Hawkins v. Justin

• Decision Date: 22 September 1981
• Docket Number: Docket No. 51445
• Citation: 311 N.W.2d 465,109 Mich.App. 743
• Parties: Lonnie HAWKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James M. JUSTIN, Defendant-Appellee. 109 Mich.App. 743, 311 N.W.2d 465
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 465

311 N.W.2d 465

Lonnie HAWKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James M. JUSTIN, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 51445.

109 Mich.App. 743, 311 N.W.2d 465

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Sept. 22, 1981.

Released for Publication Nov. 4, 1981.

[109 MICHAPP 744] William H. Van Duzer, Birmingham, and James F. Van Dam, Lansing, for plaintiff-appellant.

Stanton, Bullen, Nelson, Moilanen & Klaasen, P. C., Jackson, for defendant-appellee.

Before DANHOF, C. J., and CAVANAGH and FREEMAN ^*, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff, Lonnie Hawkins, testified as a witness in a criminal trial held on January 26, 1976. He was at that time and still is incarcerated at Southern Michigan Prison. On May 18, 1976, defendant, James M. Justin, who was an [109 MICHAPP 745] assistant prosecutor for Jackson County at that time, wrote a letter to the warden of Southern Michigan Prison in which he stated that the plaintiff appeared to have actively committed perjury during his testimony at trial.

This letter was placed in plaintiff's prison file and, on October 4, 1978, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, M.C.L. § 15.231 et seq.; M.S.A. § 4.1801(1) et seq., plaintiff petitioned to examine his file. On October 3, 1979 (approximately one month after plaintiff had sought a retraction from defendant), plaintiff filed a libel action against defendant based on the letter that defendant wrote to the warden.

Following a hearing, the trial court entered accelerated judgment in favor of the defendant based upon two findings pertinent to this appeal: (1) that the one year statute of limitations applicable to libel actions had run and barred plaintiff's suit (M.C.L. § 600.5805(7); M.S.A. § 27A.5805(7) (as amended by 1978 P.A. 495), M.C.L. § 600.5827; M.S.A. § 27A.5827), and (2) that M.C.L. § 600.5851; M.S.A. § 27A.5851, which tolls the statute of limitations for incarcerated persons, constituted a denial of equal protection and thus was unconstitutional. This Court granted plaintiff's delayed application for leave to appeal.

We have consolidated the several issues stated by the parties into the following question: Did the trial court err in ruling that the tolling provision of M.C.L. § 600.5851; M.S.A. § 27A.5851, which extends the limitations period for persons who are incarcerated when a cause of action accrues, was unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection and thus did not prevent the statute of limitations from running against plaintiff in this libel action?

There is no dispute that this libel action is [109 MICHAPP 746] governed by a one-year statute of limitations, M.C.L. § 600.5805(7); M.S.A. § 27A.5805(7). The period of limitations runs from the time the claim accrues which in the case of libel is from the time of publication even though the person defamed has no knowledge thereof until sometime afterwards. M.C.L. § 600.5827; M.S.A. § 27A.5827. Grist v. The Upjohn Co., 1 Mich.App. 72, 134 N.W.2d 358 (1965).

In the instant case, where publication occurred on May 18, 1976 (the day that the alleged libelous letter was written), the period of limitations began to run on that date and plaintiff's cause of action was barred by the statute on May 18, 1977. Therefore, unless some exception applied, plaintiff's failure to bring suit prior to May 18, 1977, barred his cause of action against defendant.

Plaintiff claims error in the trial court's refusal to apply M.C.L. § 600.5851; M.S.A. § 27A.5851, a statutory provision which tolls the statute of limitations in favor of persons imprisoned at the time of the accrual of their cause of action. The basis for the trial court's refusal to apply this statute was its finding that the statute was unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection. The statute provides in pertinent part:

"(1) If the person first entitled to make an entry or bring an action is under 18 years of age, insane or imprisoned at the time his claim accrues, he or those claiming under him shall have 1 year after his disability is removed through death or otherwise, to make the entry or bring the action although the period of limitations has run. This section does not lessen the time provided in section 5852.

"(3) To be deemed a disability, the infancy, insanity or imprisonment must exist at the time the claim accrues. If it comes into existence after the claim has [109 MICHAPP 747] accrued it shall not be recognized under this section for the purpose of modifying the period of limitations."

The scope of judicial review of equal protection challenges to socioeconomic legislation was stated in O'Brien v. Hazelet & Erdal, 410 Mich. 1, 13, 299 N.W.2d 336 (1980), as follows:

"Under traditional equal protection analysis, a legislative classification must be sustained, if the classification itself is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest." (Quoting Shavers v. Attorney General, 402 Mich. 554, 612-613, 267 N.W.2d 72 (1978).)

We first must identify the governmental interest underlying this challenged statute and the objective which this legislation sought to achieve. Our review persuades us that the purpose of the statute in question is to recognize that persons in prison are under a disability in that their freedom has been restricted and their access to the judicial process has been impaired, and to provide such persons with additional time to assert their legal rights. There is no question that the Legislature had the power to enact this statute and determine the conditions under which a right may accrue and the period in which a right may be asserted. O'Brien, supra.

Defendant correctly argues that prisoners today are generally less isolated and less restricted than they were historically. Certainly the increased right to counsel, the right to have transcripts of trial records, and the access to law libraries have rendered prisoners much less isolated and restricted. This fact alone, however, does not render the statute unconstitutional. The Legislature still could have...