Havens v. Mason

• Decision Date: 15 December 1905
• Citation: 62 A. 615,78 Conn. 410
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: HAVENS v. MASON.

62 A. 615

78 Conn. 410

HAVENS v. MASON.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Dec. 15, 1905.

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Joel H. Reed, Judge.

Application by Francis A. E. Mason for the probate of the will of Sarah B. Stevens, deceased. From a judgment of the superior court, reversing the probate decree approving the will, the proponent appeals. Reversed.

Henry E. Shannon, Carl Foster, and Arthur J. Hull, for appellant. John C. Chamberlain and J. Gilbert Calhoun, for appellee.

BALDWIN, J. The paper propounded as the will of Sarah B. Stevens contained certain specific and pecuniary bequests to a niece, Elizabeth Wells, a nephew, George Wells, and others; gave to Francis A. E. Mason, another nephew, who was also appointed as the executor, $4,000 "in consideration and appreciation of his services incaring without remuneration for my property in Hartford, and because of his many kindnesses to me"; and had the following residuary clause: "(7) I direct that all the rest and residue of my estate, real and personal, or both, that shall remain after the foregoing bequests shall have been satisfied, be divided among my heirs according to their respective shares under the laws of this state; the aforesaid Elizabeth Wells, George Wells, and Francis A. E. Mason, each to receive whatever may be her or his lawful share in the said residue under this clause in addition to the bequests already hereinbefore made them." On the trial a lawyer who wrote the will testified that the testatrix told him that, she wished her residuary estate to be divided equally among all her heirs; that he read the will aloud to her after it was drawn; and that she said it was as she desired. On cross-examination he stated that her instructions for drafting the residuary clause were that each heir should have what the statute would give him in the absence of a will; that he was not informed whether her heirs apparent were all related to her in the same degree; and that he did not explain to her what the effect of the statute would be in case some should take by representation. Following, in substance, a request of the heir who appealed from the probate decree, the trial court instructed the jury that, if they should find that the terms of the will were so indefinite and uncertain that an ordinary person would not know what they meant upon having them read to him, the fact that Mrs. Stevens executed it was evidence that she was not of sound mind at the time. The will before the jury contained nothing that was indefinite or uncertain. Whether, if it had, such an instruction could, under any circumstances, have been proper, it is unnecessary to inquire. It could only serve to mislead and confuse in the case on trial. To execute, in reliance on the assurance of counsel that it conforms to the instructions given, a will containing expressions the effect of which...