Hawaii Motor Sports Center v. Babbitt, Civ.No. 99-00218 SOM/BMK.
| Decision Date | 13 December 2000 |
| Docket Number | Civ.No. 99-00218 SOM/BMK. |
| Citation | 125 F.Supp.2d 1041 |
| Parties | HAWAII MOTOR SPORTS CENTER, Plaintiff, v. Bruce BABBITT, Secretary of Interior of the United States of America; Richard Danzig, Secretary of the Navy; United States of America; Jane Does 1-10; John Does 1-10; and Doe Entities 1-10, Defendants. |
| Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
Edward C. Kemper, Kemper & Watts, Honolulu, HI, for Plaintiffs.
Joachim Cox, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Honolulu, HI, for Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING FEDERAL DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Hawaii Motor Sports Center ("Hawaii Motor") challenges an agreement by the United States government to transfer certain property at Barbers Point Naval Air Station ("Barbers Point") to the State of Hawaii's Department of Hawaiian Home Lands ("DHHL"). Hawaii Motor had applied to purchase or lease the Barbers Point property before the United States entered into its agreement with DHHL. Hawaii Motor alleges that the agreement has unlawfully denied it the opportunity to complete the application process for the Barbers Point property. Hawaii Motor therefore requests that the court: (1) prohibit the transfer of the Barbers Point property to DHHL; (2) order the transfer of the property to Hawaii Motor; and (3) compensate Hawaii Motor for damages it has allegedly suffered as a result of the United States' agreement with DHHL.
Defendants Bruce Babbitt, Richard Danzig, and the United States of America (collectively the "United States") have moved to dismiss all claims on the grounds that: (1) Hawaii Motor may not proceed under 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (the Administrative Procedure Act) or 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (the Declaratory Judgment Act); (2) Hawaii Motor does not have a private right of action under the Hawaiian Home Lands Recovery Act ("HHLRA") or the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990; and (3) Hawaii Motor lacks constitutional and prudential standing to sue in this court. The court GRANTS the United States' Motion to Dismiss.
Barbers Point lies approximately sixteen miles west of downtown Honolulu on the Ewa Plain. See Record of Decision for the Disposal and Reuse of Naval Air Station Barbers Point, attached as Ex. A to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed on July 15, 1999 ("Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment"), at 2. Acting pursuant to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, 10 U.S.C. § 2687, the 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission recommended that the Barbers Point facility be closed. See id. at 1-2. This recommendation was approved by President Clinton and Congress, and the Navy began the process of disposing of Barbers Point. See id. at 2. The process began with the Navy's consideration of requests by the Department of Defense for properties at Barbers Point. See id. at 2-3. The remaining property was then made available to other federal agencies. See id. at 3. Property remaining after that was declared surplus to the needs of the United States. See id. at 4. Surplus property could be transferred by the United States by public benefit conveyances to state and local government agencies, by an economic development conveyance to a Local Redevelopment Authority, and/or by direct sales to the public. See Final Environmental Impact Statement for Disposal and Reuse of NAS Barbers Point, attached as Ex. C to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
The State of Hawaii formed the Barbers Point Reuse Committee (the "Committee") to act as the Local Redevelopment Authority for Barbers Point. See Amended Complaint ¶ 11. The Committee was to entertain applications for the Barbers Point lands. See id. The Committee was replaced by the Barbers Point Redevelopment Commission (the "Commission"). See id. ¶ 12.
The Commission considered a detailed application from Hawaii Motor to purchase or lease 250 acres for a motor sports complex. See Letter from Michael Oakland to Jeanne Schultz dated November 10, 1994, attached as Ex. J to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Commission had a tentative recommendation by its predecessor Committee supporting Hawaii Motor's proposal. See Memorandum by the Commission dated December 21, 1994, attached as Ex. L to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. The recommendation stated that it was "made without consideration of other proposals competing for the same facilities and adjoining areas." See id. Up until the final meeting of the Commission, Hawaii Motor was the only entity seeking the requested 250 acres of Barbers Point property. See Amended Complaint ¶ 23.
After Hawaii Motor submitted its application in 1994, Congress enacted the HHLRA as Title II of Public Law 104-42, 109 Stat. 357. The purpose of the HHLRA was to resolve the longstanding claims by DHHL that the federal government had inequitably removed certain lands from the "available land" to be used to benefit native Hawaiians under the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of 1920, 42 Stat. 108 ("HHCA"). Section 203 of the HHLRA sets out a process of land exchanges designed to compensate Hawaii and its native Hawaiian beneficiaries for the lands that were designated as "available" but nevertheless transferred to or otherwise acquired by the federal government. Section 203(b)(5) of the HHLRA specifically authorizes the Secretary of the Interior, in coordination with other federal departments, to convey federal lands to DHHL.
In accordance with the HHLRA, the United States and Hawaii signed a Memorandum of Agreement to implement the HHLRA on August 31, 1998. See Memorandum of Agreement, attached as Ex. D to Defendant's Concise Statement in Support of Federal Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Cross-motion for Summary Judgment, filed on December 16, 1999. The Memorandum of Agreement provides for the transfer of lands to DHHL pursuant to the HHLRA and for Hawaii's release of all claims under the HHCA. See id. The Memorandum of Agreement identifies several properties to be transferred to DHHL, including the Barbers Point property in issue. See id.
On April 5, 1999, Hawaii Motor filed the Complaint in this action, alleging that the planned transfer of the Barbers Point property violated the HHLRA and the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990. This court dismissed Hawaii Motor's Complaint for lack of jurisdiction on September 20, 2000, but allowed Hawaii Motor to amend its Complaint to attempt to cure its jurisdictional defects. See Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Denying Defendants' Cross-motion for Summary Judgment ("Order"). Hawaii Motor filed an Amended Complaint on September 29, 2000, repeating its earlier allegations and asserting jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (the Administrative Procedure Act), 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (the Declaratory Judgment Act), and private rights of action under the HHLRA and the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990.
The United States has moved to dismiss all claims under Fed R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). The United States argues that Hawaii Motor may not proceed under 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (the Administrative Procedure Act) or 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (the Declaratory Judgment Act). The United States further contends that Hawaii Motor does not have a private right of action under the HHLRA or the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990. Finally, the United States argues that Hawaii Motor lacks constitutional and prudential standing to sue in this court.
A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may either attack the allegations of the complaint as insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court, or may attack the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact. Thornhill Publ'g Co., Inc. v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir.1979). When the motion to dismiss attacks the allegations of the complaint as insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction, all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Federation of African Amer. Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir.1996). When the motion to dismiss is a factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction, however, no presumptive truthfulness attaches to the plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact. Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733.
The presumption is that federal courts "lack jurisdiction unless plaintiff pleads sufficient facts to establish it." Celli v. Shoell, 40 F.3d 324, 328 (10th Cir.1994). Hawaii Motor has the burden of proving that jurisdiction does in fact exist. Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733. Conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss. Rosenbaum v. Syntex Corp., 95 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir.1996).
The court grants the United States' motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint for three reasons. First, the Administrative Procedure Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act do not provide an independent basis for this court's jurisdiction. Second, the HHLRA and the Defense Base Closure Act of 1990 do not create private rights of action in favor of Hawaii Motor. Finally, Hawaii Motor is not entitled to non-statutory judicial review because it lacks standing to bring this case.1
Hawaii Motor may not base this court's jurisdiction on the Administrative Procedure Act or the Declaratory Judgment Act. The Administrative Procedure Act provides that a ...
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