Hawkins, In re, C

Decision Date05 March 1970
Docket NumberNo. C,C
PartiesIn re Disciplinary Proceedings of Kenneth C. HAWKINS, an Attorney at Law. D. 2430.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Robert O. Wells, Jr., Seattle, for Washington State Bar.

John Gavin, Yakima, Alfred J. Schweppe, Seattle, for respondent.

WEAVER, Justice.

September 1938, Kenneth C. Hawkins was admitted to the practice of law in the State of Washington.

October 14, 1967, the president of the Washington State Bar Association, at the direction of the board of governors filed a formal complaint containing four items of alleged misconduct by Mr. Hawkins. It is alleged that each item constituted breaches of certain Canons of Professional Ethics (CPE) and Discipline Rules for Attorneys (DRA). The complaint prayed for a hearing before a hearing panel as provided by DRA.

After formal answer by respondent Hawkins, an extended hearing was held commencing December 19, 1967, before a duly constituted hearing panel. Respondent was represented by counsel. Eleven witnesses testified; 47 exhibits were admitted in evidence.

June 21, 1968, the hearing panel entered its findings of fact, conclusions, and recommendations. The hearing panel (a) dismissed one item of the complaint; (b) recommended a reprimand on two items; and (c) recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years on the final charge.

September 28, 1968, the board of governors of the Washington State Bar Association approved and adopted the recommendations of the hearing panel.

The complete record is now before this court for consideration and final determination. The findings of fact disclose a disturbing tendency to confuse and intermingle two distinct lines of conduct; those acts Mr. Hawkins committed as a lawyer, and personal activities, reprehensible though they may be, in which Mr. Hawkins engaged. From the record it appears that this proceeding was earmarked from the beginning by emotional charges and countercharges.

The object and purpose of disciplinary proceedings was stated by this court in In re Steinberg, 44 Wash.2d 707, 715, 269 P.2d 970, 974 (1954):

The basic reason for all disciplinary action--reprimand, suspension, or disbarment--is broad. It is For the protection of the public. It is to preserve public confidence in the judicial system and protect it from misconduct. We said in In re Little, 40 Wash.2d 421, 431, 244 P.2d 255 (1952):

'The final adjudication should provide neither more nor less than the facts fairly require to penalize the offender, deter others, and indicate to laymen and members of the bar that proper discipline will be enforced and the standards of the profession maintained.' (Italics ours.)

In In re Purvis, 51 Wash.2d 206, 223, 316 P.2d 1081 (1957), we considered the purpose of disciplinary actions and quoted with approval from In re Beakley, 6 Wash.2d 410, 424, 107 P.2d 1097, 1103 (1940):

'Neither disbarment nor suspension is ordered for the purpose of punishment, but wholly for the protection of the public. When a matter, such as this, comes before the court, the question presented is not--What punishment should be inflicted on this man? The question presented to each of its judges is simply this--Can I, in view of what has been clearly shown as to this man's conduct, conscientiously participate in continuing to hold him out to the public as worthy of that confidence which a client is compelled to repose in his attorney?'

In In re Little, 40 Wash.2d 421, 430, 244 P.2d 255, 260 (1952), this court defined the burden the Bar Association must meet and the rights that must be extended to the respondent:

Every doubt should be resolved in his favor, and only upon a clear preponderance of the evidence that the acts charged have been done, And were prompted by improper motives, should disciplinary action be taken. The privilege--and it is a privilege, not a right--to practice his profession cannot be lost to the practitioner upon slight evidence. (Italics ours.)

We turn to the two incidents upon which the reprimands are based.

July 1, 1956 respondent Hawkins and Carl L. Loy entered into a partnership to practice law. The agreement was oral. Mr. Hawkins was city attorney for Yakima; Mr. Loy was assistant.

In the latter part of 1960, Mr. Loy learned that two checks made payable to the partnership had been deposited in respondent Hawkins' 'client account' and not in the partnership bank account. The hearing panel found that 'respondent attorney (Hawkins) claimed (the two checks) were accrued fees and not partnership fees.'

As a result of the dispute over the handling of partnership fees and partnership accounting, the partnership was terminated and an accounting made between the partners by a written agreement November 22, 1960. Respondent Hawkins and Mr. Loy, however, continued their joint efforts on certain specific litigation after the partnership was dissolved.

Although the dispute over their financial affairs, which ended in the dissolution of the partnership, had occurred more than seven years prior to the hearing of the instant proceeding, the trial panel concluded that Mr. Hawkins should be reprimanded because he had violated CPE 22, which provides in part:

The conduct of the lawyer * * * with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness.

The second reprimand is based upon the following:

Mr. George V. Rankin and Mr. and Mrs. Hawkins were neighbors; their residential properties adjoined. The Hawkins's property stood in the name of Jerold Anne Hawkins; Mr. Hawkins testified that he did not claim a community interest in it.

In 1960, in order to establish a mutually agreeable boundary between the properties, Mr. Rankin and Mrs. Hawkins exchanged deeds to certain small portions of the properties. The deeds were drawn by Mr. Hawkins.

In 1966, the title company informed the executors of Mr. Rankin, who had died in 1965, that there was a question

of marital status of Jerold Anne Hawkins . . . on May 20, 1950 date of acquiring title. If she was then unmarried, proof of the fact may be made by affidavit, otherwise the present ownership of the community interest of her husband on said date must be determined.

The hearing panel found, based upon the testimony of the lawyer for the Rankin estate, that respondent Hawkins refused to sign a quitclaim deed or any document without first receiving the sum of $1,000. Mr. Hawkins denied that he had claimed $1,000 for his community interest in the property conveyed.

Later, Mr. Hawkins furnished an undated and unacknowledged deed to the property in question. The title company removed the exception from its title insurance.

Apparently, because of Mr. Hawkins's pigheadedness, if such it be, the trial panel concluded that Mr. Hawkins should be reprimanded because he had violated CPE 29, which provides in part:

He should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but the administration of justice.

Without laboring the points further, we have concluded that the reprimands should be cancelled and not given to respondent Hawkins.

We do not believe, In the circumstances of the instant case, that the candor and fairness between lawyers required by canon 22 authorized the board of governors to delve into the understandings and misunderstandings that may develop in the internal organization of a law partnership, and to base a reprimand thereon.

Assuming that Mr. Hawkins's reluctance to give a corrective deed six years after a Personal transaction between neighbors may be characterized as pigheaded and cantankerous--characteristics that at times might be attributed to many lawyers and judges--we fail to see the relevance of CPE 29, quoted Supra.

The final charge of professional misconduct against respondent Hawkins springs from a divorce proceeding in which he represented himself. The action resulted in a default divorce from his first wife, Jerold Anne Hawkins, to whom he had been married for 26 years. Their three children...

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2 cases
  • Hawkins, Matter of, CD
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • January 5, 1979
    ...here demonstrate the necessity for more stringent discipline. First, respondent has a history of misconduct. In In re Hawkins, 77 Wash.2d 777, 466 P.2d 147 (1970), this court ordered him suspended from the practice of law for 18 months, and in In re Hawkins, 81 Wash.2d 504, 503 P.2d 95 (197......
  • Hawkins, In re, CD
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • November 16, 1972
    ...order to show cause why the respondent should not be adjudged in contempt of this court's order, entered March 5, 1970 (In re Hawkins, 77 Wash.2d 777, 466 P.2d 147 (1970)), suspending him from the practice of law for a period of 18 months beginning June 1, 1970. After the order to show caus......

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