Hawke v. U.S. Centrifuge Sys., LLC (In re U.S. Innovation Grp., Inc.), 1120296 and 1120297.

• Decision Date: 20 September 2013
• Docket Number: 1120296 and 1120297.
• Citation: 141 So.3d 459
• Parties: Ex parte U.S. INNOVATION GROUP, INC., et al. (In re Judy A. Hawke, as administratrix and personal representative of the estate of James R. Hawke, Jr., deceased v. U.S. Centrifuge Systems, LLC, et al.). Ex parte U.S. Innovation Group, Inc., et al. (In re Carolyn Grimes, individually, as administratrix and personal representative of the estate of Jerry A. Grimes, deceased, and as a dependent survivor of Jerry A. Grimes, deceased v. Amtec Corporation et al.).
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

141 So.3d 459

Ex parte U.S. INNOVATION GROUP, INC., et al.

(In re Judy A. Hawke, as administratrix and personal representative of the estate of James R. Hawke, Jr., deceased

v.U.S. Centrifuge Systems, LLC, et al.).

Ex parte U.S. Innovation Group, Inc., et al.

(In re Carolyn Grimes, individually, as administratrix and personal representative of the estate of Jerry A. Grimes, deceased, and as a dependent survivor of Jerry A. Grimes, deceased

v.Amtec Corporation et al.).

1120296 and 1120297.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

June 28, 2013.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 20, 2013.

William P. Gray, Jr., and John David Gray of Gray & Associates, LLC, Birmingham; Gary K. Grace, Jr., and Jennifer M. Matthews of Grace Matthews & Debro, LLC, Huntsville, for petitioners U.S. Innovation Group, Inc., Scott Behrens, John Emmert, Mike Evans, and Jack Dombroski.

David J. Hodge, Harvey B. Morris, and Joseph D. Aiello of Morris, King & Hodge, Huntsville, for respondent Judy A. Hawke.

Joseph M. Brown, Jr., David G. Wirtes, Jr., George M. Dent III, and William E. Bonner of Cunningham Bounds, LLC, Mobile;and David A. Lee of Parsons, Lee & Juliano, P.C., Birmingham, for respondent Carolyn Grimes.

Justin G. Williams and Brooke M. Nixon of Tanner & Guin, LLC, Tuscaloosa, filed brief on behalf of U.S. Centrifuge Systems, LLC, in support of U.S. Innovation Group, Inc.'s petition for the writ of mandamus.

On Applications for Rehearing

BRYAN, Justice.

U.S. Innovation Group, Inc., Scott Behrens, Jack Dombroski, Mike Evans, and John Emmert (collectively “the USIG defendants”) have petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Madison Circuit Court (“the circuit court”) to dismiss the claims filed against them in separate actions by Judy A. Hawke and Carolyn Grimes. The USIG defendants argue that because the claims arose on Redstone Arsenal, which is a federal enclave ¹ subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction, the circuit court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims. We deny the petitions.

Facts and Procedural History

In 1943, the State of Alabama ceded property in Madison County to the government of the United States, pursuant to Art. I, § 8, clause 17, of the United States Constitution,² and other relevant federal and State statutes. The deed for the ceded property, which included land for Redstone Arsenal, was signed by then Governor Chauncey Sparks and provided, among other things, that the United States has “exclusive jurisdiction” over the land included in that deed. The deed provided further “[t]hat the jurisdiction so ceded shall not prevent the execution upon such lands of any process, civil or criminal, issued under the authority of this State, except as such process might affect the property of the United States thereon” and

“[t]hat the State of Alabama expressly reserves the right to tax all persons, firms, corporations, or associations now or hereafter residing or located upon said land; to tax the exercise by any person, firm, corporation, or association of any kind and all rights, privileges, and franchises upon said land; and to tax property of all persons, firms, corporations, or associations situated upon said land. The jurisdiction ceded is for the purposes of the cession, and none other, and shall continue during the time the United States shall be or remain the owner thereof and shall use such land for the purposes of the cession, and the State of Alabama expressly reserves the right to exercise over or upon any such land any and all rights, privileges, powers, or jurisdiction which may now or hereafter be released or receded by the United States to the State.”

In 2010, Jerry A. Grimes and James R. Hawke, Jr., were injured in an explosion while working on a project at Redstone Arsenal. Both men died as a result of their injuries. In December 2011, Grimes's widow, Carolyn Grimes, in her individual capacity, as administratrix and personal representative of Jerry Grimes's estate, and as a dependent survivor of Jerry Grimes, filed a wrongful-death action against the USIG defendants, among others.³ In February 2012, Hawke's widow, Judy A. Hawke, in her capacity as administratrix and personal representative of James Hawke's estate, also filed a wrongful-death action against the USIG defendants, among others.⁴

The wrongful-death actions were filed in the circuit court but were removed separately to federal court. The cases were remanded to the circuit court on the ground that the removals did not comply with the procedural requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1446. Two subsequent attempts were made to remove the cases to federal court on the basis of exclusive federal-court jurisdiction, but each time the federal courts refused the cases, finding that the circuit court had concurrent jurisdiction over the claims.

In October 2012, the circuit court consolidated the two cases. Just prior to the consolidation, the USIG defendants moved the circuit court to dismiss the claims in each case, again arguing that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising on federal enclaves. The circuit court denied the motions and ordered production of certain requested discovery.

The USIG defendants filed, as to each case, a petition for the writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to dismiss the claims against them and declaring void the circuit court's discovery orders. Those petitions were denied by separate orders of this Court. The USIG defendants applied for a rehearing in both cases, and those applications were granted. The petitions for the writ of mandamus were consolidated for the purpose of issuing one opinion.

Issue

The USIG defendants argue that this Court should grant their petitions for mandamus relief because, they argue, the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising on Redstone Arsenal and because “[t]he [circuit] court erred and abused its discretion, by granting [Grimes's and Hawke's] respective Motions to Compel discovery where it had no jurisdiction to do so.” Petitions, at 5–6.

Analysis

“A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and is appropriate when the petitioner can show (1) a clear legal right to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.”

Ex parte BOC Grp., Inc., 823 So.2d 1270, 1272 (Ala.2001) (quoting Ex parte Inverness Constr. Co., 775 So.2d 153, 156 (Ala.2000)).

The USIG defendants argue that they have a clear legal right to have the claims against them dismissed because, they argue, “the deed of cession for [Redstone] Arsenal unequivocally grants exclusive jurisdiction to the federal government” and, therefore, “no Alabama court has jurisdiction over the matter.” Petitions, at 6. The USIG defendants go on to argue that “the U.S. government enjoys exclusive jurisdiction over ‘all cases whatsoever’ which arise on Art. I federal enclaves.” Petitions, at 7.

In

Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 652, 50 S.Ct. 455, 74 L.Ed. 1091 (1930), the Supreme Court of the United States stated:

“[Article I, § 8, clause 17] says that Congress shall have power to exercise ‘exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever’ over a place so purchased.... ‘Exclusive legislation’ is consistent only with exclusive jurisdiction. It can have no other meaning as to the seat of government, and what it means as to that it also means as to forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, etc. That no divided jurisdiction respecting the seat of government is intended is not only shown by the terms employed, but is a matter of public history. Why as to forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, etc., is the power given made to depend on purchase with the consent of the Legislature of the state if the jurisdiction of the United States is not to be exclusive and that of the state excluded?

“The question is not an open one. It long has been settled that, where lands for such a purpose are purchased by the United States with the consent of the state Legislature, the jurisdiction theretofore residing in the state passes, in virtue of the constitutional provision, to the United States, thereby making the jurisdiction of the latter the sole jurisdiction.”

The USIG defendants argue that “exclusive legislation” or “sole jurisdiction,” as discussed in Surplus Trading Co., necessarily includes exclusive adjudicative jurisdiction. They go on to argue that “[t]he language of the Constitution grants Congress ‘like Authority’ to the authority granted to Congress over the District of Columbia. Thus, the authority ceded by the State of Alabama ‘encompasses the full authority of government, and thus, necessarily, the Executive and Judicial powers as well as the Legislative.’ ” Petitions, at 9–10 (quoting Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 76, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982)).

However, “[e]xclusive ‘legislation’ has been construed to mean exclusive ‘jurisdiction’ in the sense of exclusive sovereignty.” Mater v. Holley, 200 F.2d 123, 123 (5th Cir.1952) (citing Surplus Trading Co., 281 U.S. at 652). In Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 481–82, 101 S.Ct. 2870, 69 L.Ed.2d 784 (1981), the Supreme Court stated:

“ Nothing inherent in exclusive federal sovereignty over a territory precludes a state court from entertaining a personal injury suit concerning events occurring in the territory and governed by federal law. Ohio River Contract Co. v. Gordon, 244 U.S. 68 (1917). See 16 U.S.C. § 457 (personal injury and wrongful-death actions involving events occurring ‘within a national park or other place subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, within the exterior boundaries of any State’ shall be maintained as if the place were under the jurisdiction of the State). Cf. Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 424 (1970) (residents of an area of exclusive federal jurisdiction within a State are...