Havird v. Lung

Citation19 Idaho 790,115 P. 930
PartiesCARY C. HAVIRD, Respondent, v. LOUIS LUNG, Appellant
Decision Date13 May 1911
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Idaho

ESTRAYS - TITLE PASSED BY SALE - LIMITATIONS - CONVERSION OF CHATTEL-ACCRUAL OF CAUSE OF ACTION-DEMAND-NONDISCOVERY.

(Syllabus by the court.)

1. By compliance with the estray law of 1905, now found in substance in sec. 1299 of the Rev. Codes, the purchaser of an animal regularly sold as an estray acquires an absolute title, regardless of lapse of time.

2. Noncompliance with such law makes the possession by the person who takes up an estray wrongful, renders him liable to the owner as for conversion, and leaves him without protection for any expenses which he may have incurred in the care of the animal while in his possession.

3. Under sec. 4054, Rev. Codes, subd. 3, which requires an action for taking, detaining or injuring any goods or chattels, or for the specific recovery of personal property to be brought within three years, a right of action accrues in favor of the owner of goods as soon as they are wrongfully taken from his possession, or wrongfully converted by one who rightfully came into possession of them.

4. Where the possession of property is acquired by tort, no demand need be made previous to the institution of suit for its recovery, and consequently the statute of limitations is set in motion without such demand.

5. Nondiscovery of the location of a chattel is not a material element in the computation of the period of limitation allowed to commence an action to recover such chattel.

6. The provisions of sec. 4054, Rev. Codes, subd. 4, that the cause of action for fraud or mistake is not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake, applies only to actions for fraud or mistake within the common acceptance of those terms, and has no application to the action for taking detaining or injuring goods or chattels, the period for commencing which is prescribed by the third subdivision of the section.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, for Ada County. Hon. Fremont Wood, Judge.

Action for claim and delivery. Judgment for plaintiff and defendant appeals. Reversed.

Judgment reversed, with directions. Costs awarded to the appellant.

Cavanah & Blake and Chas. F. Koelsch, for Appellant.

"If the original possession of property is acquired by a tort, no demand previous to the institution of a suit is necessary." (Sargent v. Sturm, 23 Cal. 359, 83 Am. Dec. 118; Coombs v. Collins, 6 Idaho 536, 57 P. 310.)

"It is only when one obtains possession of property lawfully that demand is necessary to support replevin or trover." (Velsian v. Lewis, 15 Ore. 539, 3 Am. St. 185, 16 P 631.)

It is a wrongful taking that gives a right of action, and it is a wrongful holding for the required length of time, if openly and exclusively, that sets and keeps the statute in operation and results in transferring title from the true owner to the tortious holder. (Harpending v. Meyer, 55 Cal. 555.)

"When misconduct or negligence constitutes a cause of action, the statute of limitations begins to run from the time when the defendant had been guilty of such misconduct or negligence." (Lattin v. Gillette, 95 Cal. 317, 29 Am. St. 115, 30 P. 545; Wood v. Currey, 57 Cal. 209; Piller v. P. R. Co., 52 Cal. 42.)

"Mere ignorance of the existence of the facts constituting a cause of action does not prevent the running of the statute." (Davis v. Boyett, 120 Ga. 649, 102 Am. St. 118, 48 S.E. 185, 66 L. R. A. 258, 1 Ann. Cas. 386; Lambert v. McKenzie, 135 Cal. 100, 67 P. 6; Lightfoot v. Davis, 132 A.D. 452, 116 N.Y.S. 904.)

R. M. McCracken, for Respondent.

"It has always been the rule in equity that the defendant's fraudulent concealment of a cause of action will postpone the running of the statute until such time as the plaintiff discovers the fraud." (19 Cyc., 2d ed., 243.)

"But this will not absolve him from all effort or diligence to obtain such knowledge, and the facts of which he might have obtained knowledge, had he sought it from its natural sources of information which were at his command, will be deemed within his knowledge." (Taylor v. S. & N. Ala. R. R. Co., 13 F. 152, 4 Woods, 575; Farrar v. Bernheim, 75 F. 136, 21 C. C. A. 264.)

MACLANE, District Judge. Ailshie, Presiding J., and Sullivan, J., concur.

OPINION

MACLANE, District Judge.

This is an action of claim and delivery for a horse. The defendant pleaded the statute of limitations and the trial court, by an instruction, withdrew this defense from the jury, in consequence of which there was a verdict for the plaintiff and the defendant has appealed.

The facts shown by the record are that the plaintiff lost the horse in the fall of 1905, and one C. A. Esgate took the horse up as an estray while it was trespassing upon his land, on the 1st of November, of that year. He used the horse until February 25th, 1908, when he sold him at public auction to Elias Marsters, who used him on his delivery wagon until October, 1908, when he traded him to the defendant in this action, who likewise used him publicly until about June 23d, 1909, when the plaintiff saw the horse for the first time since 1905, demanded possession, and, on defendant's refusal to comply with the demand, commenced this action on June 25th, 1909.

Upon these facts the court instructed the jury that "Where property is taken up as an estray, the law requires and points out the duty of the person taking up such animal or animals, and where such party fails to comply with the estray law, his possession of the property thus taken up becomes wrongful, and in my opinion he would not be permitted to plead the statute of limitations in his own behalf against the true owner of the property, and for that reason it is apparent that while the property was held and possessed by such wrongful holder, the statute of limitations would not run, and could not be invoked in behalf of a subsequent purchaser without notice by the person thus taking up the estray."

We think that this instruction misconceives the true purpose both of the estray law, and of the statute of limitations. By sec. 4054, Rev. Codes, "An action for taking, detaining or injuring any goods or chattels, including actions for the specific recovery of personal property," must be brought within three years from the accrual of the cause of action. By Laws 1905, p. 366, section 1, which was in force when Esgate took up this horse, and the substance of which is now included in sec. 1299, Rev. Codes, a person taking up an estray--that is, an animal running at large without sufficient food or shelter, between the 1st of November and the 1st of the following March--is required to notify the owner, if known, or, if unknown, the county recorder, whose duty it is to...

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15 cases
  • Hansbrough v. D.W. Standrod & Co., 5147
    • United States
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    • 5 Abril 1930
    ...... subd. 3, sec. 6611, Idaho Comp. Stats. 1919, operates as a. bar to the action. ( Havird v. Lung, 19 Idaho 790,. 115 P. 930; 24 Cal. Jur. 1036; Harpending v. Meyer, . 55 Cal. 555; Dee v. Hyland, 3 Utah 308, 3 P. 388;. Leavitt v. ......
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    • 24 Junio 1932
    ...personal property, are barred by the statute of limitations unless commenced within three years. (C. S., sec. 6611, subd. 3; Havird v. Lung, 19 Idaho 790, 115 P. 930; 16 Jur. 446, 447.) In an action for conversation, when the original taking is alleged to be wrongful, the statute begins to ......
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    ......Maxey, for Respondent Anderson. . . Intervener's. cause of action accrued at the time of the levy of. attachment. ( Havird v. Lung, 19 Idaho 790, 115 P. 930; Common School Dist. No. 18 v. Twin Falls B. & T. Co., 52. Idaho 200, 12 P.2d 774.). . . Statutes. ......
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