Haven & Clements v. James

• Decision Date: 21 June 1913
• Citation: 206 F. 683
• Parties: HAVEN & CLEMENTS v. JAMES.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

206 F. 683

HAVEN & CLEMENTS v. JAMES.

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia.

June 21, 1913

Brown &amp Randolph, Parker & Scott, and Spencer Atkinson, all of Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff.

Smith Hammond & Smith, of Atlanta, Ga., and Charlton Battle, of Columbus, Ga., for defendant.

NEWMAN District Judge.

The main argument of counsel for the defendant on this motion for a new trial was based on the fact that the court here called the attention of the jury to certain language in a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 25 Sup.Ct. 637, 49 L.Ed. 1031. The quotation was really taken from the language embodied by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York in the opinion in the case of Springs et al. v. James, 137 A.D. 110, the quotation being on page 121, 121 N.Y.Supp. 1054. The court stated in the charge here, after making this quotation:

'That is to say, I understand this method of doing business to be treated by the courts, both the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of New York, as an entirely legitimate method of transacting this part of the business.'

The Supreme Court of New York, in the same opinion, quoted also to precisely the same effect from the case of Clews v Jamieson, 182 U.S. 461, 21 Sup.Ct. 845, 45 L.Ed. 1183.

The decision by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York just referred to was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of New York, 202 N.Y. 603, 96 N.E. 1131.

Examining the language to which counsel calls attention in Board of Trade v. Christie Grain and Stock Co., supra, on page 250 of 198 U.S., on page 639 of 25 S.Ct. (49 L.Ed. 1031), as follows:

'We speak only of the contracts made in the pits, because in them the members are principals. The subsidiary rights of their employers where the members buy as brokers we think it unnecessary to discuss.'

-- I am unable to see that this has any effect whatever on the matter involved here. If the contracts between the principals were legal-- that is, if Haven & Clements had contracts that were valid and binding as against them with other members of the Exchange, and paid out money, as they did, because of their liability on such contracts-- it would be singular indeed if they could not recover the same from their principal, Mr. James.

In this case the court endeavored to instruct the jury in accordance with the suggestion of the Circuit Court of Appeals in the opinion rendered in this case (James v. Haven & Clements, 185 F. 692, 107 C.C.A. 640) as follows:

'Of necessity we have been compelled to read much of the evidence which includes many telegrams and letters passing between the parties, and we cannot resist the conclusion that from James' alleged notice to the agent Tate, and his telegrams and letters to the plaintiffs, and the course of dealing pursued by the parties and other matters shown, the jury might well have found that James did not contemplate actual delivery of any cotton on the future contracts bought or sold for him by the plaintiffs, and only intended wagering or gambling on the fluctuations of prices of cotton futures, expecting to settle by the receipt or payment of differences, and that the plaintiffs were well advised thereof and well understood that in buying and selling for James' account no delivery was to be made or expected to be made, even if third parties should become interested in the future contracts

...