Hawkins, In re, CD
| Citation | 81 Wn.2d 504,503 P.2d 95 |
| Decision Date | 16 November 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. CD,CD |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Disciplinary Proceeding Against Kenneth C. HAWKINS, an Attorney at Law. 2430. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Washington |
Jack P. Scholfield, Bar Counsel, Seattle, for appellant.
Kenneth C. Hawkins, Elwood Hutcheson, Yakima, for respondent.
This matter is before the court upon a petition of the Washington State Bar Association for an order to show cause why the respondent should not be adjudged in contempt of this court's order, entered March 5, 1970 (In re Hawkins, 77 Wash.2d 777, 466 P.2d 147 (1970)), suspending him from the practice of law for a period of 18 months beginning June 1, 1970. After the order to show cause was issued, the matter was referred to a hearing panel of the bar association to determine the facts. The record and the findings of the panel are now before us.
From these, it appears that the respondent's listing as an attorney was continued in the Yakima telephone directory published for the year October 1970 to October 1971, although he had an opportunity to withdraw that listing after he was notified of his suspension; that a resident of Yakima, needing the services of an attorney, found his name in the directory and called him; that she was given an appointment and was directed by him to his unmarked office and that she went to the office and discussed her legal problem 1 with the respondent; that he failed to advise her that he was not authorized to practice law and could not give her advice, but instead led her to believe that he would assist her; that he made no efforts in her behalf but failed to so advise her when she inquired as to what results he had obtained; and that after several telephone calls to his office, she engaged the services of another attorney and learned for the first time that the respondent was not authorized to practice law in the state of Washington. It also appears that the respondent did not charge or collect a legal fee from this woman.
It is the position of the bar association that by his conduct in failing to change his listing in the telephone directory, in failing to advise a prospective client that he was not authorized to practice law and in allowing her to believe that he would write a letter or give her other legal assistance, the respondent held himself out as entitled to practice law and thereby violated this court's order of suspension.
RCW 2.48.180 provides:
Any person who, not being an active member of the state bar, or who after he has been disbarred or while suspended from membership in the state bar, as by this chapter provided, shall practice law, or hold himself out as entitled to practice law, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor: Provided, however, Nothing herein contained shall be held to in any way affect the power of the courts to grant injunctive relief or to punish as for contempt.
The statute makes clear that holding oneself out as entitled to practice law constitutes contempt of an order of suspension. See also People v. Humbert, 86 Colo. 426, 282 P. 263 (1929) and State ex rel. Patton v. Marron, 22 N.M. 632, 167 P. 9 (1917), and cases cited therein.
The respondent takes the position that no harm resulted from this particular incident, since he rendered no services and charged no fee. We find this argument untenable. Under CPR DR6--101(A)(3), the code of professional conduct declares that a lawyer shall not neglect a matter entrusted to him.
In In re Vandercook, 78 Wash.2d 301, 304, 474 P.2d 106, 108 (1970), we said:
A lawyer owes 'entire devotion to the interest of the client.' CPE 15. He should with reasonable dispatch and industry, employ all honorable means available within the law and the ethics of the profession to advance his client's interest and protect his client's rights. An attorney owes a duty of punctuality--not only to the courts and public but to his client. CPE 21. Procrastination and delay in handling of legal affairs not only induces a client to lose confidence in his attorney but reflects badly on the profession and the courts, and may foster an impression in the public mind that the highly-vaunted standards of professional ethics are no more than a sham. Accordingly, continuing and protracted delay and procrastination in the performance of a lawyer's services and discharge of his duties, whether it be in advancing a cause in the courts or handling his affairs in the office, even if done without moral turpitude, do in one degree or another amount to a course of conduct which demonstrates, for the time being at least, a qualified lack of fitness to practice law.
See also In re Talbot, 78 Wash.2d 295, 474 P.2d 88 (1970).
The testimony of the prospective client in the record before us shows that the respondent's conduct did indeed produce an unfavorable impression upon the mind of that member of the public, and understandably so. The frustration suffered by a client whose attorney procrastinates must indeed be magnified many times when the 'client' learns that the 'attorney' was in fact not authorized to practice law and never intended to render any legal services.
Having permitted and encouraged the 'client' to believe that he was authorized to and would give her legal assistance, the respondent cannot be heard to say that his conduct was excusable because he did not do that which he would have been obliged to do, under the circumstances, had he been authorized to practice law.
The basic purpose of all disciplinary action--whether reprimand, suspension, or disbarment--is to protect the public from misconduct of attorneys and to preserve public confidence in the judicial system. In re Steinberg, 44 Wash.2d 707, 269 P.2d 970 (1954).
If a suspended attorney leads a member of the public to believe that he is authorized to and will rend him legal services, he not only injures the prospective client but casts doubt upon the integrity of the profession. For these reasons he is forbidden to hold himself out as entitled to practice law.
In this connection, the exercise of impeccable good faith requires that a suspended attorney change his listing in directories such as the telephone...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Krogh, In re
... ... In re Greenlee, 82 Wash.2d 390, 510 P.2d 1120 (1973); In re Hawkins, 81 Wash.2d 504, 503 P.2d 95 (1972); In re Steinberg, 44 Wash.2d 707, 269 P.2d 970 (1954) ... In making the ultimate determination as to the measure of disciplinary action, we give consideration to: (a) the seriousness and circumstances of the offense, (b) avoidance of repetition, (c) deterrent ... ...
-
State v. Athan
... ... The unauthorized practice of law includes the act of permitting a member of the public to believe that one is authorized to give and would give legal assistance even though, in fact, no services are rendered and no fee charged. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Hawkins, 81 Wash.2d 504, 507, 503 P.2d 95 (1972). The actions of the investigating officers here in creating a fictitious law firm and a fictitious class action lawsuit and in holding themselves out to be counsel in that suit clearly led Athan, a member of the public, to believe the officers, though their ... ...
-
Salvesen, Matter of, CD
... ... 2 The principle has been adhered to for at least the past 26 years as expressed in In re Krogh, 85 Wash.2d 462, 536 P.2d 578 (1975) and In re Smith, 83 Wash.2d 659, 521 P.2d 212 (1974); In re Greenlee, 82 Wash.2d 390, 510 P.2d 1120 (1973); In re Hawkins ... ...
-
STATE OF WASHINGTON v. FLORES
...to practice law. Because he was not an attorney, he was not entitled to retain their payments for legal services. See In re Hawkins, 81 Wn.2d 504, 508, 503 P.2d 95 (1972) (suspended attorney who took retainer fees during suspension was ordered to refund the fees). The payments for legal adv......
-
§9.1 Fees
...that advance fees and expenses are subject to the trust-account requirements contained in RPC 1.15A(h). 98.See also In re Hawkins, 81 Wn.2d 504, 508, 503 P.2d 95 (1972) ("A retainer is a fee which a client pays when he retains an attorney to act for him, and thereby prevents him from acting......
-
Table of Cases
...5–12; 5–12 n.81; 9–23 n.156; 12–11 nn.48-50; 16–55; 16–60 Hawkins, In re, 77 Wn.2d 777, 466 P.2d 147 (1970): 16–51; 16–57 Hawkins, In re, 81 Wn.2d 504, 503 P.2d 95 (1972): 9–17 nn.98, 102; 16–59 Hawkins, In re, 91 Wn.2d 497, 589 P.2d 247 (1979): 5–8 n.50; 16–54 Hawkins v. King Cnty., 24 Wn.......