Hawkins v. Davis

• Decision Date: 10 June 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:15-CV-145
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
• Parties: JAMES WILLIE HAWKINS, JR., Petitioner, v. KEITH W. DAVIS, Respondent.

JAMES WILLIE HAWKINS, JR., Petitioner, v. KEITH W. DAVIS, Respondent.

Civil Action No. 3:15-CV-145

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA RICHMOND DIVISION

June 10, 2015

MEMORANDUM OPINION

THIS MATTER is before the Court on a Writ of Habeas Corpus for Prisoner in State Custody ("Petition") (ECF No. 1) filed by Petitioner James Willie Hawkins, Jr. ("Hawkins" or "Petitioner") and a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 5) filed by Respondent Keith W. Davis ("Davis" or "Respondent"), Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections.¹ In the Petition, Hawkins challenges his convictions for abduction; conspiracy to commit abduction; malicious wounding; conspiracy to commit malicious wounding; and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. After being convicted, Hawkins was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of thirty-six years' imprisonment. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss and DISMISSES the Petition.

I. BACKGROUND

a. Factual History

On June 12, 2012, Latoya Hawkins ("Ms. Hawkins") and her boyfriend, Zack Bradford ("Bradford") were at Ms. Hawkins' home in Virginia Beach. Ms. Hawkins was married to thePetitioner during the relevant time period, but the couple was separated. Ms. Hawkins had a protective order against Petitioner.

Beginning around 5:00 p.m. on June 12, Petitioner repeatedly called Ms. Hawkins and left threatening messages. That same afternoon, Jimmy Bufkin ("Bufkin"), an acquaintance of Petitioner, paid a visit to Ms. Hawkins' home. Using racial slurs and abusive language, Bufkin told Ms. Hawkins that Petitioner was on his way to the home and she should ensure Bradford was not present when Petitioner arrived.

Around 6:00 p.m., Bradford stepped out onto Ms. Hawkins' front porch to take a telephone call. At approximately the same time, Petitioner arrived, carrying a gun. Petitioner approached Bradford and said, "Come here," while pointing the gun at him. He then forced Bradford at gunpoint to walk through the neighborhood towards a green pickup truck Petitioner had borrowed from a friend. An individual wearing a ski mask was in the truck's driver seat. When Petitioner told Bradford to get in the truck, Bradford refused and attempted to escape. As Bradford tried to get away, Petitioner shot him multiple times. Bradford survived the shooting.

b. Procedural History

i. Conviction and Direct Appeal

On August 20, 2012, Petitioner was indicted by the grand jury of the Commonwealth of Virginia, in the Circuit Court of Virginia Beach ("Virginia Beach Circuit Court"). He was charged with malicious wounding, abduction, conspiracy to commit abduction, conspiracy to commit malicious wounding, and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. Petitioner pleaded not guilty and proceeded to a jury trial on January 8, 2013. The jury convicted Petitioner, and on July 3, 2013, the trial court entered final judgment and sentenced Petitioner to an aggregate sentence of thirty-six years' imprisonment. Petitioner sought a direct appeal in the Court of Appeals of Virginia on the following grounds:

(1) The Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence establishing the defendant and co-defendant formed an express agreement to commit the crimes of abduction and malicious wounding.

(2) The Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence establishing the element of "malice" but instead established the defendant acted in the "heat of passion" and thus the Commonwealth failed to prove the defendant maliciously wounded Bradford.

(3) The Commonwealth failed to offer sufficient evidence of force or that any movement of Bradford from one location to another was other than incidental to the unlawful wounding rendering the evidence legally insufficient to convict him of abduction.

By Order dated December 30, 2013, the Court of Appeals of Virginia held that it would not consider the sufficiency challenges because Petitioner had not lodged a contemporaneous objection at trial, as required by Rule 5A:18 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia. (Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 1, attachment C.) Petitioner then appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia, but the Supreme Court dismissed the petition on May 9, 2014 because the assignments of error did not address the Court of Appeals' ruling. (Id. at attachment D.)

ii. State and Federal Habeas Petitions

On May 15, 2014, Petitioner filed a timely petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of Virginia. He alleged five grounds in support of his petition:

(1) The Court of Appeals erred in ruling the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to establish that petitioner and his co-defendant formed an express agreement to abduct and maliciously wound the victim;

(2) The Court of Appeals erred in ruling the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to prove malice because the evidence showed petitioner acted in the heat of passion;

(3) The Court of Appeals erred in ruling the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to prove the element of force required to convict petitioner of abduction and that any movement of the victim was not incidental to the "unlawful wounding";

(4) The trial court abused its discretion in sentencing petitioner to an active term of thirty-six years' imprisonment where he acted in the heat of passion, and that the sentence was disproportionate to his crimes;

(5) The petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel solicited perjured testimony for use in petitioner's case, but then abandoned the plan and "gave [petitioner] up to [an Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney] to execute [petitioner] fo[r] nothing." The petitioner alleged counsel did thisbecause petitioner's case was "high profile" and counsel needed votes from his colleagues to win an election for Commonwealth's Attorney.

On November 18, 2014, the Supreme Court of Virginia granted respondent's motion to dismiss the habeas petition. The Court concluded the first three grounds were barred under Brooks v. Peyton, 210 Va. 318 (1969), because a habeas petition cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal. Further, the Court held ground four was barred by the rule in Slayton v. Parrigan, 215 Va. 27 (1974), as it could have been raised during the direct appeal process, but Petitioner had failed to do so. Finally, the Court held that ground five satisfied neither the performance nor prejudice prongs of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

On March 11, 2015, Petitioner filed the instant Petition, alleging four primary grounds for relief:

(1) The petitioner received ineffective assistance of trial counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution when:

A. Counsel failed to properly conduct adequate pre-trial and trial investigation, ultimately leading counsel to fail to properly preserve several essential evidentiary issues for review.

B. Counsel was ineffective for failing to terminate his representation of the Petitioner as counsel was running for a political office which not only distracted counsel from giving the Petitioner's case the attention required, but created a conflict of interest with counsel's position as the Petitioner's defense attorney.

(2) The Petitioner was unconstitutionally denied due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution when he was convicted based upon evidence insufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

A. The Commonwealth failed to prove the Petitioner and co-defendant formed an express agreement to commit the crimes of abduction and malicious wounding beyond a reasonable doubt.

B. The Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence establishing the element of "Malice" but instead established the defendant acted in the "Heat of Passion" and thus the Commonwealth failed to prove the defendant maliciously wounded Bradford.

C. The evidence was legally insufficient to convict Petitioner of abduction because the Commonwealth failed to offer sufficient evidence of force or prove any movement of Bradford from one location to another was other than incidental to the unlawful wounding.

(3) The Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution when appellate counsel failed to properly investigate the Petitioner's case in order to determine viable issues on appeal, and ultimately counsel only raised issues that had not been preserved for appellate review in the trial court record.

(4) The prosecutor engaged in misconduct that ultimately prejudiced the petitioner.

(Mem. in Supp. of Pet. at 2.) Petitioner further requests an evidentiary hearing on these matters. (Id.) On May 14, 2015, Respondent filed a response to the Petition and a Motion to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 5, 6). Petitioner subsequently filed an opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on May 27, 2015 ("Reply Mem.") (ECF No. 8). This matter is now ripe for review.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

a. The AEDPA

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), a federal court may review a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a person serving a sentence imposed by a state court only on grounds that the person is being held in custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The federal court may grant the petition on a claim decided on its merits by the state court only if that decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

A decision is "contrary to" federal law if it resolves a question of law in a way that contradicts the relevant Supreme Court precedent, or if it yields a result that...