Haviland v. Catholic Health Initiatives-Iowa

• Decision Date: 06 August 2010
• Docket Number: No. 4:07-cv-018,4:07-cv-018
• Citation: 729 F.Supp.2d 1038
• Parties: Michael HAVILAND, Jamie Aiken, and Jeremy Patchin, Plaintiffs, v. CATHOLIC HEALTH INITIATIVES-IOWA, CORP., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

729 F.Supp.2d 1038

Michael HAVILAND, Jamie Aiken, and Jeremy Patchin, Plaintiffs,

v.CATHOLIC HEALTH INITIATIVES-IOWA, CORP., Defendant.

No. 4:07-cv-018.

United States District Court,

S.D. Iowa,

Central Division.

Aug. 6, 2010.

Thomas Andrew Newkirk, Jill M. Zwagerman, Newkirk Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiffs.

Kelsey J. Knowles, Michael R. Reck, Patricia A. Shoff, Belin McCormick, P.C., Des Moines, IA, Christopher L. McDonald, Aviva USA Corporation, Des Moines, IA, for Defendant.

ORDER

ROBERT W. PRATT, Chief Judge.

Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment, filed November 30, 2009 by Catholic Health Initiatives-Iowa, Corp. (hereinafter "Defendant" or "Mercy"). Clerk's No. 90. Michael Haviland ("Haviland"), Jamie Aiken ("Aiken"), and Jeremy Patchin ("Patchin") (collectively "Plaintiffs") filed a resistance on March 25, 2010. Clerk's No. 129. Mercy filed a reply on April 8, 2010. Clerk's No. 141. The matter is fully submitted.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Haviland, individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated employees, filed a petition in the Iowa District Court for Polk County on December 20, 2006, alleging that Defendant violated the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (the "FLSA"), and the Iowa Wage Payment Collection Act, Iowa Code Chapter 91A et seq. ("IWPCA"). See Clerk's No. 1-1. On January 9, 2007, Defendant removed the case to federal court, pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See Clerk's No. 1. Subsequently, Haviland filed an Amended Complaint wherein Aiken and Patchin were added as named representative Plaintiffs. See Clerk's No. 40.

In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs, current and former private security officers ("PSOs") for Mercy, state that they perform various security duties for three separate Mercy hospital locations, Mercy Main, Mercy Capitol, ¹ and Mercy Franklin. Am. Compl. ¶ 18. Plaintiffs' regular duties at the various locations "include monitoring facilities, responding to emergencies, and patrolling the building surrounding the hospital." Id. ¶ 17. While Plaintiffs are supposed to receive an unpaid thirty-minute meal break on each shift, the Amended Complaint alleges that, "[w]hen Plaintiffs are scheduled to work at either Mercy Capitol or Mercy Franklin, they do not receive a mealtime break." Id. ¶ 19. More specifically, Plaintiffs contend that, though they are permitted to eat at both Mercy Capitol and Mercy Franklin, the restrictions on their freedom are such that they are, in actuality, continuing to work throughout their thirty-minute lunch breaks. Id. ¶¶ 20-25. Accordingly, Plaintiffs request that Mercy be required to pay them "the amount respectively due them for overtime compensation and interest, liquidated damages, and costs," along with reasonable attorneys fees, under both the FLSA and the IWPCA. Id. at 4-5.

On April 10, 2007, Plaintiffs requested class action certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 for their IWPCA claim, and collective action certification under § 216(b) for their FLSA claim. Clerk's No. 18. In an Order dated October 19, 2007, the Court denied class certification for the IWPCA claim on the basis that the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a)(2)-(3) were not satisfied. Clerk's No. 49 at 9-11. The Court, however, granted conditional collective certification of the FLSA action. Clerk's No. 49. Although forty-four potential collective members were initially identified, only nine ultimately opted to participate in the collective action.² See Clerk's Nos. 40, 56-59.

II. FACTS

Mercy staffs its three locations, Mercy Main, Mercy Franklin, and Mercy Capitol, with public safety officers twenty-four hours per day. Pls.' Statement of Disputed Facts (hereinafter "Pls.' Facts") ¶ 7.³ Atsome point in 2009, Mercy Capitol closed, but Defendant opened another facility known as Mercy West Lakes, which also staffs a PSO twenty-four hours per day. Id. ¶ 8. At any given time, Mercy Main staffs a dispatcher and three PSOs per shift. Id. ¶¶ 13-14. According to Plaintiffs, this staffing arrangement generally makes it possible for PSOs working at the Mercy Main campus to leave work or take a meal period knowing that their job duties would be covered by another officer. Id. ¶ 18. Mercy Capitol, Mercy Franklin, and Mercy West Lakes, however, are (or were) each staffed by only one PSO per shift.⁴Id. ¶¶ 15-17.

Plaintiffs are all PSOs employed by Defendant for various time periods from December 20, 2003 through the present day.⁵Id. ¶ 1. Plaintiffs contend that Defendant "employed [PSOs] and contracted with them to perform scheduled tasks," which Plaintiffs identify as: "engage to wait to perform scheduled tasks, engage to respond to incidents, engage to wait to respond to incidents, monitor; and employ them to be a presence in the physical locations at the ready to respond to incidentsand otherwise act as a deterrent to ensure public safety." Id. ¶ 2. The evidence in this case makes clear, however, that Plaintiffs had significant amounts of free time to engage in various personal pursuits during their shifts working as PSOs for Mercy. See Def.'s Statement of Undisputed Facts (hereinafter "Def.'s Facts") ¶ 13; Pls.' Facts ¶ 93. Haviland, for instance, testified in his deposition that, while on duty as a PSO, he has gone to lunch with other officers, eaten in the cafeteria, had food delivered, brought food from home, left Mercy's premises to get a snack or to smoke, studied and typed reports, surfed the internet, sent and received personal email, watched movies on the internet, played on-line games, played cards, and read books and newspapers. Def.'s App. at 16, 18, 19, 23, 30. Likewise, while on duty, Patchin admits that he went to the hospital cafeteria, had food delivered, brought food from home, accessed pornographic or adult-content web sites, watched DVDs or movies, played cards, left Mercy's premises "daily" to go to Quik Trip to smoke and buy a soda, played chess, and accessed the internet for personal use anywhere from one-half hour to two hours per day on a typical shift. Id. at 30-34. Aiken also reports that he has used time during his shifts to eat, have food delivered, study, use the internet, go to Quik Trip, play online games, look at pornographic materials, read magazines and books, make phone calls, study, check personal email, and surf the internet. Id. at 3-7. Video surveillance and Plaintiffs' internet logs confirm that Plaintiffs engaged in various personal pursuits while on duty.⁶See id. at 43-196 (log of Aiken's on-duty internet usage for November 2006); 197-479 (log of Haviland's on-duty internet usage for March 2007); 480-565 (log of Patchin's on-duty internet usage for July 2006); 566-71 (video surveillance stills showing Haviland eating, reading the newspaper, and balancing his checkbook).

PSOs are scheduled to work for eight and one-half hour shifts, but are only paid for eight hours. Pls.' Facts ¶ 10. The remaining half-hour is automatically deducted from the calculation of an employee's hours worked, and is intended to be a non-working, unpaid meal period. Id. ¶ 11. Mercy has two written policies that refer to meal periods or lunches. First, Mercy's general corporate policy provides:

A. Employees who are scheduled to work 8 or more hours should receive one 30-minute unpaid meal period whenever possible.

B. Employees working shifts that are less than 8 hours can take a meal break if scheduled to do so. The 30-minute meal break is without pay.

C. When an employee is unable to take a 30-minute meal break without disruptions caused by work, or if the meal break is disrupted by work responsibilities, the supervisor must be notified and notation of no meal will be made at the time clock at the end of shift. This time will count as worked hours.

D. If an employee is unable to take a meal period due to work responsibilities, an employee may not choose to leave work one-half hour early. The supervisor, however, may authorize the employee to do this if work volumes are sufficiently covered. This practice is not encouragedas a solution for missed meal breaks.

E. Employees may leave the hospital premises during meal periods. Nonexempt employees must punch out/in when leaving and returning to work.

F. If the employee exceeds the 30 minute limit or fails to punch out and/or in on the time clock, he/she may be subject to disciplinary action.

G. An employee that is leaving the hospital premises for a meal, and is required to wear hospital provided scrubs, must change from and to scrub attire within the 30-minute meal period.

Id. ¶ 64; Def.'s App. at 1. A more specific policy, directly applicable to Mercy's PSOs, is entitled, "Security/Safety Department Policy" on "Overtime Authorization[s]," and states:

To provide the Security Director with a means of monitoring and managing the Overtime Program, and to insure accountability the following procedures are to be used when it becomes necessary for Security Personnel to work overtime.

It is the policy of the Security Department to avoid situations that make overtime necessary, at the same time recognizing that at times, overtime is unavoidable. Through proper scheduling and planning of staff use of paid time off, most overtime situations can be avoided. This includes the approval of short notice vacations, or any P.T.O. requests that will lower staffing levels below the minimum of three officers per shift.

...

Each employee is responsible for making an effort to take a lunch break. If it appears that there will be insufficient time to break for lunch, the employee should arrangement [sic] for relief. The Shift Supervisor may then elect to provide relief, allow the employee to leave work and clock-out 30 minutes prior to the shift's end, or authorize overtime.

The hospital has a cafeteria and vending area which provides refreshments. Employees may also bring food if they like. Therefore inability to get to the cafeteria does not constitute a missed lunch

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