Hawaiian Pineapple Co. v. Saito

• Decision Date: 07 February 1921
• Docket Number: 3374.
• Citation: 270 F. 749
• Parties: HAWAIIAN PINEAPPLE CO., Limited, v. SAITO et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

270 F. 749

HAWAIIAN PINEAPPLE CO., Limited, v. SAITO et al.

No. 3374.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

February 7, 1921

Peters & Smith and Frear, Prosser, Anderson & Marx, all of Honolulu T.H., and Edward Hohfeld, of San Francisco, Cal., for appellant.

Thompson Cathcart & Lewis and Barry S. Ulrich, all of Honolulu, T.H and Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro and L. G. McArthur, all of San Francisco, Cal., for appellees.

Before GILBERT, ROSS, and HUNT, Circuit Judges.

GILBERT Circuit Judge.

On May 18, 1916, the appellant was engaged in the business of canning pineapples in the Hawaiian Islands. On that date a contract was entered into between the appellant and the appellee Saito for the sale of pineapples by Saito to the appellant for a period of four years therefrom. At that time Saito was raising pineapples upon 150 acres of land on the island of Oahu, which he held under leases. Later in the same year on July 1 and August 1, Saito acquired two other leasehold interests, upon which he grew and produced pineapples. All the pineapples which he produced, both upon his prior and subsequently acquired holdings, were sold and delivered to the appellant until about the end of January, 1918, when he ceased to deliver to the appellant the pineapples grown upon the subsequently acquired leaseholds, and soon thereafter he entered into a contract by which he agreed to sell and deliver those pineapples to the appellee Libby, McNeill & Libby. It was to enjoin such sale and delivery to Libby, McNeill & Libby that the present suit was brought by the appellant in the circuit court of Hawaii. That court sustained the appellant's contention and enjoined the further sale of such pineapples to Libby, McNeill & Libby. On appeal to the Supreme Court the decree of the circuit court was reversed, and the cause was remanded with instructions to dismiss the bill. From the decree of the Supreme Court the present appeal is taken.

The appellee raises the question of the jurisdiction of this court to entertain the appeal, and cites Rumsey v. New York Life Ins. Co. (C.C.A.) 267 F. 554, in which we held that a decree of the Supreme Court of Hawaii, remanding a case for such further action compatible with the decision as might be necessary, was not a final decree, and was not appealable. In the present case the Supreme Court ordered that the decree appealed from be vacated and set aside, and that the permanent injunction be dissolved, and that the lower court be instructed to dismiss the complainant's bill of complaint filed therein, 'and to take such further and other proceeding prior or subsequent to the dismissal of the bill as may be consistent with the opinion of this court in said cause. ' We think the decree was final and appealable. There was no proceeding which the circuit court could take prior to the dismissal of the bill, and after the dismissal of the bill it is equally plain that no proceeding could be had pertaining to the merits of the controversy.

The appellee brings in question also, the jurisdiction of equity to entertain the cause of suit, contending that there was a complete and adequate remedy at law. It is true that equity will not decree the specific performance of a contract which relates to personalty in a case where compensation in damages furnishes a complete and satisfactory remedy. But the bill sets forth special circumstances, the allegations of which it is unnecessary here to repeat, which show that there was no adequate remedy at law, and we think the case comes clearly within the principles announced in Curtice Bros. Co. v. Catts, 72 N.J.Eq. 831, 66 A. 935, Gloucester, etc., Co. v. Russia Cement Co., 154 Mass. 92, 27 N.E. 1005, 12 L.R.A. 563, 26 Am.St.Rep. 214, Vail v. Osburn, 174 Pa. 580, 34 A. 315, White Marble Lime Co. v.

Consolidated Lumber Co., 205 Mich. 634, 172 N.W. 603, and Mutual Oil Co. v. Hills, 248 F. 257, 160 C.C.A. 335.

The provisions of the contract which are pertinent to the controversy are the following:

'The Pineapple Company agrees that during the term of four years beginning May 1, 1916, and ending April 30, 1920, it will handle and buy under the conditions as hereinafter detailed, and with such exceptions as are hereinafter stated, all the merchantable smooth cayenne pineapples that may be grown by the planter on his present holdings at Leilahua or elsewhere on the island of Oahu, or that he may own or control on the island of Oahu.

'The planter agrees that he will deliver to the Pineapple Company, under the terms and conditions and with the exceptions hereinafter contained, all the merchantable smooth cayenne pineapples that he may grow at Leilahua or elsewhere on the island of Oahu, or that he may own or control on the island of Oahu, during the term stated.'

'It is mutually agreed that the Pineapple Company will furnish f.o.b. railroad cars at Leilahua, Oahu, lug boxes for the delivery of the fruit, and that the planter will deliver said fruit f.o.b. railroad cars at Leilahua, Oahu, in said lug boxes, and that said merchantable pineapples will be delivered in such condition of ripeness as may from time to time be required or designated by the said Pineapple Company.'

It is the contention of the appellant that Saito was obligated to sell, not only the pineapples which he grew on the land which he had at the time...