Hawkins v. B. F. Walker, Inc.
Decision Date | 13 April 1967 |
Docket Number | No. 3533,3533 |
Citation | 426 P.2d 427 |
Parties | William H. HAWKINS and Clara Hawkins, Appellants (Plaintiffs below), v. B. F. WALKER, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Appellee (Defendant below). |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Willaim H. Brown, of Brown, Healy, Drew, Apostolos & Barton, Casper, for appellants.
Edward E. Murane, of Murane, Bostwick, McDaniel & Scott, Casper, for appellee.
Before GRAY, McINTYRE, and PARKER, JJ.
Plaintiffs, husband and wife, suffered rather extensive injuries to their persons and property as the result of a collision on a two-lane highway in Wyoming between their automobile and a tractor-trailer unit of the defendant and brought action to recover. Trial to jury resulted in a verdict and judgment nonsuiting the husband and a verdict and judgment in favor of the wife and against the defendant in the sum of $12,000. Claiming that the trial judge erred to their prejudice in refusing to allow plaintiffs to develop all of the material circumstances surrounding the taking of a written statement used by defendant's counsel for purposes of impeachment of an important witness of plaintiffs-including the fact that it was taken by an insurance adjuster-and claiming further that the damages awarded the wife were so clearly unreasonable and inadequate as to indicate passion and prejudice on the part of the jury, both plaintiffs have appealed.
The sharp delineation of the questions before us renders it unnecessary extensively to relate the facts disclosed by the record. By way of some orientation it is undisputed that defendant's unit, driven by Ernest Staab, was proceeding easterly upon the highway, transporting a load of pipe to be delivered to a site in the Big Muddy Oil Field, some distance west of the town of Glenrock, Wyoming; that Douglas Johnson-the witness above mentioned-was driving his car in the same direction as defendant's unit at some distance to the rear; that plaintiffs' car, driven by the husband, was also proceeding in the same direction, and behind the Johnson car; and that all three vehicles were traveling in the eastbound lane of the highway when plaintiffs' car pulled over into the westbound lane for the purpose of passing the Johnson car and defendant's unit. In the meantime Staab was preparing to make and started to make a lefthand turn off the highway into a narrow private road leading into the oil field, and it was during this maneuver that plaintiffs' car collided in the westbound lane with the tractor of defendant's unit.
Other than some further reference to the testimony of plaintiffs' witness Johnson, the foregoing will suffice for purposes here.
While plaintiffs' complaint specifically enumerates the commission of several acts and omissions of duty to sustain their claim of negligence on the part of defendant, the issue relevant to the precise evidentiary question before us is whether or not the driver of the defendant's unit gave adequate notice of his intention to make the left turn by use of his lefthand turn-signal lights located on the left front fender of the tractor and on the rear of the trailer. The testimony pertaining to this issue was much in conflict and it was in this area that the incident relating to the matter of insurance became involved.
On direct examination Johnson had testified that he was probably 250 to 300 feet from defendant's truck and by the time plaintiffs' car passed he was close to the truck 'much closer than I had been when I previously looked'; and that he slammed on his brakes, 'turned to the right, went around the back of the trailer,' and brought his car to a stop immediately south of the turnoff. On cross Johnson estimated that he was 100 to 150 feet from the truck when plaintiffs' car passed him. Thereupon the following occurred:
car, was passing you and you observed to the front, isn't it a fact you made a statement on December 3rd, 1962, 'That when the Chevrolet car started to pass, and the car was almost even with may car, then I noticed the truck was signaling for a left turn.' Did you make that statement? A. I answered questions.
'Q. Did you make that statement? A. No, sir.
'Q. 'At that time I was two hundred or two hundred fifty feet from the truck.' A. No, sir.
It will noticed that plaintiffs' counsel voiced no objection to this line of questioning for lack of foundation. Following this the record discloses that defendant's counsel handed two sheets of paper to the witness and the witness admitted that he had signed the instrument on the second page, which was dated December 3, 1962, at Casper, Wyoming. The written statement contained the language of the question previously put to the witness and his attention was also called to a recital therein that the witness stated he had 'stopped about fifty feet short of the impact location,' which the witness also denied making.
Then on redirect Johnson testified that the statement was written out by one Don Carpenter. He was then asked, 'Did Mr. Carpenter identify his business or the purpose of discussing with you the matter of a statement?' The witness answered, 'Yes' but upon objection by defendant's counsel on the ground of hearsay the witness was not permitted to go further. Plaintiffs' counsel then made an offer of proof in the following language:
The offer was rejected and in this we are inclined to agree with the trial judge that the offer went beyond permissive limits. However, from what later followed and a further offer of proof, we think it fair to say that primarily plaintiffs' counsel was endeavoring to show that Carpenter had represented himself to be an insurance adjuster and the trial judge took the view that this was a matter which could not be brought out as a part of the surrounding circumstances.
We have not heretofore been confronted with this precise question. Nevertheless, the view of this court generally with respect to injecting the matter of liability insurance into the trial of a negligence case was well expressed in Eagan v. O'Malley, 45 Wyo. 505, 21 P.2d 821, 822, by this language:
* * *'
It was also mentioned that the trial court was vested with a wide discretion in guarding against any untoward happening in this regard that might well result in an unfair trial to...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Mares v. State, 4041
...253, 165 So.2d 345, 350.3 See also Troublefield v. United States, (1967); 125 U.S.App.D.C. 339, 372 F.2d 912, 916; Hawkins v. B. F. Walker, Inc., Wyo., 426 P.2d 427, 430; State v. Green, 71 Wash.2d 372, 428 P.2d 540, 545; and State v. Walker, 148 Mont. 216, 419 P.2d 300, 304-305.4 See State......
-
Sims v. State, 4362
...the testimony of the said Irvinson, and the court properly ruled out the affidavit: (authority cited).' See also Hawkins v. B. F. Walker, Wyo. 1967, 426 P.2d 427, 430, and Mares v. State, Wyo.1972, 500 P.2d 530, 536. This fundamental is even statutory in this state, § 1-143, W.S.1957, where......
-
Ferris v. Myers
...cross-appeal by appellee challenging the damages awarded. We can find no sound reason to disturb the jury's verdict. Hawkins v. B. F. Walker, Inc., Wyo.1967, 426 P.2d 427. Even our view of the evidence, second-hand, discloses a disbelief in the claims of appellants. No passion or prejudice ......