Hawkins v. Johanns, 4:98CV3246.
| Decision Date | 31 March 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:98CV3246.,4:98CV3246. |
| Citation | 88 F.Supp.2d 1027 |
| Parties | Irwin E. HAWKINS, Teresa M. Wondercheck, Zane L. Wondercheck, Jerry R. Nicholls, Thomas P. Kappas, and Paul J. Simmons, Plaintiffs, v. Michael JOHANNS, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Nebraska, Donald B. Stenberg, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Nebraska, and Douglas D. Christensen, in his official capacity as Commissioner of Education for the State of Nebraska, Defendants, and Greater Nebraska Schools Association, Amicus Curiae. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska |
John F. Recknor, Recknor & Associates, Lincoln, NE, for Plaintiffs.
Charlotte R. Koranda, Attorney General's Office, Lincoln, NE, for Defendants.
James B. Gessford, Jeanette L. Stull, Perry, Guthery Law Firm, Lincoln, NE, for Amicus Curiae.
Are Nebraska voters, who reside in elementary-only school districts, denied equal protection of the laws because their school districts have less power than school districts that educate high school students or students from kindergarten through high school (K-12)? Similarly, are Nebraska voters, who reside in elementary-only school districts, denied equal protection of the laws because their school districts are controlled for some purposes by other school districts that educate high school students or K-12 students? Applying a "rational basis" level of scrutiny, I find no violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Pursuant to Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the reasons for my decision are set forth below.
I. BACKGROUND
This complex case was tried on stipulated facts. (Ex. PL-1.) In addition to the stipulated facts, exhibits, including thousands of pages of legislative history, were also received in evidence.
Like many other states, Nebraska has struggled with how to pay the education costs for public school students. Historically dependent upon local property taxes to fund the "common schools," but concerned with high taxes, tax equalization, education equity and local control, the Nebraska legislature began to overhaul its educational system. In particular, Nebraska redesigned its taxing structure for education hoping to lower, or at least control, local property taxes. As a result, State aid to local education increased.
This case challenges certain Nebraska laws that were enacted in 1996 and thereafter. The suit seeks injunctive and declaratory relief only. The six plaintiffs are voters in elementary-only school districts. The defendants are the Nebraska governor, the attorney general, and the commissioner of education.
The plaintiffs claim that they are denied equal protection of the laws. They have conceded that their challenge to the Nebraska statutes is a facial, and not an applied challenge. (Transcript of trial (hereinafter "Trial Tr.") at 23.)
The plaintiffs allege that they are treated differently because their school districts lack the same powers as other school districts. Specifically, they claim that their Class I school districts, and hence the voters in those districts, are controlled by other school districts, and thus other voters, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The plaintiffs claim that these differences in treatment are not rational and are therefore discriminatory, although they do not claim that the discrimination is founded upon an invidious premise such as race or religion. The plaintiffs also claim that because these differences in treatment impact their voting rights, I must employ strict scrutiny when evaluating their suit.
Specifically, the plaintiffs complain about four areas of dissimilarity. (Transcript of telephone conference, February 17, 2000 (hereinafter Tr. 2) at 6-7.) Those areas are: (1) the relative inability to set their own school budgets and the relative inability to exceed the general fund budget authority once it is established; (2) the relative inability to set or exceed tax levies; (3) the relative inability to authorize and spend special building fund monies; (4) the relative inability to merge, dissolve or reorganize.
In Nebraska, all public schools are within "a school district." A "school district" is "the territory under the jurisdiction of a single school board, which is the governing body of the school district." (Ex. PL-1 (Stipulation of Facts) at ¶ 1.) See Neb.Rev. Stat. Ann. § 79-101(1) (Lexis 1999 Supp.) (defining "school district"). With certain exceptions, among those being the exceptions challenged here, all school boards have "the same general duties and responsibilities." (Ex. PL-1 at ¶ 8.)
Nebraska school districts are classified by whether they educate elementary-age children only (Class I), children in grades K-12 (Classes II-V), high school students only or high school students plus students in grades 7 through 8 (Class VI). Neb. Rev.Stat. Ann. § 79-102 (Lexis 1999 Supp.). The primary difference between Class II through V school districts is the number of inhabitants within the school district. Id.
Class I school districts are typically located in rural areas. Some regions served by Class I school districts are very remote. Other Class I districts are near larger towns or cities. There are over 300 Class I districts. (Ex. 26 at 5038.) About 150 of those districts educate ten or fewer students. (Id.)
Despite the association between districts, the plaintiffs are not residents of the districts that allegedly have de facto control over their Class I districts. That is, the plaintiffs are non-residents of the districts allegedly favored by the challenged statutes.
For each plaintiff, the following shows his or her Class I district; the "primary high school [district]"1 for the plaintiff's Class I district (followed by a notation as to that district's classification, e.g., II or III); the district(s) that the plaintiff's Class I district is "affiliated" with or a "part of"(followed by a notation as to that district's classification, e.g., II or III); and where the plaintiff lives in relation to the other district(s) with which his or her Class I district is associated (bold print indicating the district with which the plaintiff is associated):
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