)(noting, in the course of finding the United States Postal Service entitled to "statutory employer" immunity, that Postal Service's challenge was properly asserted as a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction).

B.

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is material for purposes of summary judgment, if when applied to the substantive law, it affects the outcome of the litigation. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Summary judgment is also appropriate when a party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment bears the burden of establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in [Rule 56], an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in [Rule 56] must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1012 (4th Cir.1991). Of course, the facts, as well as justifiable inferences to be drawn therefrom, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indust. Co v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The court, however, has an affirmative obligation to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial. Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir.1987).

III.

On the merits, I have no hesitation in concluding that (1) Virginia's workers' compensation act applies to this case; (2) Perdue was the plaintiff's statutory employer under the Act; and therefore, (3) plaintiff's claim is barred.

A.

It is well settled that in a diversity case, a federal district court applies the choice of law principles of the forum. Limbach Co., LLC v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 396 F.3d 358, 361 (4th Cir.2005) (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941)). In cases sounding in tort such as the present one, Maryland applies the venerable maxim of lex loci delicti. Hauch v. Connor, 295 Md. 120, 123, 453 A.2d 1207, 1209 (1983) ("The rule of lex loci delicti is well established in Maryland."); se...