Haw Moy v. North

• Decision Date: 21 November 1910
• Docket Number: 1,756.
• Citation: 183 F. 89
• Parties: HAW MOY v. NORTH, Com'r of Immigration, et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

183 F. 89

HAW MOY v. NORTH, Com'r of Immigration, et al.

No. 1,756.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

November 21, 1910

Catlin & Catlin, Hiram W. Johnson, and O. P. Stidger, for appellant.

Robert T. Devlin, U.S. Atty., and Benjamin L. McKinley, Asst. U.S Atty., for appellees.

Before GILBERT, ROSS, and MORROW, Circuit Judges.

MORROW Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from an order of the United States Circuit Court for the Northern District of California denying an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of the appellant, and dismissing the petition praying for the same. The petitioner is one Kar Dip, who alleges that he is a friend of Haw Moy; that Haw Moy is a native-born citizen of the United States; that on or about the 1st day of October 1908, she returned to the United States from a temporary visit to the Empire of China, and applied to the Commissioner of Immigration at the Port of San Francisco for permission to enter the United States upon the ground that she was a native-born citizen; that she submitted the evidence and proof in support of her application, and after investigation and hearing, as required by law and the rules and regulations of the Department of Commerce and Labor, she was allowed to enter the United States; that afterwards, and at the date of her petition for a writ of habeas corpus, she was being held in custody under a warrant of deportation issued on or about the 2d day of August, 1909, by the Secretary of Commerce and Labor under the provisions of the Immigration Act of February 20, 1907 (Act Feb. 20, 1907, c. 1134, 34 Stat. 898 (U.S Comp. St. Supp. 1909, p. 447)); that as a native-born citizen she was not subject to the provisions of said act, and was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Department of Commerce and Labor, or the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Immigration of the Port of San Francisco.

The court denied the petition for the writ on the authority of the United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 25 Sup.Ct. 644, 49 L.Ed. 1040, and Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8, 28 Sup.Ct. 201, 52 L.Ed. 369. In those cases the question was whether the petitioners had the right to land and come into the United States. The Supreme Court held that a Chinese person seeking to enter the United States and alleging citizenship, presented a question to be determined by the Secretary of Commerce and Labor upon a proper hearing; that upon such a hearing his decision was final and conclusive, subject only to the jurisdiction of the federal courts to determine on habeas corpus whether such person had been denied a proper hearing. If it was found that a proper hearing had been had, the writ should be dismissed. If a proper hearing had not been had, then the court should hear the case upon the merits.

It is contended on behalf of the petitioner in this case that this law is not applicable to an alien or person claiming to be a citizen who has been admitted into the United States from a foreign country, and whom the immigration authorities are seeking to deport because they have since determined that such person is unlawfully in the United States. The general object of the immigration statutes is not only to prevent the admission of undesirable and forbidden classes of aliens, but to remove from this country all such aliens who may have succeeded in effecting an entry. That Congress has power to legislate as to both classes of aliens has been settled by many decisions of the courts and is not now open to investigation. Each class is equally undesirable, and each is equally inimical to the best interests of the country at large. In the Immigration Act of February 20, 1907 (34 Stat. 898), which is the latest expression of the legislative will upon the subject, Congress has provided, in section 2, that certain classes of aliens therein enumerated shall be excluded from admission to the United States. Section 3 forbids the importation to the United States for the purpose of prostitution, or for any other immoral purpose, of any alien woman or girl. Sections 19, 20, and 21 provide for the deportation of aliens found in the United States in violation of law. Section 25 provides, among other things:

...