Havre Daily News, LLC v. City of Havre

• Decision Date: 30 August 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05-292.,05-292.
• Citation: 2006 MT 215,142 P.3d 864
• Parties: HAVRE DAILY NEWS, LLC, a Washington Corporation; The Havre Daily News, Inc., a Montana Subchapter "S" Corporation; The Associated Press; The Montana Newspaper Association; The Great Falls Tribune; The Montana Broadcasters' Association; The Daily Interlake; The Bozeman Daily Chronicle; The Society of Professional Journalists, the Montana Pro Chapter; and The Missoulian, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. The CITY OF HAVRE; Kevin Olson, in his capacity as Chief of Police for the City of Havre; Michael Barthel, in his capacity as Assistant Chief of Police for the City of Havre; Lt. George Tate, in his capacity as a member of the City of Havre's Police Department, Defendants and Respondents.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 864

142 P.3d 864

2006 MT 215

HAVRE DAILY NEWS, LLC, a Washington Corporation; The Havre Daily News, Inc., a Montana Subchapter "S" Corporation; The Associated Press; The Montana Newspaper Association; The Great Falls Tribune; The Montana Broadcasters' Association; The Daily Interlake; The Bozeman Daily Chronicle; The Society of Professional Journalists, the Montana Pro Chapter; and The Missoulian, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. The CITY OF HAVRE; Kevin Olson, in his capacity as Chief of Police for the City of Havre; Michael Barthel, in his capacity as Assistant Chief of Police for the City of Havre; Lt. George Tate, in his capacity as a member of the City of Havre's Police Department, Defendants and Respondents.

No. 05-292.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs March 8, 2006.

Decided August 30, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

For Appellants: John M. Shontz and F. Ron Newbury, J.M. Shontz & Assoc., Helena, Montana.

For Respondents: Mary VanBuskirk, Bosch, Kuhr, Dugdale, Martin & Kaze, PLLP, Havre, Montana.

Justice W. WILLIAM LEAPHART delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 The Havre Daily News and other Montana newspapers (collectively, "the Newspaper") sued the City of Havre, Havre Police Chief Kevin Olson and other members of the Havre Police force (collectively, "Havre"), seeking dissemination of an unredacted initial "incident report" and the accompanying officer's "narrative." The Newspaper also requested the District Court to order Havre to develop and implement a general policy to govern the dissemination of initial offense reports. Because Havre provided the Havre Daily News with the unredacted report, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Havre, ruling that the case was moot and non-justiciable, but awarded attorney fees to the Newspaper. The Newspaper now appeals and Havre cross-appeals the award of attorney fees. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.

¶ 2 The following issues are dispositive of this appeal:

¶ 3(1) whether the District Court erred in denying the Newspaper's motion for a default judgment;

¶ 4(2) whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Havre; and

¶ 5(3) whether the District Court erred in determining that the Newspaper may recover attorney fees incurred prior to receiving the unredacted reports.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 6 The focus of this dispute is a police report describing an officer's investigation that culminated in charges being levied against several individuals for underage drinking. Looking into allegations that the police had shown preferential treatment to an officer's child, Winderl (a reporter for the Havre Daily News) requested to view the initial "incident report" and the accompanying "narrative" prepared by the investigating officer (collectively, "Reports"). The Havre Police Department provided Winderl with both Reports, which he read. Winderl requested a copy of the Reports, and an officer eventually provided him with copies in which the names of two uncharged juvenile witnesses and the parent of one of those juveniles were redacted. Approximately two and a half months later, the Newspaper sued to obtain an unredacted copy of the Reports.

¶ 7 The Newspaper filed a complaint on March 10, 2004. The complaint detailed the facts surrounding Winderl's receipt of the redacted Reports and requested the court to order Havre to release the unredacted Reports as well as to develop and implement a policy governing future dissemination of such reports ("prospective relief"). More specifically, the Newspaper's request for prospective relief sought the following: (1) implementation of a policy requiring immediate dissemination of complete copies of initial incident reports to the public upon request; (2) a provision that the public pay only the actual cost of reproduction for such copies;¹ and (3) a mandate that particular information (i.e., the name, age, occupation, family status, date of birth and residence of the accused) be included in each initial incident report. Whereas the complaint contained thirty-eight factual allegations, thirty-seven of which pertained only to Winderl's request for the Reports, the Newspaper used this incident as leverage to seek judicial implementation of a broad policy governing all hypothetical, future requests for initial incident reports. On March 29, 2004, Havre provided the Havre Daily News with an unredacted copy of the Reports. On April 30, 2004, having never answered the Newspaper's complaint, Havre moved for summary judgment. The Newspaper, in turn, moved for default judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(c) and 55.

¶ 8 The District Court granted Havre's request for summary judgment and denied the Newspaper's request for default judgment. The court awarded attorney fees to the Newspaper and ordered the Newspaper to file and serve an affidavit of fees and costs. Counsel for the Newspaper never filed such an affidavit with the court. Instead, the Newspaper filed this appeal.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶ 9 "We review a district court's conclusions of law to determine whether the court's interpretation of the law is correct." Chamberlin v. Puckett Construction, 277 Mont. 198, 202-03, 921 P.2d 1237, 1240 (1996). Whether a party may avoid default judgment when she fails to answer a complaint and instead files a motion for summary judgment is purely a question of law.

¶ 10 "We review a District Court's grant of summary judgment de novo. . . . We apply the standard declared by Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P. The moving party must establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and her entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. We review a district court's conclusions of law to determine whether they are correct." Baltrusch v. Baltrusch, 2006 MT 51, ¶ 11, 331 Mont. 281, ¶ 11, 130 P.3d 1267, ¶ 11 (citations omitted).

¶ 11 "Whether or not a party is entitled to recover attorney fees is `strictly a question of law.' Thus, `[w]e review a district court's conclusions of law pertaining to the recovery of attorney's fees to determine whether those conclusions are correct.'" Chase v. Bearpaw Ranch Ass'n, 2006 MT 67, ¶ 14, 331 Mont. 421, ¶ 14, 133 P.3d 190, ¶ 14 (quoting Transaction Network v. Wellington Tech., 2000 MT 223, ¶ 17, 301 Mont. 212, ¶ 17, 7 P.3d 409, ¶ 17 (citation omitted; modification in original)).

DISCUSSION

Issue 1: Whether the District Court erred in denying the Newspaper's motion for a default judgment.

¶ 12 The Newspaper argues that the District Court should have granted its motion for a default judgment because Havre never answered its complaint, thereby effectively admitting the allegations complained therein. The Newspaper asserts that M.R. Civ. P. 7 limits responsive pleadings to an answer and urges us to reverse Klock v. Town of Cascade, 284 Mont. 167, 943 P.2d 1262 (1997), to the extent that it conflicts with Rule 7. Essentially, the Newspaper contends that allowing a party to circumvent the Rules of Civil Procedure—by filing a motion for summary judgment in lieu of an answer—will erode the structure of civil litigation that is built upon these carefully designed rules.

¶ 13 Havre argues that its motion for summary judgment constitutes a responsive pleading to the complaint; therefore, the court properly denied the Newspaper's motion for default judgment on the pleadings. Havre notes that pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 55, as interpreted by this Court in Klock, a motion for summary judgment is a defense to a complaint. Consequently, Havre contends, a court may not enter default judgment against a party who moves for summary judgment but fails to answer a complaint. We agree.

¶ 14 M.R. Civ. P. 55(a), requires the clerk to enter default judgment against a defendant who "has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules . . . ." In Klock, this Court held that a motion for summary judgment satisfies the requirement that a party "otherwise defend" in order to escape default judgment. 284 Mont. at 173, 943 P.2d at 1266. Federal courts construing Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is identical to Montana's rule, have likewise concluded that a defendant may escape default judgment by filing a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Rashidi v. Albright, 818 F.Supp. 1354, 1355-56 (D.Nev.1993).

¶ 15 The Newspaper insists that Klock conflicts with M.R. Civ. P. 7, which provides that, aside from various iterations of complaints, answers, and replies, "[n]o other pleading shall be allowed. . . ." Because M.R. Civ. P. 55(a), explicitly contemplates defenses other than pleadings, however, no such conflict exists. A defendant may defend by filing an answer. In addition, a defendant may "otherwise defend," for example by filing a motion for summary judgment or a motion to dismiss pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b). Havre's motion for summary judgment sufficed to prevent the District Court from entering default judgment in favor of the Newspaper.

Issue 2: Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Havre.

A. Ripeness:

¶ 16 The Newspaper argues that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment because its request for prospective relief presents a justiciable issue. The Newspaper asserts that it has an existing constitutional right to receive the information contained in initial arrest and offense reports and that a judgment of the court will protect this right.

¶ 17 Havre argues that, with respect to the Newspaper's request for prospective relief, no real dispute exists over which the court may exercise judicial authority. Havre maintains that cases arising under the constitutional right to know, Article II, Section 9, of the Montana Constitution, should be determined on a case-by-case basis, and no single rule of decision can apply to all future controversies. Accordingly, Havre contends, adjudication in this case cannot operate as a...