Havens v. Tomball Community Hosp., 01-89-00936-CV

• Decision Date: 24 May 1990
• Docket Number: No. 01-89-00936-CV,01-89-00936-CV
• Citation: 793 S.W.2d 690
• Parties: 5 IER Cases 632 Connie HAVENS, Appellant, v. TOMBALL COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, Carol Kelley, Director of Nursing, Individually, and Dr. Michael A. Rodriguez, Individually, Appellees. (1st Dist.)
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 690

793 S.W.2d 690

5 IER Cases 632

Connie HAVENS, Appellant, v. TOMBALL COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, Carol Kelley, Director of

Nursing, Individually, and Dr. Michael A.

Rodriguez, Individually, Appellees.

No. 01-89-00936-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas,

Houston (1st Dist.).

May 24, 1990.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 16, 1990.

Susan McAuliffe, Houston, for appellant.

J. Richard Cheney, Matthew D. Schaffer, Eddie M. Krenek, Houston, for appellees.

Before EVANS, C.J., and DUGGAN and MIRABAL, JJ.

OPINION

EVANS, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a take-nothing summary judgment. The controlling issue on appeal is whether the plaintiff's allegations, if true, establish a cause of action under Texas law.

The plaintiff, Connie Havens, a nurse, sued her former employer, Tomball Community Hospital, the hospital's director of nursing, Carol Kelley, and a staff physician, Dr. Michael A. Rodriguez, alleging wrongful treatment and retaliatory discharge.

The plaintiff was head nurse in the labor and delivery unit at the Tomball Community Hospital from November 1976, until her discharge on October 21, 1983. She alleged that until June 7, 1983, she had worked faithfully and continuously at the hospital, without difficulty, receiving periodic raises and recommendations for her work. She asserted that on June 7, she was involved in an incident at the hospital that resulted in wrongful treatment and subsequent retaliatory discharge.

She alleged that, as part of her duties, she was required to know which physicians were authorized to do certain types of medical practice in her department, and that she knew the defendant, Dr. Rodriguez, was not authorized by the hospital to perform a continuous epidural anesthesia procedure. She asserted that Dr. Rodriguez started such a procedure on a patient who was delivering a baby and, having started the procedure, he announced to her that he was leaving the hospital and the patient. Knowing the situation was dangerous to the life of the child and mother, she suggested to Dr. Rodriguez that he not leave the hospital. Dr. Rodriguez then became quite angry, and both she and Dr. Rodriguez reported the incident to the hospital authorities.

She alleged that the hospital, and the other named defendants, thereafter commenced a course of conduct to harass, humiliate, and degrade her good name, eventually leading to her willful, malicious, and unlawful termination. She asserted that the reason for her termination was her refusal to assist Dr. Rodriguez in the performance of the unauthorized procedure. She further alleged that she was a professionally qualified, highly skilled, competent, professional registered nurse, with an excellent professional reputation in the Harris County area, and that the defendants held her up to ridicule among her peers and among the professional community, causing her shame, professional humiliation, and economic loss. She asserted that the defendants' intentional and negligent infliction of emotional harm and emotional stress upon her was a proximate cause of the damages sustained to her personal reputation and position, and to her past and future earning capacity.

A summary judgment for a defendant disposing of the entire case is proper only if, as a matter of law, the plaintiff cannot succeed on any theories pleaded. Delgado v. Burns, 656 S.W.2d 428, 429 (Tex.1983); Gibbs v. General Motors Corp., 450 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex.1970). When the defendants' motion simply challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiff's petition to allege an enforceable claim, the court must take as true every allegation of the pleading against which the motion is directed. Wood Truck Leasing, Inc. v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 526 S.W.2d 223, 224-225 (Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 1975, no writ); Labbe v. Carr, 369 S.W.2d 952, 954 (Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Applying this standard of review the plaintiff's petition, liberally construed, sets out a cause of action recognized in Texas law; thus, the motion for summary judgment must be overruled. Holmes v. Canlen Management Corp., 542 S.W.2d 199, 201-202 (Tex.Civ.App.--El Paso 1976, no writ); Gottlieb v. Hofheinz, 523 S.W.2d 7, 9 (...