Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Reeg
Decision Date | 10 October 1984 |
Docket Number | HAWKEYE-SECURITY,No. 5-84-0159,5-84-0159 |
Citation | 470 N.E.2d 1103,128 Ill.App.3d 352,83 Ill.Dec 683 |
Parties | , 83 Ill.Dec. 683 INSURANCE CO., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Helen M. REEG, William A. Reeg and Helen Rohr, Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Thomas O. Falb, Reed, Armstrong, Groman & Coffey, Edwardsville, for plaintiff-appellant.
Ross T. Anderson, Crowder & Scoggins, Ltd., Columbia, for defendants-appellees.
This appeal presents the question whether one insured under a homeowner's policy who executes a quitclaim deed to the property, which deed is later declared by court order to be null and void, had an insurable interest in the property when a fire occurred after the time of the execution of the deed and before the declaration of nullity.
The facts are undisputed. The insured, Helen Reeg, a defendant herein, was insured under a homeowner's policy issued by the plaintiff in this lawsuit, Hawkeye-Security Co. After the policy had been in effect for some time, Helen Reeg executed a quitclaim deed to the property, which was her residence, in favor of her son, William Reeg, also a defendant in this suit. The deed stated that consideration was in the sum of one dollar and other good and valuable consideration. The deed was executed on August 31, 1982, and recorded on September 3, 1982. On September 19, 1982, the dwelling was destroyed by fire. Thereafter Helen Reeg made a claim to the plaintiff, which refused to pay the claim because, it said, Helen Reeg had not owned the premises at the time the fire occurred. On December 13, 1982, Helen Rohr, who is Helen Reeg's daughter and another defendant herein, was appointed as her mother's guardian, the court finding Helen Reeg, approximately 77 years old at the time of the execution of the deed, to be a disabled person because of mental deterioration and physical incapacity, unable to manage her person or estate because of chronic brain syndrome, diabetes, chronic ulceration of the legs, generalized arteriosclerosis, and disorientation as to time and space. On December 17, 1982, Helen Reeg, by her guardian, Helen Rohr, filed a complaint against William Reeg seeking to have the court declare the deed null and void and reinvest Helen Reeg with possession of and title to the property because the conveyance "was made without any consideration and was made at a time when Helen M. Reeg was disabled and incompetent to convey real estate owned by her for the reason of physical and mental infirmaties [sic]." On January 26, 1983, William Reeg having failed to appear or to answer, the court found him in default and entered an order declaring the quitclaim deed null and void and calling for its delivery for cancellation. In the action to set aside the deed the trial court found "that the issues in Plaintiff's complaint are in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant." On February 23, 1983, Helen Rohr, as guardian, asked the plaintiff herein to make payments to her under the policy of insurance, asserting that the ownership of the premises at the time of the fire was in the name of Helen Reeg.
On June 13, 1983, the plaintiff brought this suit for declaratory judgment against the defendants, seeking a determination that at the time of the fire Helen Reeg did not have an insurable interest in the property and that the plaintiff had no duty under the policy to make any payments for damage caused by the fire. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the petition for declaratory judgment. The plaintiff did not seek to amend its petition for declaratory judgment but filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied in a final order dismissing the cause. This appeal followed in which the plaintiff avers that the trial court erred in granting the defendants' motion to dismiss, contending that Helen Reeg had no insurable interest in the property at the time of the loss. The parties have cited us to, and our research has disclosed, no case in which the precise issue before us has been decided.
A fuller statement of this long-standing rule is that expressed in Crossman v. American Insurance Co. of Newark, N.J. (1917), 198 Mich. 304, 308, 164 N.W. 428, 430:
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CHAPTER 2
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