Hawkes Television, Inc. v. Maine Bureau of Consumer Credit Protection

CourtMaine Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtGODFREY
CitationHawkes Television, Inc. v. Maine Bureau of Consumer Credit Protection, 462 A.2d 1167 (Me. 1983)
Decision Date11 July 1983
PartiesHAWKES TELEVISION, INC. v. MAINE BUREAU OF CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION and Barbara Reid Alexander.

Dennis Levandoski (orally), Portland, Terry Snow, Cumberland Center, for plaintiff.

Peter B. Bickerman (orally), Asst. Atty. Gen., Augusta, for defendant.

Richard P. Hackett, William Kayatta, Portland, amicus curiae.

Before GODFREY, NICHOLS, ROBERTS, CARTER *, VIOLETTE and WATHEN, JJ.

GODFREY, Justice.

The plaintiff Hawkes Television, Inc. ("Hawkes") appeals from a judgment in Superior Court, Cumberland County, holding that the company's "rent to own" program violates the Maine Consumer Credit Code. Hawkes also moves to dissolve an injunction issued by the Superior Court pending appeal. We reverse the judgment of the Superior Court and grant the motion to dissolve the injunction.

In August, 1981, the defendant Maine Bureau of Consumer Credit Protection ("Bureau") examined the records of Hawkes to determine compliance with the Maine Consumer Credit Code, M.R.S.A. tit. 9-A ("Code"). Hawkes is a Maine corporation that sells, rents and repairs televisions and stereo equipment from a store in Westbrook. At the time of the examination, Hawkes operated a "rent to own" program under which consumers could purchase television sets and stereo systems by making weekly "rental" payments to Hawkes, typically for 104 weeks. Under the terms of the rental agreement at issue, customers may rent a Curtis Mathes television set for a fixed weekly payment, which varies according to the type of unit rented, plus a $25 processing fee to be paid in advance. At the end of each week, the agreement automatically terminates, and the customer must return or have Hawkes retrieve the set unless he renews the agreement by paying another week's rent. If the customer makes 104 consecutive weekly payments, he becomes owner of the set without paying any additional consideration. 1 Otherwise, Hawkes retains title to the set. It may be used only at the location specified in the rental agreement. If the customer moves, he must notify Hawkes, which will move the set to the new premises without charge. The minimum rental period is one week. The Hawkes agreement is of a type generally known as a "rental purchase contract." 2

A customer who completes a typical rental contract ($17 per week for 104 weeks for a 25-inch color console) pays $1,768 to own the television. The cash price for a comparable model sold by Hawkes is $939. In other words, customers who "rent to own" that model pay the equivalent of an annual interest rate of 70.52 percent over the two years of the contract. The only difference in servicing costs between a rental and a cash-sale television set is that all house calls after 90 days on the sales televisions are subject to a fee of fifteen to twenty dollars. While Hawkes prominently advertised the weekly rent necessary to obtain the unit, nowhere did the store disclose the two-year rent total. Hawkes concedes that its rental purchase contract, if treated as a consumer credit sale under the Code, would violate the Code's usury provisions.

Advertising for the rental program was aimed at and attracted customers who could not obtain more traditional credit. The advertisements promoted the program as a method of owning a television set without undergoing a formal credit check. Most rental customers intended to complete the 104-week payment schedule and 65 percent of them did in fact accomplish that goal.

In a report issued in October, 1981, the staff of the Bureau alleged that the rental program resulted in the making of "consumer credit sales" within the ambit of the Code and that the cumulative rental payments violated the Code's interest-rate ceilings. Hawkes and the Bureau attempted unsuccessfully to negotiate a settlement. On April 15, 1982, the defendant Superintendent of Consumer Credit Protection ("Superintendent") held a public hearing on the matter. On May 21, 1982, she issued a "Decision and Order" essentially affirming the staff report. She ordered Hawkes (1) to cease and desist in the use of its rental agreement; (2) to reimburse consumers for the alleged overcharges; and (3) to structure its programs to comply with applicable Code provisions. The Superintendent has not charged Hawkes with violating the disclosure provisions of the truth-in-lending article of the Code, 9-A M.R.S.A. art. VIII.

Hawkes brought a timely action in Superior Court pursuant to Rule 80B to reverse the Superintendent's decision. On October 19, 1982, the Superior Court entered a judgment affirming the Superintendent's decision in all respects. Hawkes's notice of appeal from the judgment was docketed in the Law Court on October 22, 1982. On November 12, 1982, the Bureau and Superintendent moved in Superior Court for an injunction requiring Hawkes to conform its conduct to the Superintendent's order. The court issued the injunction on November 18, 1982, finding that despite the Superintendent's unstayed cease-and-desist order Hawkes had continued to collect unlawful rental payments and to repossess or threaten to repossess merchandise held by consumers pursuant to such rental agreements.

On January 4, 1983, Hawkes filed a motion in the Law Court to dissolve the injunction pending appeal. We ordered that the motion be briefed and argued in conjunction with the merits of the appeal.

On appeal, John and Mary Hall, Amy Morse, and Shirley Preston ("Consumers"), who are customers of the Hawkes rental program, have filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the Bureau's cease-and-desist order.

I. Injunction Pending Appeal

The Superior Court issued an injunction pending appeal against Hawkes well after the appeal was docketed in the Law Court. Ordinarily the docketing of an appeal divests the Superior Court of authority to take further action on a case. M.R.Civ.P. 73(f). Here, the only possible exception to Rule 73(f) is provided by M.R.Civ.P. 62(d), which authorizes the Superior Court to issue injunctions pending appeal as follows:

When an appeal is taken from an interlocutory or final judgment granting, dissolving, or denying an injunction, the court in its discretion may suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction during the pendency of the appeal upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as it considers proper for the security of the rights of the adverse party.

Hawkes contends that Rule 62(d), by its terms, does not apply and hence the injunction was invalid for want of jurisdiction. The defendants answer, first, that Rule 62(d) does apply because the Superior Court effectively granted an injunction in its decision on the merits by affirming the Superintendent's cease-and-desist order; and, second, even if Rule 62(d) does not apply, the Superior Court had inherent power to grant the injunction. 3 We agree with Hawkes and hold the injunction invalid for lack of jurisdiction.

The Superior Court's decision affirming the Bureau's cease-and-desist order was not a "judgment granting ... an injunction" under Rule 62(d). Under the Code, a cease-and-desist order is not the same thing as an injunction. The Superintendent may choose either to seek an injunction in court pursuant to 9-A M.R.S.A. § 6-110 (1980) or to enter an administrative order to cease and desist pursuant to 9-A M.R.S.A. § 6-108 (1980). In this case, the Superintendent chose the latter procedure. Since the judgment appealed from did not include an injunction, Rule 62(d) does not apply. See Shay v. Agricultural Stabilization & Conservation State Committee, 299 F.2d 516 (9th Cir.1962) (construing Fed.R.Civ.P. 62(c), the federal counterpart of M.R.Civ.P. 62(d)); 7 Moore's Federal Practice p 62.05 n. 3 (2d ed. 1982).

Rule 62(d), relating to the trial court, and Rule 62(g), relating to the Law Court, 4 merely declare the inherent power of courts to make orders to preserve the status quo and to insure the effectiveness of any eventual judgment. 2 Field, McKusick & Wroth, Maine Civil Practice § 62.2 (2d ed. 1970); see United States v. El-O-Pathic Pharmacy, 192 F.2d 62, 79-80 (9th Cir.1951) (per curiam); 11 C. Wright & A. Miller Federal Practice & Procedure § 2904 (1973). Orderly management of this Court's appellate docket requires careful observance of the limitations in Rule 73(f) on the Superior Court's further jurisdiction over appealed cases. For that reason, the trial court's power to grant injunctions pending appeal is circumscribed by the provisions of Rule 62(d). The federal decisions applying Fed.R.Civ.P. 62(c) are not to the contrary: the federal trial courts have entertained post-appeal applications for injunctive relief within the letter of Fed.R.Civ.P. 62(c). E.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, reh'g denied, 415 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir.1969); El-O-Pathic Pharmacy, 192 F.2d 62; Shinholt v. Angle, 90 F.2d 297 (5th Cir.1937).

The Law Court is the proper forum for seeking an injunction pending appeal in cases not fitting within M.R.Civ.P. 62(d). Under Rule 62(g), the Law Court has the authority to "grant an injunction or to make any order appropriate to preserve the status quo or the effectiveness of the judgment subsequently to be entered." The Law Court's authority is not limited to cases where an appeal is taken from a judgment granting, dissolving, or denying an injunction. See Board of Selectmen v. Kennebec County Commissioners, 393 A.2d 526, 527 (Me.1978). However, the defendants chose not to proceed under Rule 62(g). The Superior Court had no authority in this case to issue an injunction after Hawkes's appeal had been docketed in the Law Court.

II. Consumer Credit Sale

The Superintendent charges that the Hawkes rent-to-own agreement violates Code provisions limiting the amount of finance charge that a seller may contract for and receive in a "consumer credit sale." 5 The pertinent provisions of the Code defining "consumer credit sale" are as...

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7 cases
  • Green v. Continental Rentals
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court
    • 25 d5 Março d5 1994
    ...relation is not established where the lessee is not deferring payment of a debt. Hawkes Television, Inc. v. Maine Bureau of Consumer Credit Protection, 462 A.2d 1167, 1171 (Me.1983). The statutes in Alabama and Maryland employ the "contracts-to-pay" language in defining a "credit sale" or "......
  • Silva v. Rent-a-Center, Inc.
    • United States
    • Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
    • 10 d4 Setembro d4 2009
    ...leases, are in accord. See, e.g., Givens v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 720 F.Supp. 160 (S.D.Ala.1988); Hawkes Television, Inc. v. Maine Bur. of Consumer Credit Protection, 462 A.2d 1167 (Me.1983); State v. Action TV Rentals, Inc., 297 Md. 531, 533, 467 A.2d 1000 (1983) (rent-to-own contract did n......
  • Nat'l Org. for Marriage v. Comm'n on Governmental Ethics & Elections Practices
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • 4 d2 Agosto d2 2015
    ...disposition of the appeal by the Law Court.” (alteration omitted) (quotation marks omitted)); Hawkes Television, Inc. v. Me. Bureau of Consumer Credit Prot., 462 A.2d 1167, 1170 (Me.1983) (holding that “[t]he Superior Court had no authority in this case to issue an injunction after [the app......
  • Burney v. Thorn Americas, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin
    • 29 d2 Outubro d2 1996
    ...by Rent-a-Center cover only those transaction in which the customer actually agrees to pay. Compare Hawkes Television, Inc. v. Maine Bur. of Cons. Credit Prot., 462 A.2d 1167, 1171 (Me.1983). Finally, Rent-a-Center relies on Dieck v. Unified Sch. Dist. of Antigo, 165 Wis.2d 458, 477 N.W.2d ......
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