Hawkins v. Helton
| Decision Date | 07 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 20-135-DLB |
| Parties | COLIN HAWKINS PLAINTIFF v. J. HELTON DEFENDANT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
Plaintiff Colin Hawkins is a federal inmate confined at the United States Penitentiary (“USP”)-Beaumont in Beaumont Texas. Proceeding without an attorney, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging claims against Defendant J. Helton for violations of Plaintiff's Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights. (Doc. # 9).[1] Defendant, by counsel, has filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. (Doc. # 18). Plaintiff has filed a response (Doc. # 26) and Defendant has filed a reply. (Doc. # 27). Thus, this matter has been fully briefed and is ripe for review.
Plaintiff's amended complaint arises from an incident that occurred while Plaintiff was housed at USP-McCreary in Pine Knot, Kentucky. According to Plaintiff, he was involved in a fist fight with another inmate on November 14, 2018. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant (a Correctional Officer at USP-McCreary) responded to the fight, put Plaintiff in a chokehold, allowed the other inmate to punch Plaintiff in the face and head, repeatedly referred to Plaintiff using a racial slur, and continued to choke Plaintiff until Plaintiff lost consciousness. (Doc. # 9). As a result of the incident, Plaintiff claims that he has experienced mental, psychological, and emotional distress “due to the racial slurs and the near death experience and was also physically injured - resulting in pain and suffering due to the force applied on my fractured spine.” (Doc. # 9 at 2-3).
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff brings claims against Defendant for violations of his Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights. (Id. at 4). Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages in the amount of $100, 000.00 and punitive damages in the amount of $100, 000.00. (Id. at 8).
In his motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, motion for summary judgment, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's constitutional claims against him are barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations. (Doc. # 18-1). In response, Plaintiff concedes that he became aware of his injuries on November 14, 2018 (the date of the incident). However, Plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations did not begin to run on his claim until June 21, 2019, the date that he claims that the Bureau of Prisons' (“BOP”) response to his Central Officer Administrative Remedy Appeal was delivered to him, and thus his original complaint filed in this case was timely. (Doc. # 26). However, Plaintiff's argument is without merit and his complaint will be dismissed as untimely.
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint. Gardner v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 567 Fed.Appx. 362, 364 (6th Cir. 2014). When addressing a motion to dismiss, the Court views the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accepts as true all “well-pleaded facts” in the complaint. D'Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d 378, 383 (6th Cir. 2014). Because Plaintiff is proceeding without the benefit of an attorney, the Court reads his complaint to include all fairly and reasonably inferred claims. Davis v. Prison Health Servs., 679 F.3d 433, 437-38 (6th Cir. 2012).
Generally speaking, because a Rule 12(b)(6) motion considers only the allegations in the complaint, such a motion “is an ‘inappropriate vehicle' for dismissing a claim based upon a statute of limitations.'” See Lutz v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 717 F.3d 459, 464 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Cataldo v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 F.3d 542, 547) (6th Cir. 2012)). However, “when ‘the allegations in the complaint affirmatively show that the claim is time-barred . . . dismissing the claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.'” Stein v. Regions Morgan Keegan Select High Income Fund, Inc., 821 F.3d 780, 786 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Cataldo, 676 F.3d at 547) (other citation omitted) (alterations in original). In such circumstances, if the defendant meets its initial burden to show that the statute of limitations has run, “then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish an exception to the statute of limitations.” Lutz, 717 F.3d at 464. See also Bishop v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 520 F.3d 516, 520 (6th Cir. 2008) (“When it affirmatively appears from the face of the complaint that the time for bringing the claim has passed, the plaintiff cannot ‘escape the statute by saying nothing.'”) (quoting Hoover v. Langston Equip. Assocs., Inc., 958 F.2d 742, 744 (6th Cir. 1992)) (other citation omitted).
Moreover, in this case, Defendant moves both to dismiss and for summary judgment, attaching and relying upon declarations extrinsic to the pleadings in support of his motion. (Doc. # 18). Thus, the Court may treat Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d); Wysocki v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 607 F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir. 2010). See also Ball v. Union Carbide Corp., 385 F.3d 713, 719 (6th Cir. 2004) ().
A motion under Rule 56 challenges the viability of another party's claim by asserting that at least one essential element of that claim is not supported by legally-sufficient evidence. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324-25 (1986). A party moving for summary judgment must establish that, even viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Loyd v. St. Joseph Mercy Oakland, 766 F.3d 580, 588 (6th Cir. 2014). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to “come forward with some probative evidence to support its claim.” Lansing Dairy, Inc. v. Espy, 39 F.3d 1339, 1347 (6th Cir. 1994).
However, in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the party opposing the motion may not “rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading, ” but must present affirmative evidence supporting his claims. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256-57 (1986). If the responding party's allegations are so clearly contradicted by the record that no reasonable jury could adopt them, the court need not accept them when determining whether summary judgment is warranted. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
Plaintiff's amended complaint must be dismissed as untimely. Plaintiff's claims are brought pursuant to Bivens, which held that an individual may “recover money damages for any injuries . . . suffered as a result of [federal] agents' violation of” his constitutional rights. Bivens 403 U.S. at 397. Because the remedy afforded in a Bivens action is entirely judge-made, there is no statutory limitations period. Instead, federal courts apply the most analogous statute of limitations from the state where the events occurred. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268-71 (1985). The events of Plaintiff's complaint occurred in Kentucky; therefore, Kentucky's one-year statute of limitations for asserting personal injuries applies. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.140(1)(a); Hornback v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Co. Gov't., 543 Fed.Appx. 499, 501 (6th Cir. 2013); Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811, 825 (6th Cir. 2003). Thus, Plaintiff was required to bring his constitutional Bivens claims within one year from the date on which his claim accrued. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.140(1)(a).
While state law provides which statute of limitations applies, federal law controls when a constitutional Bivens claim accrues. See LRL Props. v. Portage Metro Housing Auth., 55 F.3d 1097, 1107 (6th Cir. 1995); McCune v. City of Grand Rapids, 842 F.2d 903, 905 (6th Cir. 1988); Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir. 1984). Under federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows, or has reason to know, of the injury which forms the basis for the action. Friedman v. Estate of Presser, 929 F.2d 1151, 1159 (6th Cir. 1991). See also Estate of Abdullah ex rel. Carswell v. Arena, 601 Fed.Appx. 389, 393-94 (6th Cir. 2015) () (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 122 (1979)); McCune, 842 F.2d at 905 (citing Sevier, 742 F.2d at 272) (“A plaintiff has reason to know of his injury when he should have discovered it through the exercise of reasonable diligence.”).
Plaintiff does not dispute that he became aware of his injuries on November 14, 2018, the date of the incident alleged in his complaint. (Docs. # 9 at 3 and 26 at 1). Where, as here, the operative facts are not in dispute, the Court may determine as a matter of law whether the statute of limitations has expired. Highland Park Ass'n of Businesses & Enters. v. Abramson, 91 F.3d 143 (Table) (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Hall v. Musgrave, 517 F.2d 1163, 1164 (6th Cir.1975)). See also Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 232 (6th Cir. 2007). Because Plaintiff became aware of his injuries on November 14, 2018, his claims accrued (and the statute of limitations with respect to his claims began running) on that date. Thus, Plaintiff had one year from that date - or until November 14, 2019 - to file his complaint....
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