Haverstock v. State Public Employees Retirement Fund, 2-585A160

• Docket Nº: No. 2-585A160
• Citation: 490 N.E.2d 357
• Case Date: March 20, 1986
• Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana

Page 357

490 N.E.2d 357 James L. HAVERSTOCK and Gary Cooper, on behalf of themselves
and all other persons similarly situated as members of
various local governmental departments of fire and police,
Tom Trathen, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
STATE of Indiana PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT FUND, Defendant-Appellee. No. 2-585A160 ¹. Court of Appeals of Indiana,
First District. March 20, 1986.
Rehearing Denied May 12, 1986.

Page 358

John C. Ruckelshaus, Ruckelshaus, Roland, Hasbrook & O'Connor, T. Reg Hesselgrave, Richard A. Mann, Cohen & Mann, Indianapolis, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Michael Schaefer, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for defendant-appellee.

RATLIFF, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellants appeal from the entry of summary judgment by the Marion Superior Court in favor of the Public Employees' Retirement Fund. We affirm.

Page 359

FACTS

Appellants are police officers and firefighters who began their employment after May 1, 1977, and prior to May 25, 1977. At the time they were hired, the applicable pension fund plans would have permitted them to collect benefit payments after 20 years of service. See Indiana Code sections 19-1-18-13(a), 19-1-37-11(c) (Burns 1974). On May 25, 1977, however, new pension fund plans were enacted. These plans both contained the following provision:

"Sec. 8. Retirement; Eligibility for Benefits. (a) A member is eligible for retirement after he has completed twenty (20) years of active service.

(b) Benefit payments to a retired member begin on the first day of the month on or after the date he reaches age fifty-five (55) or retires, whichever is later."

Acts 1977 (Special Session), P.L. 9, sec. 1 p. 109 (entitled 1977 Police Officers' Pension and Disability Fund) and Acts 1977 (Special Session), P.L. 9, sec. 2 pp. 117-118 (entitled 1977 Firefighters Pension and Disability Fund). ² By express provision, police officers and firefighters hired after May 1, 1977, were made members of the new pension plan. ³

On December 31, 1980, James L. Haverstock, a Bloomington police officer, and Gary Cooper, a Wabash firefighter filed a complaint in the Marion Superior Court. They sought a declaratory judgment determining that the new pension plan could not be applied retroactively to those officers and firefighters hired prior to the date of its enactment, May 25, 1977. Furthermore, they sought certification as a class action pursuant to Indiana Rule of Procedure, Trial Rule 23, which the trial court later granted. ⁴ On March 1, 1985, following submission of briefs, but without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Public Employees' Retirement Fund (PERF). The court found that the pension plan was mandatory and therefore a gratuity from the state creating no contractual rights. Consequently, the court concluded, the retroactive effect of the new pension plan did not violate any rights possessed by the appellants. Subsequently, appellants perfected this appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the legislature may determine that a public employee will be enrolled as a member of a pension plan enacted after the date his employment commenced.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Before we venture into the merits of this appeal, it is necessary to once again set out our standard for reviewing grants of summary judgment. That standard is the same one applied by the trial court in the first instance. See Indiana Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 56(C). Summary judgment is

Page 360

appropriate only where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Wingenroth v. American States Insurance Co. (1983), Ind.App., 455 N.E.2d 968, 969; Nahmias v. Trustees of Indiana University (1983), Ind.App., 444 N.E.2d 1204, 1206, trans. denied; English Coal Co. v. Durcholz (1981), Ind.App., 422 N.E.2d 302, 207, trans. denied. Both parties agree that the essential facts underlying this appeal are not in dispute. Consequently, our task is merely to determine whether the trial court correctly applied the law when it granted judgment in favor of PERF.

It is fundamental law that the power to enact statutes necessarily entails the power to repeal or modify them. Hamilton County Council v. State ex rel. Groff (1949), 227 Ind. 608, 613, 87 N.E.2d 810, 812; Wencke v. City of Indianapolis (1981), Ind.App., 429 N.E.2d 295, 297, trans. denied. This power is not absolute however. Except in very limited situations, both the United States and Indiana constitutions prohibit the retrospective application of legislation if it will result in the impairment of contractual obligations. U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 10; Ind. Const. art. I, sec. 24; Wencke, at 297; Foley v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis (1981), Ind.App., 421 N.E.2d 1160, 1167, trans. denied; Corn v. City of Oakland City (1981), Ind.App., 415 N.E.2d 129, 131; Etherton v. Wyatt (1973), 155 Ind.App. 440, 454, 293 N.E.2d 43, 51. As this court stated in Foley, however:

"In order for a right to vest or a liability to be incurred it must be 'immediate, absolute, complete,...